I welcome Nando’s very substantive reply to my criticism of the FIRE Collective’s pamphlet on Nepal. It focuses on an important difference between us, which might at first appear to be simply different emphases, on the importance of the two-line struggle in the Unified CPN (Maoist).

Nando writes: "The phrase “Revolution at the Brink” views the main contradiction as being between the revolution and the old society. The slogan “Revolution at the crossroads” presents the main contradiction as being between revolution and capitulation within the party. Both of those contradictions are very real. They are intensely intertwined."

Yes, there are two different, intertwined contradictions at work. But it is essential to grasp the actual relationship between them. One of them is principal at this particular political moment. It is essential to grasp that the two-line struggle between revolutionary and revisionist lines in the party is principal at this time, and why this is so. The correct resolution of this contradiction will enable the people's revolution to defeat reaction in Nepal; the continuing dominance of the revisionist line will make it impossible for the revolution to advance.

Since 2006, Prachanda's revisionist line--which he put forward in straightforward terms at the November 2008 UCP(N) (Maoist) National Convention–has been the dominant line in the UCPN (Maoist). It sees the “transitional stage” of restructuring a bourgeois republic with Maoist leadership as a new stage of struggle that puts the new democratic revolution off into an undefined future.

The efforts of revolutionary forces in the party to defeat this line are DECISIVE as to whether the mass struggle will be able to pass over to a revolutionary struggle for power when the objective conditions ripen. I agree with Nando that the party is not in a position to undertake a struggle for power at present. The real question is whether the party will conduct its mass work with this as its principal political goal, or will continue be bogged down in efforts to cobble together a new Maoist-led government within the framework of a bourgeois/feudal republic.

There is another area where we appear to disagree. Nando writes the following about what the CPN (Maoist), and now the UCPN (Maoist), has done since 1996:

“They launched a peoples war, they waged it successfully, they agreed to enter a political offensive (from 2006 til now), they won over remarkable political support, they have deeply “compared and contrasted” the three opposing roads (monarchism, bourgeois democracy and peoples democracy) before the eyes of millions of awakening people, they have withdrawn from the government, and they are now preparing to launch a new test of mass strength through open struggles (perhaps in preparation for insurrection.)”

This is a idealized, one-sided assessment of the situation. In return for legality and political access to the urban areas, the party dismantled its organs of popular power in the countryside, allowing the reactionary parties back in to these previously liberated areas. The party ended the armed struggle and moved the PLA into camps under UN monitors, where the PLA has been largely isolated from their mass base for 3 years.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the CPN (Maoist) in 2006 calls for integrating the PLA into the much larger, reactionary Nepalese Army, which would retain its present command structure. Though there has undoubtedly been sharp struggle within the party and the PLA over whether to carry through with this process, attempting to do so would be the disintegration of the PLA as an effective political force. The view of some that this would allow the PLA to disintegrate the NA from within is dangerously wishful thinking. Again, the resolution of the two-line struggle in the party (in this between revolution and capitulation) is critical as to whether the PLA will remain as an independent political and military force.

It is correct to stand with and support the people’s revolution in Nepal.

At the same time, I believe it is necessary to criticize the revisionist line in the party, which is the principal obstacle at this point to the advance of the revolution. Since this line–which in actuality opposes the line of protracted people’s war–is being aggressively promoted in some circles of the international communist movement, we have an internationalist obligation to oppose it.

(This is my understanding of the approach being taken by the CPI (Maoist) in its Open Letter to the UCPN (Maoist) in July 2009.)

Obviously it is not productive to make an obligatory reference to the specifics of the two-line struggle in the party--and to support the revolutionary line in opposition to the revisionist line-- in every news item about developments in Nepal. However, it is critical to do so in major pieces about the revolution such as this new FIRE pamphlet.

Finally, it is incumbent on us as internationalists to expose and oppose Indian and U.S. imperialist intervention in Nepal.

//This is a idealised, one-sided assessment of the situation. In return for legality and political access to the urban areas, the party dismantled its organs of popular power in the countryside, allowing the reactionary parties back in to these previously liberated areas.//

http://www.nepalnews.com/main/index.php/news-archive/2-political/1191-maoists-form-parallel-govt-.html

http://www.telegraphnepal.com/news_det.php?news_id=6223 />
The Vietnamese did this plenty of times. The CCP did it too, and actually held back peasant struggles against the landlords in order to help the war effort. revolutionary strategies do not proceeed in a straight line. Seriously man, these points have been adressed and proven wrong soooo many times.

//The party ended the armed struggle and moved the PLA into camps under UN monitors, where the PLA has been largely isolated from their mass base for 3 years.//

They can be battle ready in a matter of minutes, and I don't believe they've been isolated from their mass base. There are plenty of reports, including ones here on Kasama, that the cantonments have been turned into revlutionary schools for the PLA fighters, raising their theoretical and practical understanding of communism. And also, the Maoists in many cases picked areas where they had not much of a mass base to put their cantonments, and have used the cantonments to spread their influence. Some cantonments provide free healthcare to people nearby, and so on. The Maoists are an undefeated party and the PLA are an undefeated army, and they're continuing to move forward. The basic fact of the matter is that the Maoists are in a much stronger position now than they were in 2006. They've strengthened their mass base, shown the masses IN PRACTICE that it the old state structure and the old reactionary forces will not allow peaceful change, they've spread their influence into the cities (the organisation they now have with the trade unions and the student unions is a good example of how succesful this has been) and they're generally in a very, very strong position.

"The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the CPN (Maoist) in 2006 calls for integrating the PLA into the much larger, reactionary Nepalese Army, which would retain its present command structure. Though there has undoubtedly been sharp struggle within the party and the PLA over whether to carry through with this process, attempting to do so would be the effective disintegration of the PLA as a coherent political force. The view that this would allow the PLA to disintegrate the NA from within is dangerously wishful thinking. Again, the resolution of the two-line struggle in the party (in this between revolution and capitulation) is critical as to whether the PLA will remain as an independent political and military force."

Think about this for a second. How can the military function if its ranks have suddenly been filled with passionate, dedicate communist revolutionaries? If this was just a case of the PLA dissolving into the NA in an act of surrender, why would the leaders of the Nepal Congress, much of the UML and of course the army be so bitterly opposed to it happening? Why does it scare them so much? The army chiefs are constantly coming out with statements opposing "indoctrinated" Maoist fighters into their ranks. Integration scares them! It's a risk, it's a gamble, all that's true. But the Maoists haven't gotten to where they are now by following the methods of the past, they've advanced through creativity and trying new things. Integration should at the very least make it very difficult for a coup to take place and for the army to operate, and it could result in the revolutinary soldiers winning over sections of the former Nepal Army.

That said, I don't think army integration is likely to happen. There's none of the 'consensus' so beloved of Nepali political leaders around it, everyone can see it for what it is - an attempt by the Maoists to take over the state, and all the army and political leaders are bitterly opposed to it. We'll see what happens, but I don't think it's going to happen.

Ka Frank there are 2 key points where you are factually wrong.
a) That the events of 2006 was brought about by and saw a change in the line of the CPN(M). This is false. The Jana Andolan was the culmination of the parties line (the Prachanda Path) from 2001 that actively sought to exploit the divisions within Nepalś ruling classes and the state. (a line so revisionist that its result was a peoples movement of epic proportions that fataly wounded the monarchy, feudalism and the legitimacy of the incumbent state)
b) That since 2006 the PLA has been isolated from its mass base. The involvement of the PLA in the community, of its setting up hospitals and of recent reports ofarmed PLA being arrested in parts of the country says otherwise.

This is without even touching on the idea that the debate in the party is on a *two line struggle* style with clearly and easily defined revolutionary and revisionist camps. Thats a childish view- the debate is FAR more complex then that.

Earl (Owen) Gilman - a revolutionary - had a saying that although then i did not comprehend and it took long to understand but - i need to bring out here.

Pessimism is a luxury.

Is there anything wrong with seeing a party taking people's heart and mind in a non violent manner? Is it wrong to create a sometimes military but sometimes with patience and debates and, letting the people make their choices, as appose to take the political power and say we are the people, is it bad?

Katmandu's unions that are strongly influenced by Maoitst today. if the achievements that bit by bit the Maoists are working on and, at any moment they could stand up with arms when necessitated, if those achievements were taken through hard core armed struggle in the city, how would the people feel about Maoitsts, would they love them or sometimes fear them?

Perhaps blood river of the reactionary is desire of some Maoist orthodox but, i personaly believe:

Having more than one line in the party and, still be friend is too complex for the old fashion Maoists to understand; as if only after the revolution such matters can be brought up but, why cannot some think that, a party, with having more than one saying, has already cleaned up the pure cult of personality matter and not make it my voice only style. Kiran by the way, the supposedly radical one recently traveled to China along Prachanda. Aren't they still comrades? Blood pools are not the best ways to liberate nations.

And i salute the so called revisionist line of the unified party since, by doing such HUMANE things, not rushing, practicing democracy and so forth, by doing these they are attaining more respect and drawing a much better image of Maoism to the billions in India subcontinent where 75 percent of them are still in the countryside (thanks for providing data about them Ka Frank)

The more one desires seeing bloodshed to see justice, further s/he might be from a communist heart.

Alistair Reith claims that the Communist Party of China gave up its base areas during its struggle for liberation. This is misleading and factually wrong. At one point (I think it was 1941), in exchange for GMD concessions, the CCP withdrew some of its forces from southern China, which were in an exposed position. In the face of pressure from the Soviet Union and Comintern representatives in the party, Mao and the CCP refused to disband its main bases in the north and the PLA was never demobilized and integrated with GMD armies. Mao maneuvered politically at time, including in the form of proposals to form a coalition with the GMD and other parties, but he refused to give up its independent political and military role. This enabled the CCP to isolate the GMD among middle forces and prepare for a final showdown with the reactionaries.

In contrast, the CPN (Maoist) ended the armed struggle in 2006, placed the PLA in a extremely disadvantageous position, and gave up the liberated areas. This is a fait accompli, and the revolutionary forces in the UCPN (Maoist) are now faced with a more difficult situation than they faced in 2006.

On the situation with the PLA: There is no doubt that the PLA has had continuing contacts with the masses in the areas close to their cantonments. But what they have lost is their organic connection with millions of peasants in the once liberated areas, which can only be maintained and deepened by continuing people's war.

Reith claims that the "PLA can be battle ready in a matter of minutes." While they can get their guns out of storage quickly, the PLA will not be battle ready in any meaningful sense of the term. It will take them time to return to their original positions and to renew their ties with the masses. In the meantime the PLA will be dangerously vulnerable to attack by the much larger and better armed Nepalese Army (it has helicopter gunships). Thus, the UCPN (Maoist) is in a much weaker position militarily now, and is further from the conquest of power than it was three years ago.

Reith's argument is that integrating the PLA with the Nepalese Army must be good if it is opposed by the army high command. Actually, the NA generals support the vetting and integration of the PLA as individuals; they have drawn the line at unit integration as potentially destabilizing. These are their calculations.

However, from the standpoint of advancing the people's revolutionary struggle, even integration of PLA units into the much larger NA would be a major setback. There are 90,000 plus in the NA vs. 19,000 in the PLA, and that number is declining as underage PLA members are removed from the cantonments. In addition, PLA units integrated into the NA would be under the command of reactionary officers. The efforts of former PLA soldiers to work among the rank and file of the NA would face many obstacles under these conditions.

In exchange for the illusory promise of "disintegrating" the Nepalese Army from within, the PLA itself would be dismantled as a revolutionary political-military force. Nevertheless, Prachanda and others in the leadership of the UCPN (Maoist) continue to advocate integrating the PLA into the NA. This is part and parcel of a profound revisionist misunderstanding of the reactionary role and essence of the bourgeois state--concentrated in its armed forces-- that must be rejected if the revolution in Nepal is to advance to victory. The Nepalese Army must be destroyed by the people, not reformed by the addition of several thousand former PLA members.

In an October 2009 interview posted on www.southasianrev.com, Prachanda put out his position that when the PLA is integrated into the Nepalese Army, the new army will be "completely the army of the people."

Q: If the integration of the army takes place and if a unified National Army is constituted as the result of the merger of the Nepali army and the PLA, in that case are you conscious of the impending dangers? What I want to say cannot that army be used against you once you are out of power? The reason for this is what is the guarantee that the army constituting of the revolutionary cadres of the PLA and regular armymen nursing feudal would stand in the favour of people?

A; That danger is there, but we have faith in people. I have faith in integration of the army. If the integration of the army takes place then it should be viewed as the victory of the situation created through the peoples struggle. Obviously the entire army will stand in favour of the people. The army will stand in favour of the nation. And under the leadership of the party we could lead the country in a better way. This is my belief.

Just some time back you wanted to know why the Indian ambassador, Mr Rakesh Sood and Mr Girija Prasad Koirala of Nepali Congress has been opposed to integration of army. Do you think they would have opposed this if the reactionary forces have visualized that the integrated army would stand in favour of reactionary forces?

Once the integration takes place this army would ceased to be theirs. This would be completely the army of the people. Which is why they are speaking against it and trying to create hurdles. One should realize that the integration of army is not against Maoists. This is not against the people. This is in favour of people. This is the reason that the reactionary forces outside the country and also inside quite active against it. One should understand this.

Ka Frank.
There are 21 seperate camps in the 7 cantonments across the country. They are in a range of different areas, but roughly correspond to the areas that each of the divisions where operating in at the time of the ceasefire. So they have not been tottally removed from the people for one. For two, the mass work that builds that link between the party (including its millitary wing the PLA) and the populance has continued. It is simply not true to say the PLA has been tottally removed from the people, or that the parties political influence has deminished (election results- CA and bi-elections show this).

Further- PLA was able to punch well above its weight millitarily against the Royal Army because of the strength of its politics. Why dont you have faith in the strength of those politics if the PLA was be merged into a New NAtional Army?

You also failed to even attempt to defend your accusations regarding the line struggles within the party.

The key point Ka Frank is that Mao and the CCP were flexible in their tactics, and changed them according to the needs of the situation at the time. During the Northern Expedition the GMD and the CCP were integrated to a much greater degree than the Nepali comrades are advocating. During the war against the Japanese the red army operate under the command of the GMD, although you're right that at that time full blown integration didn't take place.

I also think it's false to imagine that the Maoists have given up their base areas. All reports indicate that they maintain political hegemony over these areas and retain mass support, and I note you didn't engage with the links I provided to news reports about the Maoists officially reconvening their parallel government and announcing that they will be forming local government bodies themselves.

http://comradealastair.wordpress.com/2009/09/05/confirmed-maoist-parallel-government-has-been-revived/

Why do you assume that because Maoist leaders SAY they will dissolve the base areas and the parallel state they will? Do you expect them to lay out their plans for revolution in minute detail for all to see? While transparency and popular involvement are great, it doesn't really work like that.

You are overemphasising the military aspect of the struggle and downplaying the political. Yes, the PLA would not be able to return to the exact positions it held in the early 2000s overnight. But the fact of the matter is the PLA did not have the strength to take Kathmandu in 2006. Their attacks on fortified military bases were failures. They did not have the favourable situation of a world war like Lenin and Mao both did, and could rely only on what was possible in Nepal at that time. Revolution is not about a military conquest of power by the PLA - it's about a seizure of power by the toiling masses, driven forward and made possible by the armed struggle of the PLA and the political leadership of the UCPN (M). And since 2006, the UCPN (M) had not grown any weaker and I would argue has grown quite a bit stronger in this regard. They were not able to operate effectively in the urban areas during the PW. Now they can, and they've made very good use of it. The leadership of the UCPN (M) are not gods, they're men and they are both fallible and complex. There are differences of opinion on a whole range of issues, and two line struggles do take place. But I think it's false to claim from afar that Prachanda and co are revisionists when there's really not a lot to support that claim.

Finally, one very major way the changes in the nature of the struggle since 2006 have strengthened the Maoists is how it has strengthened internal democracy. The Maoists have a very, almost surprisingly democratic internal culture. It is possible for Maoist leaders to publish articles that accuse Prachanda, the party leader, of supporting a revisionist path. Their party has carried out a number of debates and struggles in a thoroughly democratic and comradely way that did not result in a split (which is good practice and a nice departure from the past) and instead took party unity forward. The grassroots cadre of the party are able to control it and keep it on a revolutionary path, and it's easier to have this kind of internal debate in such a free and open manner now than it was before the CPA. During a time of war, military discipline is needed, and the leadership tends to keep very tight control over things. Now it's possible to have a more open internal culture. Compare for example the demotion of Bhattarai, Hisila Yami and some others before the peace accords to the way Kiran and others are able to challenge aspects of Prachanda's political line now.

This is not to say the Maoists were undemocratic before the CPA - far from it. But the fact that military discipline and near absolute secrecy is no longer required means that it is possible to allow more space for internal debate and it's easier to carry it out in a way that involves the party grassroots.

//Reith’s argument is that integrating the PLA with the Nepalese Army must be good if it is opposed by the army high command. Actually, the NA generals support the vetting and integration of the PLA as individuals; they have drawn the line at unit integration as potentially destabilizing. These are their calculations.//

My argument is a bit less simple than that. My point was that the generals would not be so bitterly opposed to integration AS THE MAOISTS WANT IT if they saw it as a surrender, and I don't believe the NA generals are stupid enough to not be able to tell if the PLA is surrendering. The Maoists have refused so far to allow integration on an individual basis, and are refusing to even allow the "child" soldiers to be discharged unless economic packages are provided for them, which the government has refused. Everything to do with the PLA and all discussions around it end up in a stalemate - the very existence of the PLA has created a crisis in Nepal that will not go away. The state can't accept two armies continuing to exist, it can't destroy the PLA but knows the PLA can't militarily destroy it. The Maoists so far have been very clever in how they've used this to their advantage.

Some communists have a gut tendency to condemn overseas revolutions for not following the exact path they think they should. Others see it as their duty to extend internationalist support to the revolutionary forces without pretending that we know enough about the facts on the ground to make assumptions about the situation we really shouldn't be making. I think the latter kind of communist has the correct approach and it's the one I try to follow.

Human element from the point of power is one thing, from the point of defeat otherwise.

In last 48 hours, PKK officers, helpless and without support of the Iraqi Kurdish administration are turning themselves in to Turkish regime to be given amnesty. Turkish government itself had promised giving up weapons would cause their being let back into society. Now, from the point of defeat though, when neither Democratic Party of Kurdistan - Iraq, nor PUK, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (of Talibani's) can gurantee safety for these rebels, they receive no mercy.

Allastair writes:

Finally, one very major way the changes in the nature of the struggle since 2006 have strengthened the Maoists is how it has strengthened internal democracy. The Maoists have a very, almost surprisingly democratic internal culture. It is possible for Maoist leaders to publish articles that accuse Prachanda, the party leader, of supporting a revisionist path. Their party has carried out a number of debates and struggles in a thoroughly democratic and comradely way that did not result in a split (which is good practice and a nice departure from the past) and instead took party unity forward.

Newday adds:

What happened during the uprising of 2006 when the army was ordered to fire upon the maoists in the midst of a huge demonstration? The rank and file of the RNA refused and the uprising toppled the monarchy.

And I point out how surprised I became when reading that in base areas, taking revolutionary taxes from tourists during the people's war, tourists were given revolutionary receipt!

This is the twenty first centruy and, the teacher, Dahal's party has added to 20th century struggle the Human Element. Political power may come out of a gun's barrell but, is not pushing the trigger a political sin? Although with the other friend who presumes Nepalese Maoists attitude will improve the way Indian people look upon Maoists while the Indian Party has bluntly declared negotiation wrong I disagree but, many, many from different culture are looking at struggles that, through the Human Element, are ripping off all slander and hatred imperialist and feudals have painted upon body and history of revolutionary communists. Instead of merely criticizing them why not? Cherish them and bring the line within your own countries, in the Humane way of Prachanda that has taken so many heart, rather than the unfortunate fight and hideaway struggles of Apo Ocalan and Chairman Gonzalo, guys that when getting arrested, out of any reason, fail to value the revolutionary cadre of parties they had indoctrinated themselves?

And today's PJAK in Iran is unlike said, not a copy of PKK - it is a combination of old revolutionary Komeleh Party members sickened by the Worker-Communist Party of Iran's pro imperialism line and, radical faction of Democratic Party of Kurdistan of Iran who have already seen result of negotiations and concesssions with the Islamic regime.

In comment 6, Alistair Reith points out, correctly, that the CPN (Maoist) did not have the strength to take Kathmandu in 2006. This was true of a number of other cities and major army bases as well.

However, this does not mean that the party's only viable alternative was to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and end the armed struggle. It could have intensified its underground work in the urban centers and among the rank and file RNA soldiers, and deepened its political support in the 80% of the country the PLA had liberated. This was particularly needed in the Terai, where narrowly focused Madhesi political parties also had a mass following.

This strategy of persisting in the protracted peoples war, while awaiting more favorable conditions for a final push to take the cities, was not guaranteed to be successful. It also had to make political and military preparations to deal with the threat of Indian intervention. The Chinese revolution had to go through several stages and ups and downs between the 1920s and 1949.

At the same time, maintaining the people's war would have strengthened the revolutionary forces in the UCPN (Maoist). Signing the CPA, ending the armed struggle and reorienting the party towards peaceful work in a "transitional period" gave the upper hand to a revisionist line in the UCPN (Maoist), which stands in the way of the development of a new strategy leading towards the seizure of state power and the advent of the new democratic revolution.

You cannot say that maintaining the people’s war “<i>would have</i> strengthened the revolutionary forces in the UCPN (Maoist).” You can only say that it may have done so. Military conquest of power should not be a principle of revolution. It should be strategic question. Given the mass increase in prestige and authority that UCPN has gained in the years since it suspended the armed struggle, it seems to have been a correct strategy.

By any means necessary doesn’t mean, automatically take the most extreme means. It simply means, do what is necessary. In the end, the struggle will most likely be determined militarily, but the Maoists are in a much stronger position today than they were three years ago. Maybe they would have been stronger had they continued fighting. We don’t know that. It might have invited imperialist intervention. We don’t know that either. All we know is that the UCPN has gained a lot of ground politically, and, should a resumption of the civil war be necessary, they are at a much higher level of solidarity with the people than they were before.

Ka Frank-
Your comments on the madheshi movement are factually wrong. The Madheshi Parties did not exist in a significant fasion in 2006 at the time of the peace agreement. They came about after during the period of 2007-2008 and the Madheshi movement. Further, the movement is very complex, with parts of it being fairly revolutionary (although damaging and misguided). At any rate it was a direct split off from the revolutionary movement, rather then a narrow movement of its own.

This is fairly endemic however of your comments though. You have consistently made factual errors, oversights and incorrect assumptions in your analysis, and refused to recognise that.

In his recent comment on Bhatterai's alleged remarks about the relevance of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution (that is, the dismissal of the possibility of socialism in one country), Nando describes the actual terms of the debate inside the UCPN (Maoist) today on this question and how it is closely entwined with the two-line debate over political strategy.

"Nepal is one of the world’s poorest countries. It is landlocked. It has virtually no industry. And it is surrounded by two of the world’s largest countries (India and China). It is vulnerable to blockades. Its main natural resource (hydroelectric power) requires massive capital investment to exploit or export in any major way. And its lowland agricultural regions are very vulnerable to military occupation from India.

In that context, there is a debate within the Maoist party of Nepal over whether they can take a road of socialism in the current international climate (where there are no socialist countries and not yet a clear prospect of revolutionary victory within India over the short term).

They are debating whether to soon seize power, establish a peoples democracy, and take the socialist road. Or to postpone it, operate within a bourgeois democratic framework of post-monarchical Nepal, and solicit international investment in hyroelectric projects — and then, when a more favorable context develops internationally, to seize power and take the socialist road.

One argument says it would be reckless and premature to go it alone in this context. Another says that waiting may mean the chance of revolution will slip away. The painstakingly gathered revolutionary forces could be demoralized, dissipated, or even crushed by such a delay.

The debate (in short) is over whether to draw out the current “transition” period — or to cut it short by now preparing a seizure of power.

In that context, Bhattarai is associated with the line of extending the transition period. He was also a major author of the whole substage of “transition period” and the proposal for the 2006 negotiated ceasefire and political offensive."

While the potential for economic isolation and Indian intervention are real, I believe that the danger of the dissipation of the revolutionary forces is more serious and potentially fatal to the revolution in Nepal.

I would like to believe that the PLA can be instantly mobilized as most of you argue. The reality is that the UCPN(M) pulled out of the government because they were unable to fire a military leader. They must have realized that the lack of control over the military was a major problem as they have been debating how to get back control of a government they originally created.
The Nepal revolution has been the most successful in this new century and that is significant by itself. It may inspire revolutionaries in India, Bhutan and other places. Their internal debates are their business as they have to decide what has a chance of working and what will simply end in disappointment. They live there, they know better than we do.
I am in complete support of the Nepal Maoist' revolution but I think we can become over optimistic and overlook that political power does come from the barrel of a gun and controlling the military is a major necessity for the success of the Nepal Revolution.