Kasama

By Mike Ely

As we watch a living communist revolution what is our task and orientation?

I ask this because there are clearly different views on this. My view is that we should observe, learn, popularize the revolutionary achievements and build support against counterrevolution — as events unfold.

By contrast, some people act as if there is little to learn. In their view (and practice) our task becomes to make judgments at every turn of events and then to popularize our advice (and not the revolution!)

In other words, they assume the right and wrong of these debates is relatively easy to extract. So when watching a debate among revolutionaries, we are supposed to quickly pick sides (based on ideological standards we evolved over decades), and then issue report cards to the various players.

I would like to make a friendly criticism of the second view — and use examples from the recent discussion of Biplap’s essay on whether revolution is possible in Nepal. And I want to express my continuing impatience with a view that assumes the world is relatively easy to understand — and that revolution is a matter of persevering along inherited strategies (and quickly renouncing those who creatively depart from your granddaddy’s revolutionary models).

First, let’s acknowledge that we are experiencing  something unprecedented: We are able to hear key arguments of a major line struggle within a revolutionary party as it debates whether to make an attempt at power.

Kasama recently posted the recent essay by Biplap that lays out arguments over whether a revolution is possible in Nepal. And there are more articles to post.

How remarkable is that! When in history have slices of such debates been available real time? Will we use this as a school of revolution or an occasion for knee-jerk kibitzing?

Much about the Nepali Maoist debates remains shrouded, of course. We can’t assume that all the issues and arguments are laid out, especially when the issue is how to make a transition to power. In such things, there are important issues of secrecy and deception. But still… the approach of the Nepali Maoists to pubic debate, and the immediacy of the internet have conspired to give us an unprecedented-if-partial glimpse of a debate over revolution.

Ultimately, I want to pose the simple question: What does it mean to learn from a living revolution? Do we know how to actively listen and assimilate independently? Do we even have a sense there is much to learn? Is simple materialist humility possible for communists or are we condemned to be intolerable know-it-alls?

Is the Nepali Debate Itself a Troubling Sign?

“Kasama Observer” makes the following point in a couple different places:

“The arguments emerging from within the party that revolution is not possible are just ways of abandoning the revolution.”

Think about what this means.

It implies that this is not a valid debate to be had over whether a revolution is possible. Such discussions are not really grappling with a major dilemma or grappling over an important evaluation. This is really “just” an issue of “abandoning the revolution.”

And if you think that, then even holding this debate is a troubling event. It means that powerful forces in the communist party want to abandon the revolution. But worse, it means that the pro-revolution factions are drawn into a bogus debate — giving credibility to arguments that should simply be dismissed as counterrevolutionary.

Let me suggest a different view:

First, it is true that in every revolution and at every stage there will emerge a sharp debate over how to advance. And in every revolution and at every key point there will be forces who argue that it is not possible to make a new leap. This is an important part of the ongoing and defining features of inner-party life which Mao called “the two line struggle.”

But the material basis for this debate is that there is, in fact, a real question of whether revolution is possible — is it possible to seize power in the current alignment of forces (i.e. can we defeat the ruling class, its allies and its army), and is it possible to hold power in the current national and international context (i.e. can we defeat what ongoing enemies hurl at us)?

At each point, there will be forces that emerge who (rather consistently) think revolution is impossible, and who think the revolutionaries should “settle” for something else. But such forces get a hearing and support in the debates because there is a real and concrete set of questions to be settled.

You can’t have a revolution without working through deeply and publicly whether revolution is both necessary and possible. There needs to be clarity within the revolutionary party and among the revolutionary people — and such clarity is not just achieved by declaring the possibility of revolution in general. The question has to be fought through in particular, at each stage of the revolution, over and over, concretely.

And this is something we need to learn and affirm about the revolutionary process by watching Nepal.

Is the Possibility of Revolution a Settled Question?

At the risk of stating the obvious: It is not a given that revolution always possible. And it is certainly possible to unwisely launch a revolutionary attempt when victory is (in fact) not possible. (Revisit Germany 1923, and the dangers of ill-considered putschs demanded by forces who insisted that the situation in Europe and Germany generally made revolution possible.)

There is a legacy in some currents of the Maoist movement that argued that Third World countries were generally (and semi-permanently) in  a revolutionary situation. This was embedded in the founding statements of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement. This was a misassessment. In fact, there is a conjunctural aspect to launching revolutions in the Third World as well — you can’t just do it any old time. It is not a matter of will alone.

The launching of peoples war in Peru and Nepal were entwined with the living political life of those countries and the accumulation of a critical mass.

And like the initiation of armed struggle, the final assault on power is a conjunctural question — going over from strategic equilibrium to strategic offensive is a decision that requires careful consideration and correct analysis. In Peru, the Shining Path decided (after a sharp internal debate) that they had reached strategic equilibrium with the government (in the late 1980s and early 1990s) — and this wrong assessment had serious negative consequences for their strategic and tactical decisions.

“Kasama Observer” points out that the leaders of Nepal’s UML party argued that revolution and peoples war were impossible to launch in Nepal, and that specific future conjunctural changes were needed first. And KO points out (correctly) that this UML used that argument to become a conservative status quo party, while the UCPN(M) proved in real life that it was possible to launch a peoples war.

But can we deduce from that that any discussion over the possibility of seizing and holding power is therefore “just” revisionism?

No.

Just because revisionists always argue that revolution is impossible doesn’t mean (mechanically) that revolutionaries assume it is always possible.

In fact, in the complexity of a real world debate, it is quite possible for both real revisionists and genuine revolutionaries to be arguing that it is not currently possible — the revisionists may be making that argument because they want to “settle” for something else, while the genuine revolutionaries may make the argument because it may not, in fact, be possible.

And in fact, this means that it is not so simple to sort out revisionism from communism by simply referring to a few permanent verdicts and assumptions — in a living revolution, you need to be making actual and correct assessments.

David D  observes:

“This debate includes some of the main components of the struggle in the Communist Party of Peru over whether the people’s war could go on after the capture of the bulk of the central committee. The same points were raised.”

This is because real life throws up these questions.

Revolution is always risky. It always looks insane and impossible (from some vantage points). There very specific and complex evaluations that need to be made and debated. (Actual insurrection requires a specific evaluation of the relative strength of very fluid forces.) And, I repeat, revolution will always look like a long shot — because weak new forces are going up against strong entrenched ones (even in the most favorable crises). Even seeing the possibility of revolution requires a real understanding of the mass line (i.e. of the possibility of mobilizing and relying on the great creative power of the oppressed people). And it requires an understanding of the possibility of “creating favorable conditions through struggle” — i.e. that our work and the struggle of millions can transform objective conditions that (otherwise) seem to be quite adverse.

The post-1992 debate in the PCP (Shining Path) over whether to suspend the peoples war was not mainly a debate over whether to adhere to previous well-understood verdicts of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. It took place within a wrenching set of particulars: As David notes, their central leadership was rolled up in 1992, and they had to think through whether it was possible to proceed, and if it was not, it was necessary to decide what path to take to recuperate.

Such dilemmas can’t be resolved simply by asserting that the principles of Marxism supposedly don’t allow such retreat: that they forbid any temporary abandonment of specific forms of struggle.

By contrast, “Kasama Observor” seems to think that the possibility of revolution in Nepal is a settled question (and should long have been a settled question). And similarly, some communists thought the Peruvian debate also involved settled questions.

Dismissing Concrete Problems

In order to assert that the verdict in Nepal is obvious, KO is forced to dismiss the concrete questions that are being debated.

Might India intervene? Can the revolution defeat that?

KO writes:

“It is not possible for Indian state to invade Nepal due to two reasons. 1) Once Indian state invades Nepal, Nepali class struggle turns into National Liberation War…. 2)…invading Nepal means inviting China for war, which, in present context Indian would like to avoid.”

In fact, reality is much more complicated (as others point out).

It is quite possible for India to use their army to blockade landlocked Nepal. Nepal doesn’t even produce nails — it is a very underdeveloped and poor country. It is also possible for India to destablize or occupy just the thin strategic strip of lowland farmland (the Terai) where half of Nepal’s population live, and leave the highlands to rot. Nepal has a highly vulnerable breadbasket along the  southern border areas, where the nationalities have considerable cultural connection with Indian society (across the border).

For its whole history, Nepal has been dominated and threatened by its vastly larger neighbor to the south. To casually dismiss the question of Indian military pressure (and possible intervention), and to dismiss a debate among Nepali Maoists over this seems very instrumentalist. It is as if we should start with the verdict that revolution is possible, and then casually dismiss any concrete question involved in that verdict. Such thinking will never lead to success in the real world.

I’m not going to get into the detail of KO’s specific claims about the military situation — but will just say that each of them is facile. I’m not arguing that the revolutionaries in Nepal should wait until (somehow) India disappears. I suspecty they should attempt revolution despite Indian threat — but I am impatient with facile arguments that dismiss difficult problems rather than taking them seriously. It doesn’t serve the people well.

Notice KO’s parting shot:

“Revolution in Nepal is possible if the leadership has intention and capabilities to lead it to victory. If it does not have qualities for leading revolution further, Nepali working masses need to look for another leadership.”

There is a whole thesis here.

Using a similar argument, the RCP’s Bob Avakian announced years ago that the problem in Nepal is that the Maoists had lost their “strategic nerve.”He has come to believe (with increasing crudeness) that the success or failure of the revolution is fundamentally a matter of will. Avakian even declared that the reason there were successful revolution in Russia and China may be because the parties there had at their helm a single leader who “refused to accept anything short of revolution.” In other words, he toys with the thesis that the key element in a successful revolutionary situation is the stubborn will of the top commander — that leaders of a certain “caliber” can almost literally warp reality around themselves and use their will to ram through revolution.

It is a view that has lost touch with reality.

Revolutionary forces do need “strategic nerve” of course. Revolution requires daring, courage and will. But there are also always very real material questions to resolve.

Making revolution in Cuba or El Salvador faced very real and material difficulties because of the proximity and hostility of the U.S. and the relatively small size of these countries. This situation had a very deep impact on the course of the Cuban revolution. And it played a big role in the defeat of the Salvadorian armed struggle. And it would be irresponsible to seize power in Nepal without evaluating (very deeply) the possibilities and obstacles embedded in Nepal’s position and in the international alignments.

I’m not saying that we (including “Kasama Observer”) can’t discuss the likelihood of India invading — but I am saying we should perhaps  assume that the Nepali Maoists know a thing or two about this question (and we should not lightly or dogmatically dismiss the issues they choose to debate).

Crucial Issues of Power

Anyone seeking to carry out a communist revolution needs to deal with the ruling class armed forces. And anyone making revolution has to think through very carefully the international situation — because it is very hard to hold power (or to do anything good with it) if the revolution is forced to operate in extreme economic isolation for long periods of time.

One of the most remarkable parts of Biplap’s article is that it lays out arguments about how to “handle” the Nepali national army.

Biplap reports that those who say revolution is not possible argue:

“The role of army is important for the success of revolution. In the situation of incomplete revolution and existence of strong old army that side gets victory towards which army pays support. Therefore, if army supports revolution, it gets its completion and if it does not, revolution becomes failure. In Nepal, army is in the side of Nepali Congress and UML. In this situation, we will have to fight with army if we want to complete revolution.

“For the completion of revolution either the army should be brought in favor of revolution or should make them split or win them over. At present, neither we can bring Nepal Army in favor of revolution nor can we split them nor get victorious over them. There is not a favourable situation where we can be victorious. Therefore, there is no possibility.”

The opposing argument (that says the revolution is possible) says:

“In general interpretation, it is said that Nepal army is in favor of NC and UML, the parliamentary parties. However, this assumption is not true even in the complexity of the contemporary politics and it should not be…

“The complex situation created in Nepal is due to the oppressive, hegemonic and interference tendency of the Delhi and the capitalist and puppet tendency of the parliamentary parties like UML and NC. Nepalese people are very sensitive, conscious and cautious about the problem of national capitulationism and national independence.

“Nepalese Army and other nationalist force belong to that category. The sense of patriotism and love for the nation is in the heart of Nepal army since its history. The concept of UCPN Maoist about nationality is crystal clear up to the level of principle. But the parliamentary parties have no sense of patriotism and nationality…. This shows possibility to form a united front between the Army and Maoists.”

Elsewhere in Biplap’s article he discusses the existence and importance of independent revolutionary armed forces, but still, what stands out (in both sides of this argument) is a sense that there is a possibility of splitting and winning over chunks of the Army and high command. And specifically the Maoists believe that this army (and presumably parts of its high command) can be expected to take a “nationalist” stand in the face of foreign (i.e. Indian) threat.

I have to say that (personally) I am quite skeptical about the possibility of neutralizing an army without defeating it in battle.

And further if the argument that revolution is possible rests on the belief that the government army will unite with the revolutionaries to defend national independence — well, that seems like a flimsy basis for asserting the possibility of revolution.

Those who say revolution is not possible in the short term argue “In this situation, we will have to fight with army if we want to complete revolution.” And presumably they are arguing that this is not possible to do successfully now, so a long term process has to be unleashed to make it possible.

To return to KO’s argument: Who here is making arguments for “abandoning the revolution”? Those who think revolution is possible because the Army can be won over? Or those who think revolution is not currently possible because the Maoists need to develop more military force to defeat the Army?

I am (personally) inclined to believe that socialist revolution is possible in Nepal (in general) — but don’t known when precisely it will possible, and specifically wonder whether this revolutionary movement  currently has the material military means to neutralize the Nepal Army. I suspect the seizure of power will be possible when (and if) the deep political support of the Maoists has been transformed into a more powerful  independent military force that can confront and disempower (somehow disperse, defeat, shatter, neutralize) that Army.

I’m of the old school that says “Without a peoples army, the people have nothing.”

At the same time, Ka Frank writes:

“[Biplap] writes that the army is a nationalist force and that a ‘front between Maoist and Nepal Army is possible for national independence’–a position which leads away from the necessity to re-establish the People’s War in order to complete the new democratic revolution.”

Here again is an instrumentalist argument — it doesn’t concretely examine the assertion it dismisses, but complains where the verdict “leads.” Methodologically you can’t dismiss an argument because you don’t like its implications.

In fact there is a very particular history to the feudal Nepal Army — it has (in fact) been the guarantor of Nepali independence. It has (in fact) been a nationalist force (even while accepting considerable Indian domination of a functionally independent Nepal). It has (in fact) long been hostile to the pro-Indian intrigues of the parliamentary parties. In fact, one reason the monarchy had popular support is that it, and its army, were seen as a barrier to Indian expansionism. The split between the (formerly monarchist) Nepal Army and the parliamentary parties has been historically very deep, and it has involved (precisely) a difference over whether to accept and deepen Indian domination (the so-called “Sikkimization” of Nepal).

It might be possible to both expand and rely on independent revolutionary armed forces, and also find unity with sections of the current armed forces if India bullies or attacks.

I do know enough (from revolutionary history) to know that such neutralization are not inconceivable: The Bolshevik’s Red Army drew in significant forces from the old Tsarist army (including large parts of the officer corps) when they were fighting attacks by British, Czech, American and Polish counterrevolutionary forces. Sections of the Chinese Nationalist Army took Chiang Kaishek hostage when he initially refused to join in a united front with the Communists against Japan.

The possibility of a particular united front with parts of the Nepal Army is a particular matter — that requires actual assessment and knowledge of the concrete conditions. It can’t simply be dismissed without an appraisal of those conditions, and certainly not because you somehow don’t like the possible implications of the idea.

Personally, I don’t know enough about Nepal and the current situation to evaluate how possible that is. I do suspect that talking about the possibility of a united front with the Nepal Army is (in fact) a bid for the neutralization of parts of that Army. The Maoists are politically preparing for Round 2 of their confrontation over civilian control of the Nepal Army.

Growing New Armed Forces

Previously, Joseph Ball mocked my suggestion that the Maoists were developing new rural militia in addition to their existing Peoples Liberation Army forces. He wrote:

“This is a kind of ‘James Bond’ version of events in Nepal, as someone of my acquaintance said. It is like Prachanda is a villain in a James Bond film raising a secret army under a mountain somewhere, which will anytime soon burst out of hiding and fulfill Prachanda’s master plan.”

This argument is part of an ongoing campaign to insist that the Nepali Maoists are dissolving their armed forces. These arguments have been made since 2005 — often with indifference to the facts. The very mention that the YCL may be reorganizing as an auxiliary fighting force is dismissed as fantasy, because…. well, because it doesn’t fit with the preconceptions of certain people.

Now I want to call attention to the part of Biplap’s article that describes the Maoists’ available forces. Biplap writes:

“[T]he people’s revolution is not success without the army of the people. Nepalese people have this efficiency available with them at this time. People have 19,000 registered PLA in the cantonments and hundred thousands trained YCL with them. This force can be used for the liberation of people, prosperity of the nation and national independency.”

You can no longer claim that this is a fantasy about some “secret army under a mountain somewhere.” The secret has been out for a while – if you cared to look.

The Nepali Maoists may (at some point) dissolve their armed forces of course. The future is unwritten. But here too we have to respect facts, and not proceed dogmatically from preexisting assumptions about what “must” be true.

Back to Learning:

There is a consistent theme here. Some people dismiss the Nepali Maoists’ strategic moves based on formulaic assumptions about what precise path is universal and necessary. They insist that it is a settled question what the road to power must look like — and so can quickly give each move or statement from  Nepal a grade of “F” for flouting someone’s version of basic Marxism.

And then, on concrete and particular matters, there is a refusal to actually engage the emerging facts and arguments deeply. All is settled on the basis of ideology and ideological assumptions — which in fact need to be repeatedly tested and applied in the real world.

I am not arguing that we can’t critically and independently evaluate the developments in Nepal. I’m not arguing that we should uncritically and unthinkingly proclaim the correctness of any given strategy. I am not arguing that “first world revolutionaries have no right to question the politics of a struggle for self-determination,” nor am I arguing that “You can’t know anything real about a distant revolution since you are not there.”

Learning means critical thinking and materialist evaluation, and it means learning from both positive and negative experience.

I’m arguing that we should actively learn from this revolution and its revolutionary core– not assume (with an amazing arrogance) that our job is teaching and they should become the students.

We should learn to break with a self-blinding dogmatism, and learn more about the kinds of materialist evaluations that are necessary for successful revolution. And then we can learn from the whole arc of Nepal’s revolution (and its internal debates) as they unroll in front of us.