Example #2: Black Panthers Liberated Our Imagination
Posted by Mike E on April 2, 2011
by Mike Ely
Examples are not models. We can no more lift and adopt the Panther model than we can simply imitate Mao’s Yenan base area. But we can learn methods instead of models — and we can (in particular) aspire to cutting to the heart of the times in a way that draws and galvanizes real forces.
The videos of the Panthers remain shocking still today.
But it is hard to recapture how profoundly they spoke to (and for) many of the new advanced and revolutionary forces — saying what needed to be said, modeling what needed to be done, raising what needed to be raised. Many of “the left” (then and now) thought they were unacceptable (not following the right script, not seeking respectability, not promoting the right orthodoxy, etc.) But in the hearts of 100,000 Black youth (and in the hearts of many “white mothercountry radicals,” their actions spoke with great power… and the goal was put before us all: To be a revolutionary, to dare, to act, to speak the truth, to take risks, to take the point and then call on the rest to follow.
The movement for Black liberation had run into a series of roadblocks, and the upsurge of the people raised challenges more rapidly than previous organization could catch up. In many ways, the Panthers did not (themselves) solve the main strategic questions of revolution or lasting organization. They served as a pole and they pointed in a direction — that wasn’t enough, but it was certainly something. And without summing them up here, we can say that the distance between them (and the exhausted left around them), and the impact they had (on a real and growing revolutionary sentiment) is something we can learn from.
Revolutionary presentation must be in the times, and at the edge of the possible. Such forms can’t be lifted out of time and place. There is a lot of work to do, to extract the method from the form, to separate the positive from the negative of previous experiences.
But we can (if we think through what they represented in their context) free our own imaginations. And prepare ourselves to see the opportunities that only revolutionaries can seize, and then to seize them.
For examples, it was said that “The Black Panther Party ideologized the gun back into politics.” Which is true and very much forbidden by established authorities (authorities in the society, but also the self-appointed authorities of the left)…. It was very much a demand of those times which had elements of leading up to a revolutionary clash.
What should we be ideologizing back into politics, and how can we do it in ways that make many hearts race and many ears turn our way? Both now in these times of doldrum-amid-turmoil, and later when the tinder has started to smolder?
feudeprairie said
Great videos.
In the USA you’ve the right to buy and carry guns. The fascists militia use it, so panthers didn’t forget to arm the people…
Marq Dyeth said
I think the framing of these clips in terms of something on “the edge of the possible” that inspired and fired the imaginations of hundreds of thousands is productive, as is the reminder that they stand as an example and not a model.
I am interested also in how this part of the Black Panther Party’s strategy was in a complicated and vexed relationship with broadcast television. In other words, were the Panthers really prepared to carry out armed struggle over the long term? And if they were not, was saying that they were for picking up the gun on tv really such a good thing?
I agree that this is not the place to sum up the Panthers, and in any case I am not the one to do it. I do want to question the value (and outcomes) of shows of strength that are more show than strength.
Ben Courtice said
David Hilliard in his books has argued strongly that it was largely symbolic (and for self-defence) when the Panthers picked up guns. Unfortunately some of their recruits got this wrong. But largely I think they were about building community power. Hilliard’s books (autobiography and his biography of Huey) discuss this in pretty interesting terms (although his view isn’t the only interpretation of what went down).
“Revolutionary presentation must be in the times, and at the edge of the possible.” That’s a great summation of the Panthers. I have read a stack of books, despite being white and in Australia and discovering them 40 years later, they are incredible and all serious leftists ought to read a couple of the books like “Revolutionary Suicide” and “This Side of Glory”.
Mike E said
Marq writes:
First, the Panthers were not mainly a media creation, and their actions were not mainly “for the cameras.”
Huey and Bobby organized street patrols to control and confront the police, and broadcast television had nothing to do with it. the Sacramento event was a moment when their developing methods and style were captured on camera — and when it “went out over the airwaves” and were seen by millions.
They were not “picking up the gun for TV.” That would be a real misunderstanding of their work and purpose. This was not theater, it was deadly serious….. as became clear soon when the police opened fire (including at Huey in Oakland) and were shot in return.
There were some forces who consciously existed as foils for the media (particularly Abby Hoffman and Jerry Rubin), and who exploited the media (for better or worse). And that can be summed up.
(Mainly we need to learn to do media work well and creatively — and find the ways to “follow up” in the media when we “light the sky”. And this often involves responding well to red-baiting campaigns — making sure they have picked up a rock only to drop it on their own feet, since sometimes we are pulled into the media precisely because they are redbaiting us, or when they want to “discover” the actual existence of articulate communists to smear someone else.)
But here, in our discussion the question becomes:
But to give an answer you need to break it down.
Not all armed activity in the U.S. is armed struggle for revolution.
Lots of things are armed. (I always joke that in the coalfields miners had armed struggle, armed picket lines, and armed meetings, and armed picnics, and armed church services…. A lot of the people were always armed, it was a fact of life, and a fact of the political conflicts.
In regard to the panthers:
The Panthers were (really) prepared to organized armed self defense — against the pig police. They confronted the police (legally) carrying guns (legally) and demanded to know why they were harassing and brutalizing black people on the streets of Oakland.
And this was a major break (I almost want to say psychological or emotional break) from the maddening constraints of previous doctrinaire non-violence in the civil rights movement (represented by both King and the early SNCC). It was a relief to have someone step up and say “We are human beings, and men. We don’t want to simply absorb your violence. That day is over. Come at us now, and we will shoot you down — with justice, and with fire in our eyes.”
And it was a message and a stand that resonated both because a whole generation had had enough (of passively absorbing the racist violence of the Klan, and White Citizen Councils, the rural sheriffs and the urban police), and because (in a much larger way) people felt that a decade of struggle and sacrifice had not yet led to liberation and radical changes and that a leap was needed (in militancy, in demands, in force) to accomplish some real change.
There were other forces who stepped up (the Black Power forces around Stokely and Rap Brown, and a hundred small Black Power collectives in cities across the U.S.). But it was the Panthers who galvanized all that (and for a few years drew such forces to them).
And their early armed actions were specifically about armed self defense: They entered the Sacramento state building carrying guns (legally) to oppose the passage of a law that would have made their armed street patrols in Oakland illegal. And they were also making the point that the violent racist opponents of Black advancement were not just the Klan (or those who Feu de Prairie calls “fascist militia) but the institutionalized police themselves… and not just in the Deep South but wherever black people were concentrated (including in the large urban ghettos).
This was not “armed struggle” for state power. It was a different use of arms, in a struggle against police brutality. And again, the Panthers did believe in armed self defense.
And at the very same time, they were promoting (politically, in their words and in the unspoken symbolism of uniforms and militancy) the eventual need for an armed struggle for revolution (and they would openly threaten to organize and unleash armed uprisings among the people, as the Cleaver video exemplifies).
(I particularly remember two brilliant Cleaverisms: “Blood to the horse’s brow and woe to him who cannot swim” and his famous “Either….or. Either class war or race war.”
Were they prepared to “really prepared to carry out armed struggle over the long term”? No.
Were they preparing (including politically, by arguing for it) to become “really prepared to carry out armed struggle over the long term”? Yes, definitely — in an unprecedented and heady way.
And there was line struggle (within the Panthers, within SDS, within the RU) over whether the launching of armed struggle should take the form of an urban protracted peoples war, or a political preparation for a future crisis and insurrectionary path.
The Panthers never had a clear unified conception of what the ultimate revolutionary scenario would look like — but they did ideologize the gun back onto the radical agenda, and did make the question of preparing for armed revolution a serious question for anyone involved in serious politics.
Ben Courtice writes:
David Hilliard is not reliable.
To put it another way: there is a post-60s narrative that the Panthers were a successful self-help organization of “serve the people” program whose effectiveness was then crushed by the police.
In some ways this rewriting of reality started with Bobby Seale’s “Seize the Time” (which is otherwise a great and interesting book) — but got even more extreme in some other subsequent “tellings” of the panther experience. All these books have interesting and revealing anecdotes, of course (including Elaine Brown’s book etc.)
But David Hilliard was (in particular) one of the worst elements in the Panther leadership, and his emergence in leadership represented a current that combined genuine gangsterism and genuine rightism (in that mix of lumpen activity and reformism that came to characterize the Panther group that retreated to Oakland after 1972). His writings are self-serving, and his politics at the time concentrated much of what was troubling (and became destructive) within the Panther spectrum of activity.
Put another way: it is true that the FBI and police killed many panthers, and the repression and infiltration took a terrible toll. But it is also true that there were lines and confusion internal to the Panthers that meant they were not able to creatively adjust to the heavy repression, or rely on the people to bounce back. And Hilliard was (as a figure) part of the problem (and this is reflected in his accounts of those events).
Marq Dyeth said
@ Mike:
1. I agree with you that the Panthers were not mainly a media creation.
2. I wrote that the Panthers advocated picking up the gun “on tv” not “for tv.” My question was more about whether there were trade-offs inherent in a publicly militant stance that was an inspiration for a generation on the one hand, and preparing a sea to swim in amongst the people for when the State got tired of them on the other.
3. You make a good point about programs like the free breakfasts. That legacy seems like it has been distorted in the service of making the Panthers look like a social service non-profit, as opposed to an organization with a revolutionary agenda and a revolutionary line.
Much appreciation to the site and getting ahold of those old film reels.
Ben Courtice said
The armed self defence certainly captured the imaginations of much of black America. And the serve-the-people programs helped to sustain this support base. Urban poor revolutionaries in places like the Philippines still use this community service model to keep their support base mobilised and surviving.
But at a certain point the guns became a real double edged sword, and some of the rhetoric of Cleaver and others an unfortunate provocation. Even the East Coast Panthers ditched Cleaver straight after he split with Huey. The initial self-defence propaganda of the deed was unbelievable, a stroke of genius. It’s a shame the broader (and white) left didn’t come in behind the Panthers. Because that tactic (armed self defence, and publicity based on it) hit limitations fairly soon. The pigs had more guns, goons and jails.
I think Elaine Brown really led the retreat, reading between the lines of her autobiography – into Democratic Party games. But Huey had unfortunately begun the decline with the development of a cult of personality and into a community self-help group.
I don’t see how Hilliard can be blamed for all this. He’d already been kicked out for reasons that aren’t clear from any of the books I’ve read. Appreciate hearing your perspective on this.
Mike E said
In thinking of advanced actions, it is worth considering how they fit into the larger dynamic of forming coalitions (and organizing forces). And it is worth remembering that revolution is not simply a matter of “revolutionaries agitate for revolution, and at some point millions turn and say, ‘gee, you are right.’” In the case of the U.S. civil war (for example) the abolitionists agitated for emancipation of the slaves, but the civil war was initiated, led and waged largely by unionists who were not convinced of the need for emancipation, and came to it because of their own process.
Advanced actions have a role, but the broad mass of people don’t move to a radical fighting front mainly because the consciously revolutionary somehow “convince them” to do so.
Advanced actions are a form of manifesto — and (as we are discussing) can serve to energize and organizationally attract the advanced to a particular pole.
Their role in radicalizing the intermediate is far more iffy, even though radicals often fantasize that they will be able to “jolt people awake” with their passion and clarity. Mass radicalization is more complicated than that, and involves other processes than simply the outreach of the most radical.
In the case of the VVAW action, Carl’s assessment is that this particular (very radical and powerful symbolic action of throwing back medals) had a positive impact on a broad spectrum of people — in part because it worked symbolically on different levels, and drew in a symbolism of medals and service that was accessible and not offensive to the intermediate. I suspect that is the exception rather than the rule (when it comes to the most successful and positive advanced actions).
It is worth noting that advanced actions can (at times) isolate the advanced from the intermediate in ways that may not be positive. In May Day 1980 (a very controversial yearlong campaign of agitation by the RCP) there was a very confrontational culture encouraged (of jacking up the intermediate and “calling out” the backward) which needs to be summed up. And which often led quickly to fist fights and arrests at plant gates.
Burning draft cards and burning U.S. flags had different impacts at different times.
And finally, we often overlook the impact of advanced actions on the backward — and the ways our actions (even if they have a positive effect on our own immediate organizational goals) can also be exploited by our enemies for their goals.
I have been doing a deep study of the Civil War (for a variety of reasons). And one comment jumped out at me: John Brown’s raid was like a meteor, a manifesto, for abolitionists — and had a profound effect in the North. It also had an effect in the South, where the hysteria about abolitionist organized slave uprisings caused a frenzy of organization among southern militias.
One historian commented that the Confederate army was born in the immediate wake of the Harpers Ferry raid — and that there had been little coherent military preparation in the South before that.
In other words, these can be polarizing events, and in considering them (strategically) it is not a matter of merely making public acts of self-expression, and agitational manifestos — but also something to gauge in terms of its impact on all the various forces in society.
Mike E said
Ben writes:
The historical details you give are accurate: after the split with Eldridge, Huey pulled his forces back into Oakland (and essentially dismantled the national aparatus of the BPP). In the wake of new charges against him, he went into exile (in Cuba etc) and Elaine Brown took over. The Panthers descended into a mess (both becoming deeply enmeshed in local Democratic politics in a rightist way, and also getting caught up in various illegal operations in a gangster way.) And it is true, as you say, that by that point Hilliard was gone.
But the problems of rightism and gangsterism in the BPP did not emerge suddenly in 1972, but had been a contending current all along.
The Lumpen line was (in some ways) formally an argument over which social stratum was the leading one in revolutionary possibilities. (And their definition of “the lumpen” on paper involved both the criminal elements, but also those who most of us would consider the more impoverished parts of the proletariat — people on welfare, etc.) But the lumpen line also involved a degree of glorifying (and even excusing) activities that were problematic (from the point of view of the people) — including pimping (for example) or casually ripping people off. And there was struggle within the Panthers over such things — struggle which is not surprising when a revolutionary organization has deep roots among oppressed people, and when it grows very explosively.
And I’m just pointing out that David Hilliard (who played a leadership role while Huey was in prison earlier), was not (imho) part of their revolutionary thrust but was an early and significant part of those troubling political pulls.
It is not a matter of “blame” — and there is (in any case) not one person who can be blamed. And if we had to point to who (overall) “really led the retreat” to the right, it was Huey P. Newton. And if Elaine Brown gives the impression in her autobiography that this and that were largely her ideas, her leadership, and her initiative, well, that is in the nature of some autobiographies, isn’t it? There is in a lot of the written reminiscences a tendency (in varying degrees) to exaggerate the social work, and forget the revolutionary politics. And to the extent that the histories sometimes focus on the post-1972 Panthers, well, the story they have to tell is not a pretty one.
RW Harvey said
Aw, go ahead and say it Mike: “I almost want to say psychological or emotional break.” Because this is where the rubber meets the road in terms of much of what your are speaking about in comment #7. It is at these levels — psycho-emotional — that revolutionary consciousness is birthed (despite the fact that we give it a rational often linear narrrative after the fact — as in “Tell me how you became a communist.”
The human psyche is imagistic first and foremost; it leads with emotions and finds its ground here. Many became radicalized by IMAGES of firehoses and police dogs; Panthers on the step of California State Capital; naked and napalmed Vietnamese villagers running down highways after “our” bombs destroyed their lives… and on and on.
Many symbols refer to literal things and in that sense stop right there. Images, on the other hand, open the floodgates to what has been previously unknown and in that process open to what was previously deemed not possible or not conceivable.
While not “for the media” the fact that the media spread these images of the Panthers was truly consciousness altering (in the same way that images of imperial war and home-coming bodybags have been deemed verboten).
If ever we are going to be able to break with crass materialism when it comes to the transformation of consciousness, then we need to understand the potency of images on the psycho-emotional make-up of human beings…
BD said
What seems to be lost in translation is that the BPP were a tremendous example of emancipatory PRAXIS, not just spontaneous response but thoroughly informed action. These actions they undertook which “lit the sky” were grounded in a Black liberation theory which distinguished them from the cultural nationalists(or porkchop nationalists as they were affectionately referred to) who overglorified Africa and the assimilationists(both liberal and conservative wings) who overglorified America.
Much of the same objective conditions which gave rise to the BPP still exist and have even worsened. What is lacking is the radical subjectivity which provides a necessary human context for revolutionary action. Here’s a good excerpt from Reginald Major’s A PANTHER IS A BLACK CAT which along with Bobby Seale’s SEIZE THE TIME are primary sources for accessing BPP theory.
Mike E said
This is interesting, BD.
One comment…. you include the following quote:
But this does not jibe with my own experience with the Panthers (and that of many others).
One of the things that stood out about the panthers was exactly the opposite: That they were eager to unite with white people (both fellow revolutionaries, and also potentially sympathetic liberals). Their unhappiness was consciously with the system not with white people. And there was an important moment in their history where they changed the wording in their third point…. taking out the words “white people” and inserting “capitalists”:
3 We Want An End To The Robbery
By The Capitalists Of Our Black Community.
You included the words:
The BPP was (of course) very diverse and eclectic. And what they believed depended on who you were talking to. And they varied between the West Coast panthers (who were more internationalist) and theEast Coast Panthers (who were more narrowly Black Nationalist) in their politics.
But overall, I think you have to say that the Panthers were not skeptical of the potential among white people, but hopeful. And they were willing to help be catalysts for that change — and in the process helped change many of us (our lives, our politics, and our understandings).
And as you say, this is in part because of the theory they were attempting to ground themselves in, which was “a Black liberation theory” — but also an infusion of a more universalized, internationalist theory drawn from an early form of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.
BD said
Mike E, your experience with the Panthers is completely accurate, after re-reading that excerpt I can see how it can be misread. The Panthers were by no means ‘cultural nationalist’, they were definitely ‘internationalist’ and had allies across the spectrum.
Radical-Eyes said
Welcome, BD, to Kasama!
I think the question you raise at the start of your first post is important. We need to study not just these high profile actions, but also the rigorous theoretical work–as well as the practical work of articulating, developing, and fusing that theoretical work in relationship to the people in their communities–all of which helped to lay the basis for this “sky-lighting” actions.
To riff a bit: in order to “light the sky” you need to first clear some ground from which to shoot the fireworks. And to pick your spot. And just as crucially, to bring about a kind of relationship with masses of people that can allow them to help you pick that spot and clear that ground as best you can. And that’s just for starters.
In this spirit, I think it would be good for us to post some of the theoretical writings of the BPP and also some more discussion of their practical work in preparation for these more high profile actions.
BD said
Mike E, just to clarity about the aforementioned quote, the “unhappiness” with “whites” is not due to them being “white” but “the fact that whites are not moving to eliminate the injustices they visit upon each other”.
I agree that Reginald Major’s choice of language highlights the inherent limitations of racial categories, although having read his book its clear he is speaking of the majority of ‘whites’, who, just like the majority of ‘Blacks’, are unfortunately not revolutionary and more often than not, constitute a ‘bewildered herd’ easily manipulated by the ruling power elite to act against their own interests.
[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jcAeuCiftgc&w=480&h=390
Also, as with Marxism, there is a rich diversity of thought within Black liberation theory itself, as such your subtle implication that Black liberation theory is not inherently universal or internationalist is off base. Put another way, both Marxism and Maoism were huge influences on the BPP and rightfully so, but it is not from Marx and Mao that Black liberation derives its universality or its internationalism.