Antaeus Critiques Maoist Summation of Cultural Revolution
- Details
- Category: History
- Created on Wednesday, 28 October 2009 13:44
- Written by Antaeus
We received the following critique from Antaeus a couple months ago.
We have published a previous piece by Antaeus here "Why Did Post-Maoist China Restore Capitalism?"
Antaeus wrote in critique of “Mao’s Cultural Revolution Pt. 2: The Sweep of A Revolution, 1966-1976” [written and published by the MLM Revolutionary Study Group]:
"This article belittles the Shanghai Commune; states that the “3-in-1” committees were good; is entirely uncritical of Mao right up to his death; and then accounts for the change to overt capitalist policies as a “coup” – which absolves it of trying to explain where it came from, why the Party not only did not oppose this “coup” but supported it; why the Maoists had so little support. In general, it illustrates why there can’t be a Maoist critique of Maoism. What we need is a Marxist, an historical materialist, critique of Maoism."
Kasama also posted some interviews with Mao Zedong on these matters, combining two excepts into Mao on Supporting the January Storm and New Seizures of Power in 1967.
The following is the response by Antaeus to those Mao excerpts in particular.
* * * * * *
Mao Kills Off the Red Guard Movement, July 28 1968
By Antaeus
In an article titled “2 Excerpts From Mao Zedong: On Dilemmas Within the Cultural Revolution” posted on April 27 2009, Mike E. posted the text of an important interview involving Mao Tsetung, other leading Party officials, and a number of Red Guard leaders.
That document is titled “Dialogues With Responsible Persons of Capital Red Guards Congress” of July 28, 1968."
Mike E. introduces this text with the following paragraph:
“The following is an earlier discussion between Mao Zedong and key figures of the Red Guard movement around the issues discussed in the accompanying essay by Antaeus. The figure K’uai Ta-fu mentioned here at the beginning was a key leader of the Red Guards nationally, and one closely associated with the “overthrow all” line that emerged. Mao’s inability to win him over, and the forces he led, was one of the defining moments of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution — indicating that the grand revolutionary alliance Mao envisioned for a rebuilding of the party was not to be.”
I have tried to boldface this line from the quotation: "Mao’s inability to win him over, and the forces he led, was one of the defining moments of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" -- for a reason:
The statement is false.
There is a lot of information available about Kuai Dafu (that's how you spell his name in pinyin, the normal way to transliterate Mandarin Chinese; "K'uai Ta-fu" is the way you write it in the century-old Wade-Giles system that nobody uses any more). Anyone can look him up on the Internet, for example. In simplified Chinese characters his name is 蒯大富 Just copy and paste that into Google.
Here is the Chinese-language Wikipedia entry on Kuai Dafu (and yes, I know it looks strange, but it works -- it's just that the stuff after "/wiki/" is in Chinese characters):
http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%92%AF%E5%A4%A7%E5%AF%8C
Here's what it says about the meeting with Mao of which Mike E. posted the transcript:
1968年7月28日凌晨,毛泽东召见聂元梓、蒯大富、韩爱晶、谭厚兰和王大宾“五大领袖”,批评了蒯大富,蒯大富当场投入毛泽东的怀中痛哭。五大领袖返回学校下,动员手下放下武器,停止战斗。
My translation:
"On July 28, 1968, before dawn, Mao Zedong summoned Nie Yuanzi, Kuai Dafu, Han Aijing, Tan Houlan, and Wang Dabin, the "big five" leaders, and criticized Kuai Dafu. Kuai Dafu on the spot threw himself into Mao Zedong's bosom and wept bitterly. The "big five leaders" went back to their schools [these were all college student leaders], and saw that arms were laid down under the supervision of the activists, therewith stopping the armed struggle."
But you don't have to trust my translation. You can copy and paste this whole text into the following page. It will get you the gist of it: http://us.mdbg.net/chindict/chindict.php?page=translate
The point here is this: Ely's note says:
"Mao’s inability to win him over, and the forces he led, was one of the defining moments of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."
The Chinese Wikipedia page says this is wrong -- Mao DID win the student leaders to stop armed struggle.
According to this same Wikipedia page, by December '68 Kuai Dafu had been assigned to work as a technician in an aluminum factory in Ningxia Province, in a Hui (Muslim) Autonomous Region -- the boondocks, a long, long way from Beijing, etc. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ningxia_Autonomous_Region,_China
1968年12月被分配到宁夏青铜峡铝厂(冶金部三_四厂)任技术员。
That means that Kuai Dafu went back to Qinghua University, saw to it that the armed leftist bands were disarmed, and within a few months was no longer a student but a technician in a factory. And THAT means that Mao DID win him over! Right out of activism, in fact.
In reality, this text represents the moment that Mao successfully put an end to the Red Guards movement, the mass movement of college students and young people. Mao called it off, and the militant young leaders, overawed by Mao’s prestige, obeyed him and put an end to their movement.
This statement is consistent with what a recent academic study of this same document (the one quoted by Ely here) by Alessandro Russo concludes:
"These characters were subjective figures who met in the final moment of the political situation in which their existence is grounded. As of the next day, the situation would be totally different—the Red Guards would not exist anymore as independent organizations, and in the following months they would be dissolved, ..."
And in his conclusion he repeats this:
"For quite some time, I had looked at the record of this meeting as a key document, but only a few years ago did I start to study it in detail. At one level, for me its importance is that it marks a crucial caesura: in the early hours of July 28, 1968, the core sequence of the Cultural Revolution definitely resolves. That sequence had been determined by the existence of independent political organizations, or the "Red Guards," that through this meeting were put under tutelage and shortly after dissolved."- Alessandro Russo, "The Conclusive Scene: Mao and the Red Guards in July 1968." positions 13.3 (2005) 535-574.
All this completely contradicts Mike E's note, which says that Mao "failed to win over" Kuai "and the forces he led".
In fact the opposite is true. Mao DID "win them over" -- to political passivity, to killing off the Red Guards movement. Note that Mao says at one point that the "black hand" trying to suppress the GPCR) "is me."
"Besides, I am also the black hand that suppressed the Red Guards.. . . Chairman: "If you want to arrest the “black hand,” the “black hand” is me."
Comments (3)
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I'm not sure what Antaeus is arguing here.
Mao was seeking to raise waves of new successors to the revolution -- and bring them together with sections of veteran cadre to revitalize the Communist Party. In effect, he wanted to build a new leadership and transformed party out of the storms of the Cultural Revolution.
But the effort failed. And a large reason that it failed is that the Red Guard movements developed an array of political lines and escalating mutual hostilities that deflected them from Mao's intended focus of struggle ("those in power taking the capitalist road.") And there was a particular line (associated with Kuai Dafu) that wanted to "overthrow all" -- meaning all the veteran cadre and current officials.
This was sharply contrary to the line (and the unity) that Mao was hoping to pursue (since the Kuai Dafu forces were essentially wanting to overthrow the current government and party, and build a new one from bottom up). Mao thought that this would fail, would produce chaos, and would end with capitalist restoration (sooner rather than later).
Given the stubbornness of these lines, and the forcefulness of the escalating conflicts, the Maoist forces (headed by Mao) decided to rein in the Red Guards, and ultimately disperse them (to the countryside, to learn more about the conditions of real life and the people). This difficult decision handed a great deal of power over the the Peoples Liberation Army (which was forced to step in to restore order in many areas) -- and led to the troubling ascent of Lin Biao (the head of the military).
It was in many ways tragic that Mao's vision of a grand alliance (and new reinvigorated Communist Party) proved beyond reach. And after the suppression of the Red Guards, it is true that in many ways the vitality and life of the Cultural Revolution declined (and received a second shock when Lin Biao was knocked down in 1971).
None of this is disproven by Antaeus' citations from Wikipedia... so i'm a bit uncertain how to respond to his remarks.
It is not true that the forces opposing Mao simply laid down and became passive. And it is a bit strange to quote Wikipedia as some kind of authoritative source... For example, I went to a different wiki-page <a href="/http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuai_Dafu#Nach_der_Kulturrevolution" rel="nofollow"> on Kuai Dafu</a> and found a story different from Antaeus' wiki account. In this version Kuai Dafu was removed from political life by imprisonment (from 1970 to well past the end of the Cultural Revolution (in 1976). This period of restraint included work in a chemical factory in Beijing (not an aluminum factory far from the capital. What's a wiki-maven to do?
The point is not this or that version of events: Did Kuai claim in words to support for Mao, or did he oppose Mao openly? Was he sent to a distant aluminum factory or to prison?
The tragic fact is that the Red Guards (including Kuai's forces) did not "come together" to help create a new, stable, radicalized political order. And this resistance was not just verbal: There emerged the notorious May 16 Movement which operated underground to attack the Chinese government. The details of this are complex (and unclear in some way) but it is clear that sections of the Red Guard congealed as a force that the Maoist forces considered truly counterrevolutionary.
Antaeus seems to think that Mao did win over the Red Guards and suppressed them anyway -- which is (I believe) neither logical and true.
The fact is many of the Red Guards were determined to pursue a disastrous course. Their leaders rejected the plan for a grand strategic alliance. And the suppression was the result.
I guess the real question is whether this was correct and necessary -- whether there might have been some other overlooked way of pulling a solid new revolutionary order together from the great waves of cultural revolution.0 Like -
Guest (Otto)
PermalinkWas China better off to have gone through the Cultural Revolution (无产阶级文化大革命)? That’s an interesting question. People who have been to China have met many people who didn’t like that period, but there are some who didn’t mind.
Clearly the goals were good, but the implementation was not good, nor was the people’s understanding of its many goals.
In contrast to the Soviet Union where non party member’s participation was almost non-existent and there seemed to be a major push to conform to a party line, the Cultural Revolution proved to allow factions to express themselves, even if it went too far into actual fighting. In the beginning, people who were discouraged from confronting any party officials, were suddenly allowed to attack them openly (often going too far, by publicly humiliating them). Students were freed from the Confucius idea that a teacher was a god-like figure beyond any disagreement or dissent. And once again, some students went too far in publicly humiliating those they disagreed with. When Deng took over China he reinstituted entrance exams for would-be-college students, (according to Time magazine) which meant that the Cultural Revolution had made it easier for a student to enter a college.
There have been plenty of complaints of Chinese people, mostly of the professional classes that their education was disrupted and it is now trendy for Chinese writers to bash the Cultural Revolution.
But for me the choice was between a stagnant conformist form of communism practiced in the Soviet Union and its client states or a social experiment that opened up dissent, but allowed some people to go too extremes. It also tried to push for change in the arts and literature, replacing generals and princes and princesses with more common soldiers and peasants.
If I had to choose I would pick China with all of its Chaos over stagnation.0 Like -
Guest (skepoet)
PermalinkMy experience with talking to Chinese professors here in South Korea, quite a few of them still quietly Marxists but increasingly merging it with Confucianism, seem to have a very mixed view of the cultural revolution. This was an interesting answer to the stagnation of getting too entrenched within a state, but ultimately this didn't do that. Obviously, 无产阶级文化大革命 is a failure in some sense. I suppose we will always be trying to figure out exactly what went wrong there. Was it Lin Bao's crushing on red guard, was it the response to the Shanghai Commune, was it exactly as Mike states? I don't know. I suspect bits of all of it. I honestly need to study this more deeply.
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