Mike Ely: And if a Showdown Comes in Nepal….?
Posted by Mike E on April 22, 2009
By Mike Ely
Jaroslav writes a critique of the revolutionaries in Nepal. He rejects the idea that they may be working to show large numbers of people, through living political practice, that there is a need for a new revolution:
“I am not saying [the people] had all the education they need for seizure of power, I’m saying that what UCPN(M) is doing now is not contributing to any further education. Either people get it & it is repetition, or they don’t & it’s not helping.
This is a remarkable claim. I want to use this remark as a jumping off point — for some comments that are not aimed at anyone personally. They are aimed at a mix of dogmatism and deep cynicism has (unfortunately) paralyzed too many people who sincerely want radical change.
The Riptides of Revolutionary Opportunities
Let’s just step back a second, and think about how revolutionaries come to know the mood of the people within an emerging revolutionary situation — when the people are not yet ready to strike and when exactly they become ready. Think of how carefully revolutionaries need to evaluate which sections of the people are needed for victory, and how the thinking of those sections are changing. Victory and defeat can hinge on this. In such moments the mass line has heightened importance — These are not the politics of small propaganda groups, but of moving millions of people into position to act (and fight).
The hard core needs to be ready (mentally) to move decisively– literally to die and kill for the next advance — and they need to be organized to act with great unity, energy and determination (something that, if you think about it, revolutionaries are not always able to do). The middle forces need to be swinging toward the revolution (or at least toward “friendly neutrality”). And the reactionary forces need to be “over a barrel” — exposed, divided, far from the high moral ground.
This is political combat of a particularly close kind — where society is becoming highly politicized and all kinds of awakening forces are scrambling to decide what to do.
One of the things that happened in Nepal over the last few years, is that the focus of the revolutionary struggle (the monarchy) was overthrown — and a series of changes and political processes put into place. There was a tremendous (even giddy) air of expectation and hope — that these processes would create a new Nepal. And while there was widespread understanding that the Maoist-led peoples war had played a tremendous role in toppling the king — that does not automatically mean that the people are ready to launch a new potentially difficult civil war — in the real world, people don’t support initiating civil war, until they become convinced that it is absolutely necessary to move forward on their most heartfelt needs and demands– i.e. until they have a sense that a stalemate has emerged, that the die-hards are determined to prevent progress, that the reactionaries will not bend to pressure, that sinisister forces are preparing some deadly counterrevolutionary stroke that may shift events in a horrific direction….
And in every revolution there have come such intense periods, where the revolution has gathered a significant force, but for actual victory (and for a chance of stabile political power after victory) they need to win over and lead sections beyond their core — sections of people who were previously beyond their reach, people not naturally sympathetic to the communists’ core ideologies and long range goals.
This is often difficult. The German Communist Party did not succeed in doing that (in the 1920s and 30s) and was trapped in a kind of political ghetto with millions of supporters but an frustrating inability to form broader alliances for the defeat of Hitler and the seizure of power.
Another example: I won’t detail the complex efforts of Lenin and his party between April and October of 1917 — but they started in a situation where “everyone” supported the bourgeois Provisional Government that had replaced the Tsar in February…. and it took a series of shocking events and the active exposure of this government’s determination to continue Russia’s participation in World War 1 to turn the people against it.
And, it has to be said that the process was not just a matter of winning over middle forces to the need for a second revolution — it was also a process of winning over the communist party itself to that new leap. When Lenin arrived in Petrograd (in April 1917) the communist leadership in the city had adopted a public position of “critical support” for the very government that Lenin intended to overthrow. When Lenin announced he would plan a second revolution — his own second-tier leadership literally questioned his sanity and his grasp of the situation — and publicly distanced themselves from those views. On the eve of the insurrection, Lenin faced a revolt on his own central committee — with two prominent Bolsheviks even denounced plans for the October insurrection in public (and warning the reactionaries of what was coming).
So there was a very concrete political process in which the revolutionary forces helped expose the nature of very specific, and very new political arrangements (centered on the Provisional government) which were ruling in the name of democracy and the anti-Tsarist February revolution. And they hammered on the three main points “Bread, Peace and Land” — which represented the most urgent demands of the people, and which (it came to be understood) the people could only get by overthrowing the Provisional government under communist leadership.
In China, the people emerged from World War 2 (and the occupation by Japan) quite devastated and exhausted — and the onus of launching a new, second civil war had to be put clearly on the reactionaries and their foreign backers. And so Mao went through a protracted process of negotiations for coalition government. And here too, this was not just for the “education” of the more backward — but also to consolidate his own party (and the larger progressive world opinion) behind an understanding of why a new war (against the reactionary nationalist government) was needed and just.
There is no formula for this kind of approach to the actual seizure of power. It is described as an art — and involves manipulating very specific and rapidly changing dynamics. It requires an intimate understanding of the “mood of the people” — not just in general… but the specific moods of different sections of the people, the soldiers of the other side, the spirit of the communists themselves, the relations between reactionaries and their social base and so on. It is not just a matter of “educating” people in some pedagogic fashion — but of creatively working to create a fighting mood among the people (around your organized core), and working to put the enemy in a position of isolation, confusion and internal disarray.
If you think seriously about what such situations are like, if you have a sense of the historical nature of such transitions to the final “coup de grace” of revolution — then you will get a sense of how wrong it would be to think you can sit a world away and judge the effectiveness of tactics seen and unseen.
What It Means to Support a Revolution
We should be clear on what we know, and what we don’t.
And one thing we know is that this revolutionary cause in Nepal is just. It has drawn in millions of people. Ith as built itself an army. It has captured the imagination of the youth. It has embodied the hopes of some of the earth’s most impoverished and isolated people. And this is the first time this generation has even SEEN such problems of communist revolution played out in real life.
There is a living revolution going on here — in all its complexity, mystery and unpredictability.
And we should know that we need to take a clear political stand of support for this.
Sure we will “wait and see” in one sense — in the sense that everyone “waits and sees” how great events turn out — including their direct participants.
But in another sense, it would be wrong (and I’m tempted to say a criminal betrayal of internationalism) to SIT BACK while we “wait and see.”
Here again I need to quote Jaroslav, who writes:
“In fact this uncertainty is extremely important to note for what it is. Because of uncertainty about their positive progress, we cannot say that what they are doing is a good example or not. Therefore I especially disagree with any calls to ‘learn from Nepal’ or the like. Also, after so many fake ‘revolutionary’ organisations in history, I think the burden of proof lies with the revolutionary, not with the skeptic observer.”
This is just wrong on every level.
First we will learn from Nepal no matter how it turns out. And I think (on a deeper ideological level) that we need a worldview that is prepared to learn from all kinds of events and people. And, let’s not forget: There is a terrible legacy that thinks “learning” is a “one to many” process where “we preach and you listen.”
There is a tremendous amount to learn from living revolutions — and this discussion is one sign of that. This is true even when they lose (which is often the outcome). The Nepalis talk about learning from Peru and Nicaragua — and they are right.
Again: A whole generation has never seen such a revolutionary process before — so in many ways, many sincere revolutionaries no real idea how to look at and evaluate what might be going on — and have little sense of how communists should act when a precious revolution actually emerges.
As for this argument that Nepali revolutionaries somehow have a “burden of proof” (that they owe TO US?!) Well it is rather startling. Is our role really to play “skeptical observer” when people fight and die making revolution? No.
Here is a place where (with sacrifice and consciousness) millions of people have made communism and revolution a living political question. The revolutionaries and the oppressed of Nepal now have the “burden” of finding their way to revolution and socialism — through incredible obstacles.
And shouldn’t we be asking what “burden” WE have?
And really, we have seen here on our site, examples of the view that revolution is really unlikely. That they are all bourgeois anyway. That there is nothing but betrayal and capitalism, so why get worked up about any of it?
This is the result of some long difficult decades — but it is a view that does not reflect reality or a communist understanding of society. And there is even a view that says “well, I want to support revolutionaries, but only once its clear they are on the right path and that they are going to win.”
With that logic, there will be no internationalism until after-the-fact — which means no internationalism at all. Imagine if the revolutionaries of the 1960s had adopted that approach to the Vietnamese revolution?
When the Paris Commune broke out, Marx had all kinds of questions and concerns about strategic and tactical decisions being made in Paris…. but he also understood that the world was seeing its first revolutionary communist attempt at power, and he responded with all the partisan energy that such a moment decided. It was the only revolution of its kind for Marx’s generation — these were a few months that came and went quickly, but left everything changed.
Let’s confront the reality: A very destructive dogmatism has worked to demobilize revolutionaries in the U.S. And it is a dogmatism that is linked to a deep pessimistic mood of failure about the chances for revolution. And meanwhile a depressed rightism has led other sections of activists to assume that revolution isn’t even on the radar screen of our times.
It is as if the whole world now has a “burden of proof” to show some “skeptical observers” that it is not just a big pile of shit.
And this dogmatism is not just a matter of a few recent “letters” calling the Nepalis “revisionists” — it is a matter of years of training in very mechanical and idealist thinking, where communism has been severed from any sense of living people and living politics. And one of the hallmarks of this line is a very distorted and mistaken use of a famous Lenin quote:
““There is one, and only one, kind of real internationalism, and that is — working whole-heartedly for the development of the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in one’s own country, and supporting (by propaganda, sympathy, and material aid) this struggle, this, and only this, line, in every country without exception.”
We have here a reduction of theory and politics to a matter of mere formulas (snatched out of context). And this particular misuse has encouraged a narrowness toward the world’s revolutions that has become a defacto jettisoning of internationalism. An absense of very basic solidarity. A deadening of any spirit of celebration.
Internationalism was once a proud hallmark of revolutionaries here in the U.S. The revolutionary movement in the U.S. was literally born and then reborn in connection with international events (the russian revolution, the war in vietnam, the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles in Africa, and so on). And to see revolutionaries and communists made passive, suspicious, incurious, and crudely dismissive in their reactions to international events is truly shocking and intolerable.
We need to turn this around. We need to fight through these line struggles with some energy and speed. We need to understand (clearly) the difference between supporting a living revolution and endorsing every tactic of distant revolutionaries. We need to really understand that something remarkable is unfolding in south Asia (both India and Nepal) that radical and progressive people in the U.S. need to know about — and quickly. And those of us who are freeing ourselves from this deadening pessimism and dogmatism need to hook up and get to work.
I don’t know what will happen in Nepal — but there is a chance (a chance!) that a showdown may be brewing between the Maoists and the Army. If that is so, if Nepal is about to get kicked into the headlines over the summer, and if the revolutionaries enter a life and death struggle — then what are we prepared to do? And what do we need to do now, to be prepared when the big events hit?
To be clear, I am not predicting a specific showdown in Nepal. I do not know what will come now. I do not know what is happening behind the scenes. I don’t know how well the advocates of revolution are doing in their struggle with the advocates of caution. And I don’t expect the Nepali revolutionaries to explain themselves to us in advance.
If there are people who just want to passively “wait and see” — then fine, let them do that — and perhaps they will at least agree not to snipe at every sign of our own action and life.
But mainly, i am saying that the rest of us have a responsibility to act with some energy. So we need to be preparing (with materials, networks, common understandings, plans, articulate explanations, etc.) to act. We were not that active in the days of last year’s Constituent Assembly election — when we could have reached many new forces. We blew that opening.
We may have new opportunities ahead to speak about communist revolution to far wider audiences than we have long seen. Will we be ready this time?
Tell No Lies said
Right fracking on! Thank you so much for this Mike.
Its so important to understand that this dogmatism and cynicism among people who themseleves sincerely want revolution is not an individual personal faioling, but one of the effects of the long period of retreat of peoples struggles that we appear to be coming out of. Jaroslav’s comments clearly speak for many and we need to struggle patiently with people to get over this legacy of defeat and retreat.
At the same time we can’t be too patient. Time is of the essence and we have work to do. One of the most effective ways we can fight against cynicisms and dogmatism among revolutionaries is to show concretely how the Nepalis have offerred us an opening to reach whole layers of people otherwise beyond our influence. Just as the Maobadi are confronted with the simultaneous tasks of struggling within their own ranks and winning over broad sections of the people to need for a second revolution, we have to both struggle against the cynicism and dogmatism of fellow revolutionaries and building support for the revolution in Nepal far beyond our presently small circles of conscious communists.
One thing that we need desperately is the ongoing production of analyses of events in Nepal that are far more popularly accessible than much of what presently appears here that is really more appropriate for discussions among already convinced revolutionaries. We need literature that graphically describes the horrendous conditions of life confronting the masses of the Nepali people, that explains the need for the first period of armed struggle, that brings people up to date on the events since the fall of the monarchy, and that exposes the reactionary and anti-democratic character of the NA and other forces arrayed against the Maoists, including of course the Indian and US ruling classes, their media and so on.
We also need to start building broader formations that can integrate forces that oppose Indian and US intervention, that are generally sympathetic with the aims of the revolution, but that may not themselves be ready to declare for revolution. That is to say we need to reach out and build sympathy and support for the revolution in Nepal among progressives and liberals who are likely to harbor a measure of skepticism about a self-identified Maoist led revolution.
And in our production of accessible analyses and in building these formations we can not be shy about seizing on some of the very qualities of the UCPN(M)’s politics that have been most controversial among communists — their decision to end the armed struggle, their declared opposition to a one-party state, and so on. Without pretending that the full implications of these decisions are yet known we should be unafraid to uphold the willingness of our Nepali comrades to try new things and should be attentive to precisely how that willingness resonates internationally and breaks down the broad cynicism out there about the possibility of liberation through revolution. Because just as these are the politics that enabled them to significantly broaden their base of popular support and triumph in the CA elections, they are key to winning broad sympathy internationally. The more people we can convince now of the good faith nature of these decisions the harder it will be down the road for the imperialists to demonize and isolate the Maoists when a showdown finally arrives.
Much of this is work that, frankly, should have been taking place for the past 15 years, but that because of the narrowness and dogmatism of the Maobadi’s chief supporters in the US, the RCP, did not happen. This failure, as much as the more recent complete abdication of any sense of internationalist obligations to the UPCN(M) at all, needs to be correctly analyzed to avoid repeating those errors.
NBAU said
There is a Nepal consulate in San Francisco. When should people meet there to show unity? Typically it’s 5pm after the day after an incident.
Skwisgaar Skwigelf said
This is an excellent piece.
Linda D. said
I am more than grateful to Mike for posting this, as well as grateful for the added and important comments by Tell No Lies, which comments also help point us in a concrete direction as to some of the things we need to be doing around Nepal (and India).
Personally my point of view, and my interpretation of revolutionary politics, is [I]fundamentally[/I], first and foremost, based on being an internationalist, but being an internationalist is obviously open to interpretation by many revolutionary forces worldwide. When the political and internal struggle in Nepal started to become more apparent, I was a bit shocked at the reaction amongst some on Kasama. I had been angry with the rcp for their silence up to that point, and well into 2009. But IMO, I hardly judge, nor try and understand what the lay of the land is by the rcp, nor have I done so in years.
My main question to our comrades was, what does the revolution in Nepal mean for both revolutionaries and a broader base both in the U.S. and internationally, and as internationalists? What is our role in this struggle that is lighting up the sky for the first time in decades? Even with, or perhaps understandably so and because of, all the contradictions our COMRADES in Nepal are facing. So back in October of 2008, I posed some of the following:
TNL:
Clearly TNL is speaking to our internationalist duties. Within that I would emphasize starting to build “broader formations that can integrate forces that oppose Indian and U.S. intervention”! That, IMO, can only aid the revolution in Nepal (and India), as well as our own struggle within the U.S. Here is a small example of some of the effects TNL was addressing: My oldest and dearest friend (for 50 years) has been a practicing Buddhist for 40 years. She lived in Nepal (as well as Afghanistan, India, etc.) for a long time. She is not a revolutionist, para nada, but an extremely progressive person. Needless to say, we have had our differences politically, but when I discovered Kasama, and finally more current information about Nepal, I immediately turned her onto K. and various articles, including the “4 Reasons.” She is the one who has enlightened me more about the economic situation there – resources, backward economy, life of the people, etc. And to this day, while she is not interested per se in lots of the dialogue on K., when it comes to Nepal and India, she continues to not only read everything that is posted, but sends the articles to her circle of friends around the world.
To take further remarks (and some very intense struggle) albeit out of context–sorry, over my original comments, one K. comrade said, “For those who want to argue for a more partisan stance, I think the onus is on them to show how the compromise in Nepal has not been raised to a principle by the leadership of the CPN(M).” And this person further said, “I believe that the opposing view sees our internationalist tasks from a mistaken perspective. Our main task is to make a revolution. Doing so would greatly strengthen revolutionary movements throughout the world. It would decisively end the cause of much suffering in the world. And it would be a significant theoretical and practical leap taking international communism into the completely unseen territory.”
I am not disputing the imperative for revolution in the U.S. But what we are witnesses to in Nepal is a [b]living[/b] revolution of our times, including the more than complex revolutionary process, and I can’t see how this is in contradiction to what our tasks need to be in the U.S. Do we really see ourselves as part of a rebirth of the ICM, or are we content to just debate amongst ourselves? Do we even have a handle on the contradictions (and various forces and pertinent struggles) we face in our own particular situation in the U.S.? I don’t think so.
Think Mike summed it up best:
Tell No Lies said
I’d just like to put in a word here in FAVOR of cheerleading. I think there is a way that we all demonstrate our critical distance by insisting that we aren’t in favor of cheerleading. But sometimes cheerleading is exactly what is called for. Right now I’d say that what the revolution in Nepal needs most for us is to be, in effect, yelling our heads off saying “Thats Our Team! Go Team” and trying to whip up as many people as possible to join us. Because what is cheerleading, after all, except the creation of public opinion.
This is not to say that we don’t also need to critically study what is happening in Nepal. That is really part of our responsibilty to make revolution in the US. But if we are serious about viewing revoluton as a global process and if our sense of internationalist responsibilities flows from that, our most pressing obligation right now is to build the broadest possible support in the US for the revolution in Nepal — cheerleading.
red road said
There is indeed great urgency to the taking up of internationalist tasks, especially in a time when the radicals and revolutionaries of yesteryear have been either further isolated through the influence of dogmatic subjective idealism, or drawn into narrow economism, obamamania, and creeping xenophobia.
Meanwhile, the struggles of people throughout the world are showing new life by the day, amidst very difficult conditions.
But the passionate call to this urgency does not require the distortion and disrespectful dismissal of those who disagree with Mike’s assessment of the situation.
You say: “I want to use this remark (Jaroslav’s) as a jumping off point — for some comments that are not aimed at anyone personally. They are aimed at a mix of dogmatism and deep cynicism has (unfortunately) paralyzed too many people who sincerely want radical change.” But the string of references you make, and the sweeping generalizations you draw make it clear that you lump together all critics of the strategic line(s) of Prachanda and Battarai.
In fact, there are many who are already involved in internationalist tasks, including many who believe that the masses of south Asia and especially Nepal continue to struggle and will not stop, but who also believe that this struggle continues despite the taking of a serious wrong turn by the leadership of the UCPNM.
By painting Prachanda today as parallel to Lenin in 1917 and Mao in 1945-49, you ignore that there has been a strategic turn over recent years, that the leadership there described it precisely in such terms! While you have presented it as only a tactic!
MikeE says, “you will get a sense of how wrong it would be to think you can sit a world away judge the effectiveness of tactics seen and unseen.”
You do not apply this same standard to your own endorsement of Prachanda’s leadership, judging from a world away. You urge all others to equivocate on their criticism. You show no respect for those revolutionary critics who have been studying these questions for years, not just the words, but have sought out those who know the situation intimately.
But you are unequivocal: “we need to take a clear political stand of support.”
You set the stage for blanket dismissal: “A very destructive dogmatism has worked to demobilize revolutionaries in the U.S. And it is a dogmatism that is linked to a deep pessimistic mood of failure about the chances for revolution. And meanwhile a depressed rightism has led other sections of activists to assume that revolution isn’t even on the radar screen of our times.” First, you group all critics of the Prachanda line together, dismiss their investigations and studies, attribute a set of bad attitudes to them (cynicism and pessimism), say that (and not serious study) is the reason for their criticism, thereby dismiss their arguments, and circle the wagons. If this is not a blanket dismissal of critics, then why not say who, in particular, your comments are aimed at?
You have set the equation which stops the discussion. And it is: Nepal=revolutionary people of Nepal=UCPNM=Prachanda. The meaning is unambiguous: if you support the revolution in Nepal, that means you must promote Prachanda and the revisionist strategy being employed. This is now the litmus test. Is this now the policy of Kasama?
Those who have some understanding of dialectics and contradictions and two-line struggle, will not accept conflating all the elements of that equation. Those who say the central task is cheerleading, will, apparently.
Now the litmus test for Kasama-style internationalism has been articulated–now the character of such internationalist work has been focused (Tell no lies: “in our production of accessible analyses and in building these formations we can not be shy about seizing on some of the very qualities of the UCPN(M)’s politics that have been most controversial among communists — their decision to end the armed struggle, their declared opposition to a one-party state, and so on.”), and now the limits of Kasaman engagement and excavation of issues has been clarified (MikeE: we ask that the critics “will at least agree not to snipe at every sign of our own action and life”).
Has the Kasama project considered all the effects of this?
Mike E said
Red Road writes:
It is helpful to engage this thought — because it is a misunderstanding. (And you state this misunderstanding throughout the piece).
No. This is not my view. i think we should give internationalist support to a revolutionary process in Nepal — and we should do it without equating that with support for particular leaders and policies. My view is precisely that we should not do the equation above.
And in fact, the line i am criticizing is the one that does this equation: i.e. they have “concerns” about statements by Bhattarai or Prachanda, and so they are unable to support the revolution.
In fact, take the example (which I have often given) of the support of the Vietnamese in their struggle for national independence — against the U.S. (1965-1976). We were able to support that without having to support every twist and turn of the Vietnamese Workers Party. (And in that case, unfortunately, as it later became clear, their overall direction was not a good one — after Ho Chi Minh’s death, the forces that rose to power were closely wedded to the politics and military methods of Soviet social-imperialism, and sharply inclined away from revolutionary politics).
I don’t equate prachanda with lenin or mao (in fact I don’t even mention him.) And that is because my argument does not hinge on an assessment of him (which I don’t feel capable of making).
Red road writes:
Where have you seen such endorsement? I have not made any comments in public about Prachanda’s views, or Prachanda Path. (Other than the passing criticism I have of tendencies to make policies in Nepal into “universal” features of modern Marxism.)
All of this is your invention and assumption — and I am grateful for a chance to clear it up.
I am discussing more particularly the complexity of politics and tactics as a revolution approaches the actual seizure of power…. and the difficulty of understanding the choices made, issues, controversies and errors from a world away.
There is a view that revolutionary processes are always clear (like a glass of water) where people say what they are going to do (in well spelled out MLM documents, for all to see) and then they go do it.
And in one sense the Nepalis have spelled out (for all to see) their intention to complete New Democratic revolution and take the socialist road. But (in fact and in the deed) these things become complicated — and the actual road has to be then carved (in real life) against real opponents, by gathering real supporters, and by working through huge and inevitable fractures in the revolutionary party.
I think we should support the revolution in Nepal — bring it to peoples attention. Speak about the condition of the people, the history of peoples war, the experience of rural commmunes, the changes in women’s lives, the overthrowof the monarchy, the stated goals of the movement, AND the complexities of this moment. And I think we can (and should) do all of that without some romanticized or mechanical support for every statement or move by the leading party. We can be supporters of revolution without putting our critical faculties on a shelf. We can support this revolution without dismissing the real criticisms that people raise (i.e. we should publish and discuss and evaluate those criticisms to the extent that we can.)
Rev Road writes:
Just to be clear, and to help clear up misconceptions, and to be able to discuss the real issues: this is exactly wrong.
And, just to put it sharply, why do you assume that I (personally) don’t have such strategic criticisms? At some point, I hope to get to that… to write, for example, my own views on Bhattarai’s essay on the state…. Or, to bring up a related issues, why would you assume that I don’t have some strategic criticism of the Indian Maoists?
My own study and understanding of these things is still rather primitive. i have decided not to speak on things until and unless I feel i have something helpful to say. Some of my thoughts are questions that guide my study and investigation. Some of my thoughts are pre-existing verdicts that I am eager to think through again — in light of these important new experiences.
But you seem to assume that I am not among those with strategic criticisms. Why?
So no, we should not “lump together” peoples views. We should consider them, study them, engage them. We should (and do) make distinctions.
But Rev Road complains when i take on a marked dogmatism that has paralyzed some communism and stripped them of internationalism. I write:
Revroad responds with this:
Where do I do any of that? I am calling out a dogmatism — but never say that everyone critiquing the Nepalis is infected with it. That is your invention. I don’t lump “all critics” together — but i do say that we are grappling with a legacy of dogmatism that has robbed quite a few people of their internationalism.
As for serious study etc. do I need to remind you that I (and other folks at Kasama) created the South Asia Revolution website where we post such strategic criticisms daily. And that posting, circulating, studying and engaging such works was a big part of the reason we created that site. I do think that many of the criticism raised (and here I am particularly talking about Ajit, for example, or the RCP) are examples of the dogmatism i’m discussing. And I plan to speak to some of the other criticisms in good time (precisely aftercareful study of the critiques and of the real world events.)
And, at the same time, through all of that, I believe, we should (as internationalists) build support for the people, with some urgency and energy, when they rise to make revolution and dream communist dreams. And that applies to the specific and remarkably unique revolutionary processes developing in India and Nepal.
Linda D. said
One of the points I was arguing with with someone over this question of internationalism was in reference to that person calling Nepal “a backwater” (not unlike remarks made by others that likened Nepal to a “swamp,” insignificant because of its size, semi-feudal economic structure, lack of resources, etc.)—or how much of this (Nepal) had little to do with “our” making rev. in the U.S. Also, this particular person was saying how as the economic crisis deepened (the worldwide economic crisis at that–my emphasis), the U.S. was unlikely to intervene in a country as insignificant as Nepal (even though Nepal is located bet. India and China).
Was recently reading a short story by Francisco Goldman written in 1992. Goldman is a novelist, journalist, professor (“at Fundación Nuevo Periodismo Iberoamericano, the journalism school for Latin-America created by Gabriel Garcia Márquez,”—Wikipedia), born in the U.S. to a Guatemalan mother and Jewish-“American” father. And while reading The Long Night of White Chickens couldn’t help but flash back to some of the former debate about Nepal.
Tell No Lies said
Thank you again Mike. My thoughts exactly. While I am excited by some elements in the Maobadi’s practices that others find worrisome that does not mean I don’t also share many of their worries. All sorts of things are possible. Maybe Prachanda’s line is wrong and will be defeated and other forces will carry forward the revolution. I really don’t know.
The key to this discussion really is first, our internationalist responsibilities to the Nepali revolutionary process as a whole (and not to any leader or faction) and second, our actual capacity to critically analyze the situation on the ground in all its complexity. This is NOT some blanket excuse for agnosticism, it is a concrete assessment of the (overall quite low) quality of our knowledge and the prospects for coming to verdicts based on that level of knowledge. It seems to be genuinely difficult for some people here to actually acknowledge how flimsy their/our knowledge is and to accept that this greatly reduces the value of coming to firm conclusions.
The view that we need to come to an assessment of the prevailing line in the UCPN(M) before we can go out and educate people about what is happening in Nepal, build solidarity organizations, and put pressure on US imperialism to stop meddling in Nepal is a cramped and sect-like view of things that abdicates internationalist responsibilties.
I look forward to learning a lot more about what is happening right now in Nepal and am entirely open to the possibility that some of the criticisms made here will be vindicated. But I have not been impressed so far with the empirical groundings of those criticisms, which seem to rely overly on interpreting official statements and cursory coverage of events in the capitalist media. And not being able to find much better sources myself I’ve come to the conclusions that our knowledge is, for now, too imperfect to attempt to come to the sorts of precise conclusions that some people feel the need for.
Jaroslav O. said
First some clarifications. These are not the heart of the matter & will not convince Mike E et al to my position, but still.
- As said by Red Road, not all critics of UCPN(M) should be lumped together. While it is totally fine to make a survey of positions out there, keep in mind differences despite general agreement. After all there’s many supporters of UCPN(M) recent behaviours, who have very different reasons, e.g. Kasama thinks it’s a revolution whereas the government of India hopes it will be a model for Naxalites to take the peaceful parliamentary road.
- On the ‘burden of proof’ thing. Mike baulks at the idea of UCPN(M) proving anything ‘TO US’. My talking of proving things, to be clear, is rhetorical & not an actual court case or Prachanda writing a letter to me personally or some such nonsense. I am simply saying, there’s a century (& more) of history which yes has inspiring stuff but also gives very very reasonable grounds for skepticism (call it cynicism if you want). If UCPN(M) wants support, or if Kasama wants UCPN(M) to have support, it is their responsibility to convince folks to support them. The irony should be apparent in that this thread of debate started around the question of UCPN(M) getting population’s support in Nepal.
- I have raised also the question of what UCPN(M) will do with a victory, I am skeptical that it will lead to socialism. This position is not because maybe they will achieve the victory by some means other than ‘surround the city from the countryside’, but because of what they’ve been putting out as their vision of socialism. That an at-least-progressive party could seize state power in a million different ways is easy to accept; that they will be willing & capable of revolutionising their society towards communism, this is a much higher standard that I for one am not just going to take the word of the party in question.
- On uncertainty & predictions. As in science, the judge of correctness is not author or other correlation but nature/reality. Do the hypotheses stand up to real application? Well UCPN(M) doesn’t have state power yet, so we don’t know the answer. But we cam look at the trends of how things have been going, & use the UCPN(M) theory as a guide to how they want things to go. Based on that we can talk about the degree of uncertainty. So although there is always uncertainty towards future events, there are different degrees. Anything is possible. Maybe Obama really will be about change, & 2 years from now USA will an ecotopia with equality for all nationalities. But that is a long shot, it is not within the realm of realistic probability & hence it is not just questionable but outright ignorant to be a ‘supporter’ of Obama. The degree of certainty around that is quite high, that Obama will not bring radical change. So not only should we not be active supporters, but we can be certain that exposing him as the imperialist he is is the right thing to do (not saying to not engage with those people who do support him etc, let’s not go on a tangent). Amongst the the two outcomes of ‘radical change’ or ‘no radical change’, one is hugely more likely than the other. A case with a high degree of uncertainty, on the other hand, has a smaller gap between the likelihoods of possible outcomes. For example global climate change. Climate is a highly complex & somewhat chaotic (NB this does not mean ‘random’) system, so in a sense ‘anything’ can happen & ‘maybe’ a huge catastrophe against humans will not happen. But the strength of certainty behind this ‘maybe’ is extremely small that it is highly ignorant to not act as if climate change must be actively averted. Therefore I am a supporter of efforts to do so (plus, those efforts will definitely not hurt anything). With regards to Nepal & whether to support the UCPN(M), the question is not whether state power will be seized. That does have a high degree of uncertainty, but in deciding our support we shouldn’t base it on cheering for the likely winner, that’s just another expression of ‘might makes right’ & is not at all what I am talking about. I am talking about the question of whether they will institute socialism — again, defined as society going in the direction of communism (stateless, classless, oppressionless free association of humanity) — as criterion for support. Based on all available information I think there is a high degree of uncertainty about this, therefore not only do I refrain from calling UCPN(M) ‘demagogues’ or ‘enemies’ or ‘betrayers’, I also refrain from calling their actions ‘a living [communist] revolution’. If we are simply picking sides from amongst the main forces in Nepal (I only say ‘main’ because I don’t know about what some small &/or clandestine groupings might think & nor would I pin any hopes on such possibly non-existent things), UCPN(M) is definitely the best. So with that here is my mantra again ‘Best’ does not mean ‘good’. I only support forces which are not just best but good, & which are good to a reasonably high degree of certainty.
- Mike E requests ‘not to snipe’. Many months ago during a similar thread, in which similar talks of ‘we can’t judge from afar’, I specifically asked if we should simply refrain from these open criticisms. No response was made. Apparently
- By ‘learn from Nepal’ I was calling back to Single Spark slogan (they are the ones who had put up Worker reprints on their website), who meant this as in learn from this as a positive example. Of course we should learn from everything, positive, negative, neutral, whatever. I was definitely unclear in my wording, but what I meant is that because of high degree of uncertainty we should not be taking lessons in the sense of ‘look at Nepal, that’s how to make revolution’. Maybe yes, maybe no, it is much too uncertain to draw conclusions about that right now.
* * *
I find it interesting that Mike et al are quick with the ‘dogmatism’ label, despite claiming elsewhere to want to do away with the practise of neat & tidy ‘-ism’ labeling. I agree that this is a counterproductive process. Let’s be consistent about it. It is easy to say ‘they’re thinking something new’ = ‘revisionism’ & ‘they’re thinking the same thing as before’ = ‘dogmatism’. Pointless & untrue in both directions.
These double standards are not OK. 1: Kasama core wants us outside Nepal to support UCPN(M) without much to go on, yet expect Nepali people to continue wavering until ‘stalemates’ & ‘sinisister forces are preparing some deadly counterrevolutionary stroke’ etc (yet also at the same time consider UCPN(M) to be enjoying huge support of the Nepali people). 2: Kasama core wants us to forego ism labeling, yet they can continue (albeit thankfully to a much lesser degree than typical ICM).
Ka Mike’s 9 Letters critique of RCPUSA & suggestions of much better ideas for how to go about making revolution are what initially drew me to this site. However the above article is nothing but a rerun of the same assertions, emotional pleas, & cries of urgency that are the trademark of RCPUSA. It’s not going to convince me.
Also, in reference to the letters between RCPUSA & [U]CPN(M), one comment that I loved from the Nepalis was their expressed ‘frustration’ at RCPUSA continuing to deign to teach ‘ABCs of Marxism’ rather than grapple with actual issues. Mike does a similar thing here with all these historical examples. They are all examples worth learning from, & can undoubtedly in some way be applied to understanding Nepal. However, this application is not actually carried. I hypothesise this is because of the very high degree of uncertainty I refer to, i.e. the Kasama refrain of ‘who are we to judge from afar’… since we don’t have enough infos to judge. This lack of infos itself means that Mike is forced to use historical allegory to support his position, although unfortunately the position itself does not have solid foundation, only such rhetorical side support.
Example, he says ‘Is our role really to play “skeptical observer” when people fight and die making revolution? No.’ On somewhat of a stickler note, people in Nepal at the moment are not fighting & dying. But the core issue here is are they really making a (communist) revolution? Now it is true that there is no universal imperative, in some abstract or moral sense, that folks must expend time & effort to convince me or anyone else that UCPN(M) is definitely making communist revolution. But if they want UCPN(M) to be supported then is a quite logical requirement. You want us to support a ‘revolution’, well first convince us that it is a revolution in the first place.
Stop shooting the messenger. Surely I am not 100% correct in every word I type, but my main thing is that your position — UCPN(M) is leading a living communist revolution which we should support — is not convincing. You can either ignore this & go on your way, or convince me (& others). But getting all in a huff because I am not already supporting them, I don’t understand.
Why do you support them? In particular. Not why should one support a revolution. How is this a revolution, & why should one support this revolution? What sets UCPN(M)’s movement apart from others that are not given the same attention by Kasama? Other maoist-named struggles (like India, Philippines) are given attention but not as much — is the reason that they are not so close to seizing power? (BTW I think that’d be a very understandable reason.) And what about movements which are not maoist-named, like the Chávez’s Bolivarians in Venezuela to name one example of many possibilities? What about UCPN(M)’s movement is so special & so undoubtedly positive & deserving of support, that it is singled out & promoted like this by you?
Jaroslav O. said
BTW I posted above (comment #10) after seeing only up to comment #6, others were posted during my typing time.
Now having read the others, the point is made that Ka Mike et al support ‘a revolutionary process in Nepal’ & not necessarily UPCN(M) or Prachanda in particular. This is likened to Viet Nam, where the party was not having a great line but it was nonetheless a just struggle deserving of support.
Viet Nam was literally occupied by France & then USA; this is qualitatively different from what USA is doing &/or planning to do in Nepal nowadays. And again my question, what is special about Nepal in this regard? USA is meddling in many other countries to a larger degree, some of which have resistance movements with questionable leaderships.
As for supporting ‘the people’, well we should support the people of the whole world, including those in Nepal. The question is why you are picking Nepal & its UCPN(M)-led struggle to focus on.
As for history of PW & current existence of rural communes, we could even talk about China with that criteria. The percentage of villages which are collectively run is certainly higher in Nepal, but again what direction is this figure going in? Ups & downs are of course to be expected, but it is too uncertain to say ‘look at the rural communes, therefore Nepal’s movement is going towards socialism’. Also there are other collectivisation movements in the world which Kasama has not highlighted, like in Argentina & Spain. I am not saying that those are examples of living communist revolution by the way; again I ask what is special about Nepal that qualifies it in particular as ‘living communist revolution’ & in particular deserving support which if not given makes the non-supporter failing to meet internationalist duties?
Nil said
“And one thing we know is that this revolutionary cause in Nepal is just.”
How do we know this? I’m serious; I don’t dispute it, but neither do I know it. I’m confused.
Surely that it has attracted many supporters is not sufficient. Plenty of unjust causes do that.
I agree that most everything else in the essay follows if we indeed do know that the cause is just. I’m not clear on how we know that.
NBAU said
some people act as if everything the masses have created in Nepal have simply vanished. I’m not too familiar with dialectical materialism, but this doesn’t sound like a correct method.
Carl Davidson said
For once, some common ground. I agree with just about every point in MikeE’s original post. My praise may count against him among a few, but most here are more serious than that.
Nepal is far from being high on the priorities of average American workers seeking change. That doesn’t make it unimportant to us, the socialist left. In addition to educating ourselves and our contacts, we also have the task of finding, spotlighting and opposing any of the connections and obstacles placed in Nepal’s way by our own ruling class.
I don’t know how this will turn out either. But I wish them well, and they have my support.
Tell No Lies said
I think Carl’s support for Mike here is instructive in terms of the potential to build mass solidarity with the revolution in Nepal. Whatever people here think of his politics, Carl is something of a barometer for us of where a whole layer of progressives are at. Most of these folks aren’t watching Nepal particularly closely so there is a pressing need for us to do educational work amongst them right now.
Mike E said
Nil says candidly:
And I think his honest statement proves TNL’s point:
Also it has to be said:
Althusser talks about how, when people are trapped in an aging problematic they discover its limitations as answers start to accumulate to questions they haven’t thought to ask.
Well the signs of communist life are accumulating, but for ideological reasons even many leftists don’t notice. And this poses a number of very basic questions, which can’t be presumed to be “settled” questions:
* how relevant to building a revolutoinary movement in the U.S. is the experience of revolution in one of the worlds most backward countries? What is there to learn?
* can people in the U.S. even “relate” to a country like Nepal (so different, so remote)? This is not (after all) Zapatistas next door in Mexico…..
* what responsibilities do we actually have as people living in the U.S. — to popularize such a revolution, and to build awareness of the dangers of U.S. interventions? And related to that, what does it mean to be internationalist? To take the world as the basis of our perspective and work? And does it have any practical relevance compared to focusing on the economic crisis and the possibilities of struggle around its effects?
* what is the value of singling out a revolution just because it is led by the most radical communists, and does this have importance over other struggles (that are closer and more accessible) like Venezuela etc.?
We need to engage these questions, as well as the very basic explanation of the “justice” of the Nepali cause.
My view is that if every college campus can have a committee around defending democratic and cultural rights in Tibet, there can also be committees supporting the most radical anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution in nearby Nepal.
As for our own work here:
We have engaged a kind of dogmatic argument against the Nepali revolution (i.e. that it is not a “real” revolution, that it doesn’t fit certain models, that its leaders have said things that grate a certain kind of purist mentality.) We have done this for months, from many sides. There is more to do…but…. this is an argument with a very very small sliver of the world (those influenced by a particular admixtures of dogmatism and cynicism).
Reallly we need to find the time (and create the space) to engage the much larger questions: which is the very relevance of communism, and the very nature of what is happening in both Nepal and India.
For many people, communist revolution is not on the radar screen, and so (ironically) they often don’t really notice when it arrives on the radar screen.
Dealing with this, and with the broader radical argument wondering whether rev is possible, will be far more rewarding that getting trapped in a permanent engagement about whether this revolution violates this or that principle (drawn mechanically) from Marx’s Gotha program or Lenin’s State and Revolution.
zerohour said
Jaroslav -
“With regards to Nepal & whether to support the UCPN(M), the question is not whether state power will be seized. That does have a high degree of uncertainty, but in deciding our support we shouldn’t base it on cheering for the likely winner, that’s just another expression of ‘might makes right’ & is not at all what I am talking about. I am talking about the question of whether they will institute socialism — again, defined as society going in the direction of communism (stateless, classless, oppressionless free association of humanity) — as criterion for support. Based on all available information I think there is a high degree of uncertainty about this, therefore not only do I refrain from calling UCPN(M) ‘demagogues’ or ‘enemies’ or ‘betrayers’, I also refrain from calling their actions ‘a living [communist] revolution’.”
“I only support forces which are not just best but good, & which are good to a reasonably high degree of certainty.”
I have to say, I agree with Zizek’s take on Lenin here. He argued that Lenin’s greatness is that he fought for making the revolution against the Second International’s notion of the “objective laws of history”, he was not afraid of the uncertainty seeing it as an opportunity to create a new reality. Those who wait for metaphysical “ideal” conditions won’t make revolutions, nor will those who demand straight line progress.
Since you invoke science, I will continue on that track. Part of the practice of science is to establish a criteria for evidence. What is yours? “A reasonably high degree of certainty.” And what would that look like? At what point would you consider a society to be definitively headed towards communism? After toppling a state? Instituting communes? After the reversals in the USSR and PRC, I think it’s not accurate to say that one can ascertain ahead of time when a revolutionary advance has reached an intractable tipping point. Aren’t you then basically saying that your criteria is based on how closely a revolution follows the same trajectory as past revolutions? An impossible standard to meet since no two revolutions have actually taken the same forms.
Revolutions are experimental and therefore highly uncertain at all stages, it’s just a matter of which priorities they will have to confront, with what resources. Scientifically, when talking about experiments, intent counts. That is, an experiment designed to produce a result is going to go farther than one that is not. Communism isn’t going to happen by accident. For over a decade, the CPN[M] has expressed their communist aims openly. This marks them off from other revolutionary forces, important as they may be. Other posters have recounted their achievements in the last couple of years, so I won’t go into them here, but we should think through what it means to provide support in a time of uncertainty. None of us know how this will turn out. Much depends on the status of struggles within the Party, between the UCPN [M] and the other parties, and the degree of popular hegemony. Even as you acknowledge that previous revolutions have had setbacks, you don’t situate yourself in those moments. After a revolution it’s easy to look back at the different twists and turns and discern a seemingly inevitable logic leading directly to the seizure of power. We now have one going on in real time. Do you only provide support when things look like they’re going forward, then withdraw when the situation becomes murky, waiting for the right moment to give support again?
The question for internationalists is: what role must we play in helping revolutions advance? Sitting back and waiting for more evidence, when quite a good deal of it already exists, is a refusal to even consider the question. Fundamentally it’s not about evidence, but about outlook. If you think it’s important for a communist revolution to succeed in the world, then you find ways to help move that forward, and that includes actively seeking information, not waiting for other people to prove things to you. Revolution is neither a dinner party, nor an academic paper.
One more thing about the way science works – it’s often by pushing ahead into the seemingly “impossible” and unknown that we find out what is really possible, instead of confusing reality with our own subjective limitations. The three laws of thermodynamics were not formulated by Newton in a lab, extrapolating from known phenomena. Rather, they were discovered in the process of trying to invent perpetual motion machines [the analogy here is not that making revolution is an unattainable goal, but the important dialectic of persistence and risk]. The latter didn’t succeed, but the experimental process yielded what is now a cornerstone of modern physics. This would never have happened if scientists gave up at every stumbling block.
I agree with you that we could use more coverage of revolutionary struggles and practices from around the globe, and if you have anything to share in this regard, please pass it on to us.
red road said
Internationalism is rooted in the recognition that humanity is one, and that the sufferings the people face have common roots; and that our humanity determines that we will “get each others back” wherever we may be—in immediate ways, and from generation to generation. We have a common cause of liberation, not just from the obstacles we each confront in local circumstances, but from the open and hidden global systems of denigration and oppression. We are deeply indebted to those who gathered themselves together with this understanding and who began to build the road forward. Generations have gained powerful experience in uniting and struggling, thinking and fighting, learning by doing and doing with the understandings gained directly and from the knowledge and experience which our ancestors have relayed to us. Understandings do not arrive in neat packages, they arrive conflicted and contradictory. Some understandings are drawn from temporary circumstances, and really don’t help elsewhere. Others have concentrated experience and investigation from many sources and over the stretch of many decades, so more solid understandings have become principles because they are not temporary, they do not possess limited local application. Grasping these principles in a living way is not easy, and much work is involved in applying them to local situations.
Often, it must be said, the need for tools that serve the practical needs of alliance and circumstance pushes the wielders of such tools to either discard them, or simplify them beyond recognition. And so the immediate utility becomes the enemy of longer, more conclusive struggle to raise the plateau for generations ahead.
Internationalism aims to serve the process of the struggle against suffering, by having each others back, rendering assistance and sharing in the process of developing the understanding which leads forward, and recognizing that which does not. Comrades, whether side-by-side or across the globe, will spread the word of struggles everywhere, so the people’s forces will grow in capability, in both the numerical sense, as well as the intellectual, cultural, combat-readiness, and in re-shaping the world sense.
Internationalism is a life shaping responsibility. We must promote and educate, we must also study, analyze, compare, expose and oppose the open faces of our enemies, but also criticize, challenge, debate, and denounce the hidden faces of the enemy as sicknesses which will destroy our struggle, despite the superficial appearance of vitality and health. Sometimes this means we jeopardize friendships and put our vaunted (and often illusory) reputations and egos on the line, but nevertheless the urgency of our responsibility is clear. It all goes together—the actions that promote and connect and support the people’s struggles, educational programs on how different movements have handled different issues–and making sharp questions, challenges, criticisms, and exposures of false directions and of opportunist betrayals of the people’s interests. It is all part of what internationalism consists of, watching each others back and maximising each step that humanity makes. Holding back on any of this—not doing what we can, and not saying what we think and know—means not being comradely and honest with those on a difficult and dangerous road to liberation.
————————————————————-
There are many who are ready to take up internationalist tasks, including many who believe that the masses of south Asia and especially Nepal continue to struggle and will not stop, but who also believe that this struggle continues despite the taking of a serious wrong turn by the leadership of the UCPNM. This includes people who have been doing ongoing internationalist work on campuses, in communities, online, broadening and connecting the work of groups focused on particular issues or the struggles in particular sectors.
These include organizing anti-imperialist contingents at broader anti-war demonstrations, deepening that by organizing educational which link these things up; joining others in demonstrating at Indian consulates for the freedom of political prisoners. Or developing cultural projects including murals that popularize the struggles of the people of India and Nepal. Or other art projects which link the struggles of Palestinian people with oppressed people in the Americas. Developing materials which expose the Obama mythology, and which expose the notion of Afghanistan as the good war. Deepening the exposure of Western imperialist NGOism, and of “humanitarian imperialism” from the Philippines (where thousands of US troops are today) to the rapidly expanding AFRICOM. Exposing the UN occupation of Haiti. Taking on the genocide of the Tamils. Educating about the joint Obama/Zionist “boycott” of the World Conference Against Racism (Durban 2) in Geneva last week. Taking up the struggles of immigrants and raising the struggles of migrants everywhere, pointing to suffering and struggles of the huge numbers of contract laborers from Nepal, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia.
Such is not the work of cynics. It is definitely not enough, but those doing it have not been waiting. Again, it must be said: among those doing such work are many who are not at all infatuated with the course of the UCPN(M)–but that does not stop them from popularizing the history and ongoing struggles of the people of Nepal and of the problems they face, which includes the present strategic line.
Much more is needed in the weeks and months ahead, promoting internationalism:
• Promoting information about the suffering of peoples of South Asia in the “post-colonial” period and especially in the deepening worldwide crisis in the ways it hits this region.
• Concretize this in specific campaigns around anti-displacement movements, with emphasis on Nandigram as well as current sharp struggles;
• Joining the international campaign to free all political prisoners in the region, as well as oppose waves of repressive acts against the people such as Salwa Judum
• Bring to light the captive nations in the region—inside India, as well as Kashmir, the Tamil peoples, the indigenous people of Diego Garcia
• Educate on the continued dehumanizing conditions of Dalits, of women, of Adivasis, of children.
• Expose the collaboration of British, US, and Israeli forces with the reactionary militaries in the region. The further extensions of war into Afghanistan and Pakistan and how this reshapes the entire region and the struggles within it.
• Exposure of the meddling of imperialism in the region, through such mechanisms as military aid and training, investments, World Bank and IMF, NGOism and conditional funding, counterinsurgency programs disguised as humanitarian and educational programs.
• Expose the various forms of oppressive rule in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, from Congress Party to reactionary Hindutvu to various revisionist “Communist” parties, including the special programs and campaigns against Muslims and against revolutionary Maoists.
• The role of the SEZ’s, of mining, and other forms of capitalist theft and imperial plunder. Including the history of Bhopal
• Highlight the various forms of popular resistance, and educate on the various strategies of revolutionary and oppressed nationalist movements in the region
• Popularize the history of the peoples struggles and revolutionary movements in the region
• Prepare the internationalist response for the event of outbreak of armed struggle over the army, or civil war or … because this may be the time when the masses can stop being spectators and may actually get on the stage again. So the tasks will be about mass education on the background and terms of the struggle, exposure and actions against Indian and US involvement. And not isolating the whole thing from the rest of the world
• Do all this through written materials, organized educationals, joint actions with activists focused on the region, college teach-ins, speaking tours with people from the region, guest op-ed pieces, demonstrations, and organizing fact-finding delegations.
• And carry forward the deepening of knowledge about, and debate and education on, the contending lines of struggle, not as a private matter, not as a secret, but as life-blood for the further development of eyes-wide-open internationalism.
Jaroslav O. said
Ka Zerohour thank you for your non-condescending response. Apparently I was not clear enough, as it is not my attempt to predict ‘tipping points’. When I am talking about things going in or away from the direction of communism, I am talking about their momentum in a certain direction, not whether they have enough momentum to get there. I hope I’m not accused of dogmatism for saying this but it seems like a lot of this revolves around the contradiction (or ‘interaction’, to use non-MLM terms) between theory & practise. Theory plays a key role in what I am uncertain about here, which is what kind of society is UCPN(M) fighting for. Not whether their current tactics will get them power to implement their plans for social change, but whether those changes would be the kind of revolutionary changes needed.
Ka Mike, you word it in a question, ‘what is the value of singling out a revolution just because it is led by the most radical communists’, but I take that to be your answer to why UCPN(M) movement is singled out for support, it is because they are ‘the most radical communists’. But that is a non-answer. What makes you say they are the most radical communists? And again, most radical, who cares, that’s a comparison. Why are they radical enough to help change humanity the way it needs to change? You took exception in another thread to Ka Frank describing CPI(Mao) as ‘blazing a new path for revolution in India’, yet claim this does not stop you from supporting India’s revolution. However you obviously do not support & promote CPI(Mao)’s every new theoretical contribution or twist in strategy as you do with UCPN(M). And I am not asking you to. But I’m trying to understand your different actions regarding the two forces which both claim to be ‘radical communists’ & both are ‘leading living revolutions’ (in ‘the 21st century’ no less…!), I’d like to know what is behind the discrepancy, what is convincing to that UCPN(M) is so cool. And I emphasise I’d like to know what is cool about their vision, not what is cooler about theirs compared to CPI(Mao) or somebody else.
Ka Red Road, that is a wonderful list of internationalist tasks there. At once it is a lot to take on, & also incomplete compared to all possibilities of what could be done. That is a great example of things we can do that would support the revolution regardless of UCPN(M) itself supporting revolution. From my perspective, I would not put UCPN(M) in the category of ‘various revisionist “Communist” parties’ to expose, though neither would I talk about their ‘blazing a new path’ etc. And we should be able to criticise SEZs no matter who does it, in fact criticising SEZs in Nepal should not even be taken as some roundabout attack on UCPN(M) or indication that we must be unrealistic foes of any compromise. As I said before, assuming UCPN(M) does have the best intentions etc, criticising SEZs will just keep them on their toes about the issue. By the way I think it’s correct to have supported return of Hongkong & Macao & Taiwan to PR China during Mao years. Not to paint Mao/CCP as traitor if he doesn’t enact that for whatever strategic reasons or capabilities, but after all letting those people live in socialism would be better for them so how is not a just demand? I thought we are supporting people ‘dreaming communist dreams’ etc?
red road said
For clarification, the red road statement said exactly what it means, nothing more or less:
Jaroslav said:
My reference was, frankly, to the CPI and CPM and the CPI(ML); the CPN(M) has not consolidated and continues to be in the midst of 2-line struggle, so I do not consider them to be the same as the openly revisionist parties in India. (The leading line, but not the party as a whole, is cause for deep concern).
Jaroslav:
My raising of the SEZ’s is focused on them in India, their role in massive peasant and indigenous displacement, and more generally as a key method of imperialist economics in present world conditions which has been trumpeted by revisionist forces in some places (like Vietnam, China and India) and by comprador nationalists in Latin America (maquiladoras and other forms). I am studying the development of SEZ’s in Nepal, but have not enough material to speak about that in any detail yet.
Jroslav:
I don’t think that anything here will keep the party on its toes, but we might be able to inject some sense of conflicting perspectives, difficult realities, and scientific method into a discussion (here in the US and to a limited degree elsewhere) that otherwise tends to cheers, blush, or rage.
Jaroslav O. said
On the first 2 points, I got that but it’s good to clarify anyway. I was saying something additional, not critiquing what you had said.
On the 3rd point, yes what’s on this blog is not keeping UCPN(M) on or off its toes. But if UCPN(M) does hear such criticism from some more influential source (however they’d want to evaluate the influentialness of a source), even if they are having sound tactics & strategy of compromise related to SEZs in the particular case, it would be helpful to them to be reminded nonetheless that it’s a bad thing & should not be allowed to become permanent. And I also agree with your comment on how it affects the discussion in US.
Mike E said
Red Road writes:
I would be very careful about putting the Communist Party of India (ML) in some bag as “revisionist” (let alone “openly revisionist.”) Perhaps I’m missing something, but you seem simply uninformed.
In fact the Communist Party of India (ML) is the name of the party that organized the Naxalbari uprising in 1968 (under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar). It was anything but non-revolutionary. After the suppression of that uprising, that party shattered — and many different currents and groupings continued to use that name. Some are largely local.
For example the current party called CPI (Maoist) drew considerable forces from a trend called Communist Party of India (ML) (Peoples War) — which was generally known as the Peoples War Group (PWG)
Similarly we have been discussing the Communist Party of India (ML) (Naxalbari) which is part of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement. If you are assuming they are somehow “openly revisionist” — I think you should explain why.
And one of the groups less oriented toward armed struggle is the Communist Party of India (ML) (Liberation). It is quite a different critter from the others mentioned.
In other words, I do not understand how RR could put the CPI(ML) in some revisionist category, without specifying which of the many groups you are talking about.
Mike E said
also this talk of the “parliamentary road” — let’s get into it.
* * * * * * *
Let’s first talk about unspoken political assumptions….
Are we to assume that any communist party that runs in elections is inherently non-revolutionary? Why? If that is your view, lay it out. does this apply for all time and all places? If it is true in India (with an old and hated system) must it be true in Nepal (where the people are often demanding elections and the monarchy was suppressing htem). If it is true in the U.S. (with a carefully-rigged two party system) is it also true in France or Norway (where far leftists have used elections to get on television and speak to millions)?
I remember that one of the first revolutionary speeches i ever heard was on French TV during the election of 1968 — where a far left candidate for office received (as part of the electoral process) free airtime each week to address “the electorate” — the speech, which I still remember, spoke in (what seemed then) clear and militant terms about the importance of the barricades and of developing the then-upsurge in France toward a revolutionary seizure of power.
If some electoral systems and moment allows such openings to conveying revolutionary ideas, is it wrong to do so?
And is it not the case that many revolutionary communist parties have used electoral arenas to promote revolutionary politics? Many examples come to mind, but certainly the KPD (Communist Party of Germany) in the 1920s and 30, the Bolshevik Party after 1905 (Lenin had to defeat the faction that opposed running in the Duma parliament — and wrote Empirio-Criticism as part of that line struggle), and of course the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) who used elections in the mid-nineties as their way to organize their uprising (and whose original base areas in Rokum and Rolpa were the places where they first won elections and then organized an armed seizure of local power.)
In the U.S., the revolutionary forces have generally not run in elections (and have generally never had enough size to even consider it) — though in the early days people like Bob Avakian and the Panthers’ Eldridge Cleaver got on the ballot.
Abstention has always seemed wise to me — given the weakness of revolutionary forces, given the “winner take all” nature of U.S. elections, given the structural impossibility of functioning as a stable “third party,” and given other factors particular to U.S. history… but does that mean that it is wrong everywhere and always?
* * * * * *
Now on a very different matter, lets talk about Nepal…and India….
Jaroslav writes about Nepal:
This is a real ‘WTF” remark that needs to be unravels.
Here, I won’t address the first half — the fact that there is a revolutionary movement has been growing and reaching for power in Nepal (since the initiation of peoples war). That issue has been discussed already from several sides. (And in passing, Jaroslav shouldn’t confuse what Mike Ely writes with what “Kasama thinks.”)
But the second half of Jaroslav’s statement demands some detailed comment, because of its utter confusion:
First, the Nepalis did not take any “peaceful parliamentary road.” They staged an insurrection in the mid 1990s, organized an army, seized power in local base areas and ran the old government out of vast stretches of the country. Waged ten years of war. Then on that basis they initiated a new process of outreach and countrywide political struggle intended to create a basis for their final seizure of power — still resting on their existing armed forces.
There is nothing essentially peaceful or parliamentary about any of this strategic thinking. Their whole politics has been based on a rejection of the parliamentary road (from the very beginning).
There are several other confusions here:
First, some people (in a very sloppy and uninformed way) sometimes equate the Constituent assembly with parliament. If so (let me be blunt) please start doing some homework.
Some think that running in ANY elections MUST be parliamentary — and aren’t even aware that the demand for a Constituent Assembly was formulated (over fifty years ago!) by communists in direct opposition to the Congress Party demands for a western style parliament.
In other words, when the other parties agreed to electing a Constituent Assembly it was a major (shocking) and bitterly fought CONCESSION to the front-rank quintessentially-communist demands of fifty years. and it was a step away from parliamentarism and a refutation of the right of parliament to decide the future of Nepal. And it represented a de-legitimization of the rotten Nepali parliamentary politics.
Further, while jaroslav claims to interpret the desires of the Indian ruling classes (based on what i wonder)… the fact is that the Nepali peoples war has played a huge role in shaking up and reenergizing the Indian revolutionary movement (not dampening it).
This has taken place on two levels:
First it has taken place on the level of line. There were numerous forces on the Indian left (including prominently the PWG and the MCC) who had stubbornly waged armed resistance to Indian feudalism since the 1960s. But they had not been able to form political base areas and had confined themselves to guerrilla zones. the difference between the two is significant: A political base are is a place where the revolutionary forces actually hold state power and have excluded the state authoritiy of the oppressors. a guerrilla zone is a place where armed revolutionary guerrillas contest the authorities for power (i.e. it is called “leopard spot” system, or a conditions where “we rule by night and they rule by day.”)
However there has developed a sense among sections of the Indian Naxalites that it was (in fact) impossible to proceed from guerrilla warfare to political base areas under current objective conditions. And so, the armed struggle in the zones of guerrilla activity had settled into a kind of routine — where the armed guerillas often operated as an adjunct of the demands of the local peasants, but where in some ways the sense of creating a new form of state power had faded considerably (over the decades).
the ability of the nepali maoists to create political power in Rukum and Rolpa was a lightening shock among the maoists of India — a real wakeup call.
And in a way not seen in decades it put the question of state power back on the agenda — and sharpened the ongoing line struggles over whether to rest content with guerrilla zones or to move energetically toward political base areas.
In other words, the Indian ruling class knows well that the advance in Nepal had a huge effect in India. Naturally, there also had to be revolutionary forces in India to seize on, and learn from the Nepali successes in waging peoples war.
And, relatedly, the Indian ruling class has a sharp sense that there is a tremendous danger in having a liberated revolutionary country just on the other side of their long porous northern border. It would represent a powerful material base area for the growing revolutinary forces in India.
That border was used by the Nepali guerillas to protect their leaders and their wounded from the attacks of Nepali government forces. And certainly the Indian government would inevitably have concern about such potential sanctuary emerging for their own domestic Naxalite insurgents.
* * * * * * *
I want to end by pointing out what the content of the Nepali criticism of the Indian Maoists has been. (Jaroslav implies that the Nepali Maoists have urged the Naxalites onto some “parliamentary road” — which is wrong on many levels.)
In the document from Basanta which we recently posted, there is a passage that can be read (and I believe should be seen) as encapsulating the Nepali criticism of the CPI(Maoist) — which is the main revolutionary Naxalite group in India.
I think this deserves a close read. My understanding is that their main critcisms is that the Indian Maoists allowed themselves to get tunnel vision, to get trapped in the most backward areas, and to put all their “eggs in one basket.” And more: that they had in some ways abdicated the national political stage, focusing only on the local demands of peasants, and not lighting the sky with their vision for the larger issues confronting India’s people. It is a call for working more in urban areas, for engaging more in broader united fronts, and so on (and for developing the armed struggle in those contexts).
Again, the argument of the Nepali Maoists have been anything but a call for a “peaceful parliamentary road” (not in nepal, and not in india)… but to literally be less economist in the way the armed struggle of the peasants is approached, and to have eyes on the larger questions of seizing power.
Finally, as the Nepali Maoist leadership was negotiating its tricky return to Nepal (from India), as they were transfering their forces (and funds and whatever), they held meetings with various decrepit Indian ruling class forces. The Indian press carried speculation that the Nepali Maoists were becoming a corrupt parliamentary party, and crowed that perhaps the Naxalites should follow suit. And as the Nepali Maoists maneuver to seize power (and work to make it difficult for the Indians to intervene) they have also made statements about not allowing their territory to become a base areas for attacks on their neighbors. (This was mainly made in regard to base areas for attacks on Chinese tibetan areas — but I read it as a clear-if-implicit signal to India which is the main issue here).
Those tactical moves and statements are part of the terrain. They have their justifications and their costs — all of which we can explore.
But again: the argument of the Nepali Maoists have been anything but a call for a “peaceful parliamentary road” (not in nepal, and not in india).
Jaroslav O. said
You take issue with my saying ‘Kasama thinks it’s a revolution whereas the government of India hopes it will be a model for Naxalites to take the peaceful parliamentary road’.
I don’t know what kind of italics & bolds I should use to get point across, but I clearly am talking about what the government of India wants to use the recent situation for, not what UCPN(M) has been actually doing when looking at the whole process 1996-today. Of course government of India’s actions are varied & they will try different methods to get their way by hook or by crook, whether it is celebrating UCPN(M) as democrats (a false simplification to attempt convincing India’s maoists to do the same actions superficially without regard to local conditions) a couple years ago, or whether it is backing a coup against UCPN(M). I am also not referring to any advice UCPN(M) is giving to Indian revolutionaries. I am contrasting simply that different forces support UCPN(M) for different reasons. It is not only India’s government at times which supports UCPN(M) for non-revolutionary reasons, anyone can look at the huge pile of solidarity messages the UCPN(M) receives from revisionist parties around the world. These parties did not suddenly become revolutionary when Maoists won elections in Nepal. Similarly different forces refrain from support for different reasons.
As for what Kasama thinks, I’m getting the impression that although there is a diversity of views, the core of the group seems to be sure in agreeing that UCPN(M) is leading a living communist revolution.
Actually your discussion of parliamentary tactics vis a vis revolution is very interesting. If you had simply started discussing that issue without the needless distortionary intro it would have been appreciated.
red road said
The heart of the question is whether it is true that the state is the instrument of class rule. Generally speaking, those erstwhile communists who turn from the path of armed revolutionary overthrow of the state, STRATEGICALLY, to the path of ELECTORAL or PARLIAMENTARY or CONSTITUTIONAL reform of the state, STRATEGICALLY, have clearly indicated their attitude toward the class nature of the state, and they organize their forces accordingly.
The confusion results from turning all consideration of the STRATEGIC question into a discussion of TACTICS and tactical flexibility or the way to make use of opportunities in the bourgeois political terrain, which, while an important subject in its own right, misses the whole point of STRATEGY and the class nature of the state. Blurring the distinction between strategy and tactics only serves to blind folks on the extremely significant difference between tactical flexibility and strategic betrayal.
I thought this distinction was clearly established in a previous exchange on the southasiarev page, but since the same problems on this issue have come up again, here it is again (from the thread : “India’s Maoists: 3 Statements…”)
• Jaroslav O. said
April 17, 2009 at 6:57 pm
• nando said
April 17, 2009 at 9:53 pm
• red road said
April 18, 2009 at 2:08 am
• red road said
April 18, 2009 at 11:56 am
Ka Frank said
A number of issues in Mike’s response to Jaroslav and Red Road deserve a response.
First, I think Red Road’s point about the difference between a tactical and strategic use of elections is very important. Elections in some countries under some conditions can be used as a way of getting the revolutionaries’ positions out to broader sections of the masses (as Mike points out), can expose the repressive nature of bourgeois democracy, and can be used to accumulate revolutionary forces for the armed struggle for power.
In the Philippines today, the CPP has run in national elections since 2003 as a way of strengthening their work in the cities, while intensifying armed struggle and insisting that this is the strategic path to power and socialism in the Philippines.
In the particular conditions of India, where parliament is more exposed among the masses as a corrupt, reactionary institution, the CPI (Maoist) has called for the boycott of elections as a strategic perspective. (To the degree that they assert that this is a fundamental principle of MLM for all communists, I would disagree.)
At the same time, and contrary to what Mike asserts, the CPI (Maoist) has been giving greater attention to work in the urban areas through mechanisms such as the Revolutionary Democratic Front and united front organizations. They hardly have “tunnel vision,” but have been expanding their guerilla operations into new areas and states. They don’t have a perspective of just maintaining their guerilla zones, but of developing political base areas, which they have done in some areas of the Dandakaranya forest, centered in Chhattisgarh. Their fight with the Salwa Judum, which they have largely won, is about protecting and expanding these still fragile base areas.
The struggle in Nepal hasn’t been a kind of “wake up call” to the Indian Maoists as Mike claims. The key development that has propelled the revolutionary struggle forward in Nepal has been the merger of CPI (ML) People’s War and the Maoist Communist Centre of India to form the CPI (Maoist) in 2004–thereby uniting the large majority of Indian Maoists who uphold armed struggle as the strategic path to power. (This does not include the revisionist CPI (ML) LIberation, which focuses on electoral work, and the CPI (ML) Red Flag, which accuses the CPI (Maoist) of anarchism and armed actions which provide the Indian state with the excuse to repress the people’s struggles.)
The CPI (Marxist), which rules through Left front governments in West Bangal, Kerala and Tripura, has predictably argued that the Nepali Maoists strategy has demonstrated the futility of armed struggle. However, Prachanda has publicly lectured the Indian Maoists on studying and following the electoral road to power in Nepal that has been practiced since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2006. Moreover, the CPN (Maoist) has proclaimed multi-party competitive elections as an essential element of the revolutionary struggle, both before and after the seizure of power, for communists of all countries in the 21st century.
In answering Jaroslav’s position that the Nepalese revolution has been defined by a “peaceful parliamentary road,” Mike states:
“First, the Nepalis did not take any “peaceful parliamentary road.” They staged an insurrection in the mid 1990s, organized an army, seized power in local base areas and ran the old government out of vast stretches of the country. Waged ten years of war. Then on that basis they initiated a new process of outreach and countrywide political struggle intended to create a basis for their final seizure of power — still resting on their existing armed forces.
This is accurate, up to the final sentence. Since 2006, the CPN (Maoist) has consistently stated that their strategy is to restructure the state by peaceful means, principally through the popular mandate they achieve through the use of competitive multiparty elections. UCPN (Maoist) spokesmen have repeatedly stated that this state restructuring is taking place principally through efforts to write a new constitution and through “continuing the peace process to its logical end.”
This process is currently concentrated in army integration and a sharp struggle over the leadership of the Nepalese Army. It is highly questionable whether the UCPN (Maoist) is planning a “final seizure of power,” resting on their “existing armed forces”, when they are planning to integrate the PLA with the Nepalese Army in order to complete the peace process.
What is positive about the current struggle centering on whether to sack Army chief of staff Katawal is that it has brought the struggle out into the streets in a way that hasn’t been seen for most of the past three years. This could be a critical point of struggle that sharpens up the two line struggle in the UCPN (Maoist) and impels the party to reverse political direction and prepare the party and the masses to undertake the armed seizure of power. This work of revolutionary preparation necessarily has secret aspects, but the political line cannot be kept secret from the masses and the rank and file of the party and the PLA if it to be successfully implemented.
This struggle over the leadership of the army has led to a new round of intervention by India, and by the US and the other imperialist powers. It has also led to the uncovering a coup plot by the top commanders of the army, that may have been a trial balloon to see how various forces would respond. These developments confront revolutionaries in the US, India and other countries with the need to demand No Intervention by our governments and to express our solidarity with the continuing revolutionary struggle of the Nepalese people.
Linda D. said
N.B. to Red Road: I have found your comments invaluable in this discussion BUT heard from someone this a.m. that they were having trouble reading your posts because of the lack of breaking things down into paragraphs. So, in the future, hope you are able to do this, as it would be a shame for your ideas to get lost in the shuffle for as silly a reason as that.
Jaroslav O. said
Ka Frank said, ‘This work of revolutionary preparation necessarily has secret aspects, but the political line cannot be kept secret from the masses and the rank and file of the party and the PLA if it to be successfully implemented.’
I think this is very true in general, whether it’s about Nepal or anywhere else. Although the element of surprise is very important, history (e.g. radical armed movements in western Europe) has shown that small-group conspiracies achieve nothing. It’s not a revolution without ‘the masses’. And a party is not going to have all of the masses be cadre.
red road said
Linda D.,
Thanks for pointing out the problem in one of my posts above. I had written my comment out in Word, then cut and pasted it into the Reply box for Kasama, where the formatting was apparently stripped from the document and it appeared without paragraph breaks. I’m sorry for the difficulty this made for readers.
So the offending comment (originally #18, above) is repeated here, with appropriate breaks:
red road said
April 25, 2009 at 4:34 pm
Internationalism is rooted in the recognition that humanity is one, and that the sufferings the people face have common roots; and that our humanity determines that we will “get each others back” wherever we may be—in immediate ways, and from generation to generation. We have a common cause of liberation, not just from the obstacles we each confront in local circumstances, but from the open and hidden global systems of denigration and oppression. We are deeply indebted to those who gathered themselves together with this understanding and who began to build the road forward. Generations have gained powerful experience in uniting and struggling, thinking and fighting, learning by doing and doing with the understandings gained directly and from the knowledge and experience which our ancestors have relayed to us. Understandings do not arrive in neat packages, they arrive conflicted and contradictory. Some understandings are drawn from temporary circumstances, and really don’t help elsewhere. Others have concentrated experience and investigation from many sources and over the stretch of many decades, so more solid understandings have become principles because they are not temporary, they do not possess limited local application. Grasping these principles in a living way is not easy, and much work is involved in applying them to local situations.
Often, it must be said, the need for tools that serve the practical needs of alliance and circumstance pushes the wielders of such tools to either discard them, or simplify them beyond recognition. And so the immediate utility becomes the enemy of longer, more conclusive struggle to raise the plateau for generations ahead.
Internationalism aims to serve the process of the struggle against suffering, by having each others back, rendering assistance and sharing in the process of developing the understanding which leads forward, and recognizing that which does not. Comrades, whether side-by-side or across the globe, will spread the word of struggles everywhere, so the people’s forces will grow in capability, in both the numerical sense, as well as the intellectual, cultural, combat-readiness, and in re-shaping the world sense.
Internationalism is a life shaping responsibility. We must promote and educate, we must also study, analyze, compare, expose and oppose the open faces of our enemies, but also criticize, challenge, debate, and denounce the hidden faces of the enemy as sicknesses which will destroy our struggle, despite the superficial appearance of vitality and health. Sometimes this means we jeopardize friendships and put our vaunted (and often illusory) reputations and egos on the line, but nevertheless the urgency of our responsibility is clear. It all goes together—the actions that promote and connect and support the people’s struggles, educational programs on how different movements have handled different issues–and making sharp questions, challenges, criticisms, and exposures of false directions and of opportunist betrayals of the people’s interests. It is all part of what internationalism consists of, watching each others back and maximising each step that humanity makes. Holding back on any of this—not doing what we can, and not saying what we think and know—means not being comradely and honest with those on a difficult and dangerous road to liberation.
There are many who are ready to take up internationalist tasks, including many who believe that the masses of south Asia and especially Nepal continue to struggle and will not stop, but who also believe that this struggle continues despite the taking of a serious wrong turn by the leadership of the UCPNM. This includes people who have been doing ongoing internationalist work on campuses, in communities, online, broadening and connecting the work of groups focused on particular issues or the struggles in particular sectors.
These include organizing anti-imperialist contingents at broader anti-war demonstrations, deepening that by organizing educational which link these things up; joining others in demonstrating at Indian consulates for the freedom of political prisoners. Or developing cultural projects including murals that popularize the struggles of the people of India and Nepal. Or other art projects which link the struggles of Palestinian people with oppressed people in the Americas. Developing materials which expose the Obama mythology, and which expose the notion of Afghanistan as the good war. Deepening the exposure of Western imperialist NGOism, and of “humanitarian imperialism” from the Philippines (where thousands of US troops are today) to the rapidly expanding AFRICOM. Exposing the UN occupation of Haiti. Taking on the genocide of the Tamils. Educating about the joint Obama/Zionist “boycott” of the World Conference Against Racism (Durban 2) in Geneva last week. Taking up the struggles of immigrants and raising the struggles of migrants everywhere, pointing to suffering and struggles of the huge numbers of contract laborers from Nepal, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia.
Such is not the work of cynics. It is definitely not enough, but those doing it have not been waiting. Again, it must be said: among those doing such work are many who are not at all infatuated with the course of the UCPN(M)–but that does not stop them from popularizing the history and ongoing struggles of the people of Nepal and of the problems they face, which includes the present strategic line.
Much more is needed in the weeks and months ahead, promoting internationalism:
• Promoting information about the suffering of peoples of South Asia in the “post-colonial” period and especially in the deepening worldwide crisis in the ways it hits this region.
• Concretize this in specific campaigns around anti-displacement movements, with emphasis on Nandigram as well as current sharp struggles;
• Joining the international campaign to free all political prisoners in the region, as well as oppose waves of repressive acts against the people such as Salwa Judum
• Bring to light the captive nations in the region—inside India, as well as Kashmir, the Tamil peoples, the indigenous people of Diego Garcia
• Educate on the continued dehumanizing conditions of Dalits, of women, of Adivasis, of children.
• Expose the collaboration of British, US, and Israeli forces with the reactionary militaries in the region. The further extensions of war into Afghanistan and Pakistan and how this reshapes the entire region and the struggles within it.
• Exposure of the meddling of imperialism in the region, through such mechanisms as military aid and training, investments, World Bank and IMF, NGOism and conditional funding, counterinsurgency programs disguised as humanitarian and educational programs.
• Expose the various forms of oppressive rule in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, from Congress Party to reactionary Hindutvu to various revisionist “Communist” parties, including the special programs and campaigns against Muslims and against revolutionary Maoists.
• The role of the SEZ’s, of mining, and other forms of capitalist theft and imperial plunder. Including the history of Bhopal
• Highlight the various forms of popular resistance, and educate on the various strategies of revolutionary and oppressed nationalist movements in the region
• Popularize the history of the peoples struggles and revolutionary movements in the region
• Prepare the internationalist response for the event of outbreak of armed struggle over the army, or civil war or … because this may be the time when the masses can stop being spectators and may actually get on the stage again. So the tasks will be about mass education on the background and terms of the struggle, exposure and actions against Indian and US involvement. And not isolating the whole thing from the rest of the world
• Do all this through written materials, organized educationals, joint actions with activists focused on the region, college teach-ins, speaking tours with people from the region, guest op-ed pieces, demonstrations, and organizing fact-finding delegations.
• And carry forward the deepening of knowledge about, and debate and education on, the contending lines of struggle, not as a private matter, not as a secret, but as life-blood for the further development of eyes-wide-open internationalism.
red road said
from MAOIST REVOLUTION digest issued April 30, 2009:
Nepal’s Maoist Government Faces Unrest in the Ranks, 27th April 2009
In the latest development in Nepal’s experiment with allowing former
rebels to take the helm of the nation’s democratically elected
government, the Maoist leadership formally retracted its threat last
week to sack the chief of the formerly royalist Nepal army. The move,
some say, may have saved the less-than-a-year-old government from being
overthrown. The intractable dispute over assimilating the former Maoist
guerrillas into the army, as per the terms of the peace accord signed in
November 2006, could have led to a military coup. But while the
government’s reconciliatory decision succeeded in keeping power and
pulling a fragile peace process back from the edge, the Maoists now find
themselves tasked with trying to stamp out growing unrest amid their own
ranks — the former insurgents of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Trouble had been brewing for months in Kathmandu over the most
controversial goal of the peace accord: integrating the 19,000 former
guerrillas into the Nepal army and, more important, into society. During
the Maoists’ decade-long insurgency, the former King’s Royal Nepalese
Army was called upon to tackle the Maoist guerrillas, and the two forces
have been stridently inimical to each other ever since. “The fact is,
the Nepal army today is the only significant opposition to the Maoist
takeover of Nepal,” says retired Major General Dipankar Banerjee,
director of the New Delhi–based Institute of Peace and Conflict
Studies. “The new government wants to get greater influence over the
army.”
Indeed, the current army chief, Rookmangud Katawal, has a reputation for
being a strident royalist and Maoist baiter. Katawal had been adopted by
Mahendra, the father of King Gyanendra, whom the Maoists fought hard to
bring down in their aim to abolish the monarchy. The army chief has long
resisted the induction of the PLA into the Nepal army, and he courted
trouble last November by beginning recruitment of 3,000 new soldiers
before any former PLA guerrillas had been folded in — a move made
without permission from the Ministry of Defense and against the
provisions of the peace agreement. Katawal also refused to retire eight
monarchy-era generals despite the new government’s order. Things came to
a head earlier this month when he refused to let the Nepal army
participate in the National Games because the PLA was also taking part.
The Defense Ministry wrote to Katawal earlier this month, giving him 24
hours to clarify his actions. When the general wrote back defiantly,
claiming the actions were legitimate, his removal looked imminent,
sending shock waves through the political establishment and the donor
and diplomatic community. The key opposition party to the Maoists, the
Nepali Congress, disrupted parliament on Tuesday and was joined by 15
other political parties, including a key coalition partner, CPN-UML, to
oppose the Maoists’ move to unseat Katawal. Even the Indian ambassador
to Kathmandu, Rakesh Sood, made several representations to PM Prachanda,
asking him to back down.
Even after Prachanda did just that, however, the end of this dramatic
series of events has left the Maoist leader facing the ire of his own
ranks, who are getting edgy after being corralled into U.N.-monitored
encampments around the country since they began their surrender over
2½ years ago. Nearly 20,000 PLA fighters have been verified by the
U.N. and are ready to be inducted into the army if they meet the
eligibility criteria. But that process has yet to begin, a stall that
some have attributed to the opposition of the army chief and the Nepali
Congress. “The fact is that the Maoists took things to the edge, and now
face-saving within the party will be difficult,” says journalist and
Nepali Times publisher Kunda Dixit. “The problem is now not between the
army and the Maoists but within the Maoists themselves.”
By all accounts, accommodating all 19,000 former guerrillas in the army
is not possible. Earlier this month, the Army Integration Special
Committee set out to conduct the first survey of what the former rebels
want to do. A vast majority are expected to opt to join the Nepal army,
but those who don’t make the cut will have to be assimilated into other
security forces or given other jobs per the terms of the accord. “Some
5,000 have left — they just got tired of waiting,” says Kosmos
Biswokarma, spokesman for the U.N. mission in Nepal. “The rest are
getting impatient. They want decisive action.” Prachanda’s biggest
problem now will be containing this unrest and finding a solution. Until
then, “the first great world experiment of the 21st century” — as
Prachanda described the Maoists’ political ascension in Nepal in
November 2006 — may only yield more instability for the people of
this tiny Himalayan nation.