<blockquote>"Is communism inevitable? Well, I look at it like this: Human history has given rise to many “civilizations” — the Mayans, the Assyrians, the Malian empire, the Indus valley, the Yellow River civilizations, Egyptian Nile civilization, and so on. dozens of them. On the basis of agriculture, classes and early cities emerged.

The majority of those “civilizations” rose and fell. They did not give rise to some “next” level of class society. They emerged from the plains and jungles — prospered for a while — and then melted back into the plains and jungles. Is there some diretionality to that? I don’t think so."</blockquote>

this is a really interesting assessment of world history, I had not thought about things on terms of the development of the majority of particular human societies, but rather always in terms of a rather abstract concept of human history. That method (of not nuance or paticularity) is the one that Bob Avakian used all along, even when he did reject inevitablism.

In his case, the rejection of inevitablism was based upon his obsession with apocalyptic scenarios and the need to hype people. I don't think he rejected it on the basis of making a materialist assessment of particularities or the trends of world history, but rather analyzed things in an instrumentalist way to serve his hype campaigns around nuclear war, eco-devastation, christian fascism.. etc. Isn't his rejection of inevitablism just a repackaging of it and a repackaging of the general crisis theory, only with the crisis and inevitability coming from phenomena outside the traditional class struggle?

How is "nuclear war or communist revolution," "christian fascism or communist revolution" different from the general crisis theory in any fundamental way?

---------------

I'm currently taking a "technological futurism" course where the students are making the opposite problem of what is being criticized here.. they have an economic determinism in terms of insisting that the environment cannot be saved because it is not profitable (as if they can't imagine society organized any other way), while at the same time insist that robots will be an integral part of "everyone's" lives in 15 years (which everyone are we talking about?). Little of this has anything to do with a material assessment of reality.

Appreciate the historical materialism here.

"I think we can build our optimism on our appraisal of reality, our options, our sense of possibilities."

exactly the possibility of revolution and a society working towards communism gives all the optimism one needs. Also in regards to people thinking communism is inevitable, other then that position being non-materialist I can imagine it being like a poisonous weed. Sure it may make people feel good about the future but if communism were enviable what is the point of doing truly revolutionary work if communism is a sure thing? I think this "feel good" position would lead ones political work to be little more then work to make you sleep at night if that makes sense. It seems to me that the root of that sort of position would be dogmatism, but is there other important factors in how it arises that I may be overlooking?

In regards to many options being available besides barbarism and communism, I'd like to flesh out your thinking more on this. The RCP liked to promote Avakian's three alternative worlds formulation, where the alternatives were essentially free-market capitalism/imperialism, social democracy, or communism. It seems to me, and I think we are in agreement here, that there is a limit to the options for what society we have based on the constraints placed on us by the present development of the productiven forces, however there are more options available than just the ones proposed by Avakian. For one, it seems that those who advocate some kind of particpatory democracy are beginning to realize movements and experiments with this type of vision particularly in Latin America. I think these movements are obviously not communist, however I wouldn't call them social-democratic either. It is tricky because in these types of situations the apparatus of the state as it is traditionally understood by communists, ie. the army and the beauracracy are still in the hands of the capitialists. (In the case of Venezuela, which is what I am thinking of here, there may be sections of the armed forces loyal to Chavez). That being said there is a concerted and genuine effort as I see it, to build dual forms of power among the basic people and to build up a democracy from below. There are two questions that this raises for me in relation to Nando's points about options.

One, given that these movements or say indigenous movements in Bolivia, or even adavasi movements in India etc. contend for government power without attempting to smash the existing atate apparatus, do you see these movements as "dead ends"? In other words can these movements succeed without attempting to "smash the state first" but instead building up a movement alongside the state while at the same time participating in government elections. Is their vision "a possible option?"

Second, how should communists relate to these popular left-wing movements? It seems to me that our relationship to them does not need to be an antagonistic one, and that they may even be a valuable part of getting things to where "we want to go," even while we can struggle in friendly ways with them over "where we need to go." In this way, even our internationalist responsibilities in regards to these movements go beyond resisting our governments inteference, and may include strategic alliance and productive dialogue about building socialist economies.

I agree with this in general, in the sense that I think the assumption that socialism is the only mode of production that could possibly replace capitalism is a bad one.

For instance, as the internet continues to develop, completely new forms of production, exchange and distribution become possible. It seems possible that new productive classes could emerge around this new infrastructure, which could provide a basis for a post-capitalist (yet not necessarily socialist) mode of production.

There should be more investigation, I think, into the question of how new production relations emerge in a society (and under what kinds of conditions can they become the *dominant* mode of production by replacing their predecessor?)

Why is it assumed so casually that the only mode of production that can possibly replace capitalism is socialism? I think that socialism is the only mode of production capable of abolishing class society...but that is another thing all together (and is also a bit of an assumption).

"For instance, as the internet continues to develop, completely new forms of production, exchange and distribution become possible. It seems possible that new productive classes could emerge around this new infrastructure, which could provide a basis for a post-capitalist (yet not necessarily socialist) mode of production.

There should be more investigation, I think, into the question of how new production relations emerge in a society (and under what kinds of conditions can they become the *dominant* mode of production by replacing their predecessor?)"

Bezdomnij, do you see the fight to maintain net neutrality and related battles between telecom giants over chunks of the virtual pie as a fight to determine whether such a new form is even possible in the midst of our capitalist society? The capitalist vultures seem to be circling constantly, looking for the least signs of vulnerability so they can swoop down and conquer this yet vital and breathing, and relatively free, force. Is it too late for this particular battle to be won?

The overthrow of the capitalist system is inevitable. We can say this not because we need to in order to overcome demoralization--but because there is a solid (and irrefutable) theoretical basis for saying this.

The theoretical basis for the capitalist mode of production being replaced by a higher mode (whether we call the higher mode "socialism" or something else) is that the higher mode will make possible a higher productivity of human labor.

In the long run, the productivity of labor will overwhelm all other forces.

The capitalist mode of production has a fundamental limit in that an irreconciliable conflict of material interests exists between capital and labor. Because of this, each of the antagonists (ie: capital and labor) will find it necessary to withhold various kinds of information from one another inasmuch as they will always be in perpetual antagonistic struggle.

Only in the higher mode of production, based on a "gift economy" (ie: without money, capital, prices or wages and based on the principle of "pay it forward" rather than "pay it back") will the flow of information between producers become totally unfettered. It is the unfettered flow of information that will unleash a higher productivity of labor.

Today, the "gift economy" exists in small and relatively isolated pockets of capitalist society such as:

(1) the free software movement (ie: the Linux operating system),
(2) the free conselling available at meetings of alcoholics anonymous and
(3) the art and workshops at places like Burning Man.

I have written extensively on these topics and readers who are interested can find more about this on my website.

Ben Seattle
(http, etc) struggle.net/ben/

Ben writes:

<blockquote>"The overthrow of the capitalist system is inevitable. We can say this.... because there is a solid (and irrefutable) theoretical basis for saying this.The theoretical basis for the capitalist mode of production being replaced by a higher mode (whether we call the higher mode “socialism” or something else) is that the higher mode will make possible a higher productivity of human labor."</blockquote>

I'm trying to follow the logic of this. You are saying that it is inevitable that society with one level of productivity is replaced by one with a higher level of productivity.

Is that true? How would you argue or prove that thesis? The opening paragraphs of Marx and Engels' Communist Manifesto say:

<blockquote>"The history of all hitherto existing society(2) is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master(3) and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes."</blockquote>

Is it not possible for societies to stagnate, and have their level of productivity decline?

For example, the Roman empire in Europe was replaced by the early feudal production of the so-called "Dark Ages" -- because of the breakup of the large imperial armed there was a significant decline in trade and a shrinking of markets.

Was it inevitable that the society of the Roman empire was replaced by a society with higher productivity?

The emergence of new more productive societies is one possible outcome of political events -- why do you believe it is the only one possible?



Right there, they are positing a very different set of possibilities -- saying that throughout history the struggle of classes within societies have ended "either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes."

Sad to show a so mystic and messianic portrait of French communists

It's true : we are the conutry of Descartes, the country of bourgeois-idealist materialism. We are made for physics, not biology - and dialectical and historical materialism is far closer to biology than physics, it's a complex science, not a science of theorems.

I'm conscious of that, but it's not easy to get out this education.

The example Nando gives, of disappeared civilizations, is an illustration of the Unequal development law, which is close to Natural Selection law.

The civilization he mentions, actually didn't "disappeared" but were supplanted by others. Mayans didn't disappeared : they still live in Guatemala and Soutern Mexico. But their civilization declined after 1200, maybe because climatic factors, and sure supplanted by Aztecas concurrency (even if they were not submitted by them) and then Spanish conquest.
Egyptians were supplanted by Persians and Hellenics. Indus civilization by Aryans. All which had superior technics and/or social organization. So they didn't "disappeared", but passed to a superior mode of production, by external factors (invasion).

There's examples, for some of you at your immediate neighbourhood, of completly disappeared civilizations : Anaszasis and Mound Builders. They disappeared suddenly around 1200, maybe because climatic factors, maybe attacked by nomadic peoples, about at the same time Mayans declined, and Aztecas migrate to the south. It seems that American continent knew at this time big climatic perturbations.

Civilizations also disappeared under the sand of Sahara, desertified around 3000 BC.

But all these civilizations Nando talks about, had the particularity to be "asiatic" mode of production (a superior cast exploiting a collectivist agriculture), so with small productive forces, very sensible to climate changes or invasions. Now we are in industrial era.

The way is sinuous, but globaly you can see a driving line : progress (technic and scientific) and emancipation (from nature first, then from exploitation of man by man).

During 3 or 4 centuries, capitalism played a very postive role : developping productive forces, science and technics, growing up life level. It's important to say it, against "feudal socialism" and other fascist attachment to the past.

But now it faces it's historical limits, it can drive only to regression. Maybe in the last century, capitalism was like feudalism in the 16th or 17th century, with longer possibilities.
But now it's like, i think, feudalism in 18th century.

The problem is : progress is still possible but is not the central preoccupation of capitalism, which is making money.

There's a good statement of the New Italian CP, which explains clearly that : http://www.nuovopci.it/voce/comunicati/com2009/com.09.12.30.html (in italian)

I translated it in French : http://servirlepeuple.over-blog.com/pages/nPCI_Attaquer_avec_methode_et_avancer_dans_la_guerre_populaire_revolutionnaire_de_longue_duree-2410083.html
it took me 2 weeks If someone can translate it in English, it would be good, it's very interesting and simple to read.

Precision : "Dark Ages" is quite a myth, invented by bourgeoisie which reclaims it from Roman civilization, against "german" feudals. The decline began in the 3rd century, when big esclavagist "villae" fold up on their theirselves, with decline of cities (reduced at big markets and administrative centers) and reduction of money.

Then there was provincial revolts, military anarchy which opened the way to Germans (and Arabs in the East). Engels said (in The Origins of Family, State and Private Property) the Roman rule had become so unstandable, that they were welcome in liberators.

Maybe some not-so-developed regions, like northern France or Britain, really regressed but globally it was not the case : Spain under Wisigothics and then Muslims, Italy under Ostrogoths and then Lombards remained briliants. Like North Africa and East under Byzantins and then Arabs.

Thanks for responding Servir Le Peuple. I will read your comments closely.

In a minor point: I do understand that "Dark Ages" has been mythologized and mis-represented (which is why I called it the so-called "Dark Ages"). But on the particular point of regression -- the rise and fall of the productive forces... the relative collapse of empire-based trade (after Rome crumbled) did affect the level of productive forces. There has been a general rise in productive forces in the last few thousand years -- and with that (as Marx) pointed out a corresponding series of social transformations.

In responding to my points about Mayans etc. -- I think you misunderstood. I did not say they "disappeared" (and certainly not that the <em>people themselves</em> disappeared). My point was that forms of class society (accumulated surplus, ruling classes, distinct bodies of armed men, urban areas resting on agricultural extraction etc.) emerged, and <em>they</em> receded.

There is no law (or history) to human society that insists that people are climbing up some given "ladder" of social forms (primitive communism, barbarism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, communism).

Those forms of society have existed (except for communism) but they are not a necessary ladder of progress. And more, there is not some inherent directionality to human events. There is much more historical evidence of <em>other</em> outcomes (swirls, eddies, regression, leaps, peculiarities etc.).

It is not true that the early "civilizations" were generally supplanted (as you assert). They did "rise and fall" -- i.e. merge back into the plains and jungles. (And we could make longer lists of them: the Khymer, the Zimbabwe ruins, and so on). In some particular places (Middle East, Andes, central Mexico, China), the emergence of class society was more stable, and one culture did supplant another -- but that is not inevitable either, or the only thing on record.

The law of "uneven development" is sometimes used as a way of fudging the evidence. If someone asserts a law of development -- and if the history of humanity shows that such development is an exception (not a rule) -- then sometimes people say "well all those other cases were exceptions."

* * * * * * *
I think there <em>is</em> a "higher" and "lower" in human society -- in the strict sense that some cultures have radically greater productive forces than others. And we can define (as a social construct and convention) the more productive ones as "higher" and the less productive ones as "lower."

That terminology is somewhat arbitrary (like the notion in biology that whales are a "higher" form than say caterpillars).

<strong>But let me repeat:</strong> Some forms of Marxism have historically overestimated the directionality and inevitability of specific changes.

Stalin <a href="/http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1938/09.htm" rel="nofollow">writes</a> (for example):

<blockquote>"The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development should be understood not as movement in a circle, not as a simple repetition of what has already occurred, but as an onward and upward movement, as a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher."</blockquote>

This is not true. There is no general trend "from simple to complex" (in biology or society). And often "lower" to "higher" are defined arbitrarily (laden with socially conditioned assumptions that are not objective).

And (i would assert) there is some general or inherent tendency to increase the productive forces -- and <em>therefore</em> a corresponding tendency to go from "lower" forms of society to "higher" ones.

There is a specific history <em>that happened</em> -- it more or less takes the form of

<blockquote>tens of thousands of years of almost zero change, then a thousand years of slow change, five hundred years of rapid change, a hundred years of explosive change.</blockquote>

But I don't see that specific history as the outcome of an <em>inherent</em> tendency.

It is what happened, but it need not have happened. And (further) we can't extrapolate from that specific history to an assumption that some trendline continues and will produce an inevitability of communism. Things could go that way, and they could not. It depends a lot on what people actually do and think and fight for.

And further, people can fight for all kinds of things, and yet arrive somewhere quite different from where they wanted to go. (I.e. people fought for liberty, equality, fraternity two hundred years ago, won victories of various kinds, and got Napoleon and DeGaulle and Sarkozy.)

* * * * * * *
SLP writes:

<blockquote>"But all these civilizations Nando talks about, had the particularity to be “asiatic” mode of production (a superior cast exploiting a collectivist agriculture), so with small productive forces, very sensible to climate changes or invasions."</blockquote>

This concept of "asiatic mode of production" (found in Marx occasionally) is a mistaken one -- and is laden with many misconceptions about class society, history and economics in Asia.

One of the best books dealing with that is Eric Wolf's "<a href="/http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0520048989/ref=s9_sims_se_p14_t1?pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&amp;pf_rd_s=auto-no-results-center-1&amp;pf_rd_r=0R81D5CE93G1GPTMKZ8H&amp;pf_rd_t=301&amp;pf_rd_p=480051571&amp;pf_rd_i=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FEurope-People-Without-History-Eric%2Fdp%2F0520048989" rel="nofollow">Europe and the People without a History</a>" -- which I urge everyone to check out.

Also, Mao Zedong (and the Maoist revolutionaries of China) do not uphold the concept of "asiatic mode of production." There are controversies over how the Maoists tell their histories of China (i.e. the debates over legalists etc. in early chinese history)... which I have not investigated deeply.

But it is true that in party debates, the Maoists <em>opposed</em> that concept of "asiatic mode of production" and did not deploy it in their historical class analysis.

* * * * * * *

SLP writes:

<blockquote>"The way is sinuous, but globally you can see a driving line : progress (technic and scientific) and emancipation (from nature first, then from exploitation of man by man)."</blockquote>

This is exactly the issue.

In fact if you look at human history overall (in the great sweep) you don't see a single driving line. You see episodic leaps that have a great deal of locality, particularity and accident to them. NOT an overall driving force. And (as it happened) the emergence of class societies in some pockets eventually created a world market. But that does not mean that y ou can see "globally" such a driving line. I don't think it exists.

SLP writes:
<blockquote>...now [capitalism] faces its historical limits, it can drive only to regression. Maybe in the last century, capitalism was like feudalism in the 16th or 17th century, with longer possibilities.</blockquote>

What does it mean that capitalism faces "historical limits" -- what are they? How do you prove they exist? What is your evidence?

You can't simply assert precisely that which is in dispute.

* * * * * * *

I think it is worth revisiting Marx's seminal observation:

<blockquote>"In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter Into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely [the] relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms of consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political, and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or — this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms — with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead, sooner or later, to the transformation of the whole, immense, superstructure. In studying such transformations, it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic, or philosophic — in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production."</blockquote>

Understanding that changes in the "economic foundation" of society lead to changes in social relations and ideas -- is not the same as asserting an inherent directionality or inevitability to such changes.

Mike (or somebody), could you recommend a Maoist history of China? I would be very interested to see a Marxist treatment of early Chinese history.

The fundamental forces of a capitalist society, even the deformed and dominated capitalism, are the bourgeoisie as the builder of capitalism and the working class as the destroyer of capitalism. So, is communism inevitable, a struggle that must be wage in the mist of the working class as the only historical force capable to replace capitalism and offer an alternative to capitalism. Any alternative to capitalism will be and must be a decisive political battle of the fundamental popular classes under the leadership of the proletariat against capital.

Communism will not land mechanically on planet capitalism. Communism is the process of struggle of the working class reaching maturity. The inevitability of communism is the process of the working class addressing the problematic of radical transformation of the capitalist society. Thus, communism, is the most advance form, the most radical form of proletarian revolutionary ideology since it questioned the organizational form the capitalist society functioned and reproduced. Communism is the class struggle of the proletariat on the economic, political and ideological battlefield to defeat capital/surplus value, in organizing all dominates classes under its leadership for the abolition of classes and wages.

Mike, could you boil that down to something more simple.

If, for example, someone comes up to me with talking points from the Jan Halliday book, what's a good book I can recommend them to give them the other side of the story?

Just one book, 400-500 pages or so, written for a general audience.

Reality is liberating, gleaning laws of development, and changing reality based on that scientific approach. Kind of back to Eric's point.. I think Bob Avakian has given up on revolution and trying to tie up lose ends to safeguard his vanguard. The main problem he ran into is isolating himself for too long based on self fulfilling fantasy. Mao really spoke on this question - being among on the masses, the importance of mass line, tilling superstructural aspects of the party. Avakian should just come back to the USA reassess what needs to be done.

Thanks. I will check out the book by Han Suyin. I just ordered it on Amazon for 6 pennies plus postage. Raymond Lotta recommended a few books but they were all out of print and 50-100 used.

A reading list might be a good thing to put together.

You could have:

1.) General studies of the Chinese Revolution and Chinese history from an "objective" point of view.

2.) Right wing attacks on the Chinese Revolution.

3.) Primary writings by Maoists.

So if I were putting together something about the French Revolution, it might look something like this.

General "Objective" Studies: George LeFabre, Thomas Carlyle, Christopher Hibbert, Eric Hobsbawm

Right Wing Attacks: Simon Schama, Paul Johnson's book on Napoleon

Primary Writings: Rousseau, Voltaire, Abbe Sieyes, Thomas Paine, etc.

"If, for example, someone comes up to me with talking points from the Jan Halliday book, what’s a good book I can recommend them to give them the other side of the story?"

Read 'Was Mao really a monster? The academic response to Chang and Halliday's Mao: The Untold Story', a collection of 14 reviews of Chang/Halliday's book. Two are positive, mostly because of political reasons (these reviewers see the book as a useful attack on Maoism), the 12 others are critical in various degrees. Most of the reviews give examples of the way Chang/Halliday abuse sources, quote of out context or just completely make up some of their 'revelations'.
A good recent book on the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and a defense of the real popular support for maoist policies and the positive sides of them, is Mobo Gao's 'The battle for China's past. Mao and the cultural revolution'.

Was Mao Really a Monster is insanely overpriced.

http://www.amazon.com/Was-Mao-Really-Monster-Contemporary/dp/0415493293/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&amp;s=books&amp;qid=1264879062&amp;sr=8-1

That's the hardcover, the paperback is 38 dollar (still expensive but less insane)

Hi Nando,

First, thanks for raising this topic. It is valuable to put our understanding of this topic on a scientific foundation.

<blockquote>
the Roman empire in Europe was replaced by the early feudal production of the so-called “Dark Ages” [...] there was a significant decline in trade and a shrinking of markets.

Was it inevitable that the society of the Roman empire was replaced by a society with higher productivity?
</blockquote>

I am not an expert but have always thought that, in many ways, the societies that followed Rome were more productive--at least in agriculture. Roman agriculture was based on slave labor. Slaves do not have a lot of incentive to be productive. For example, in Howard Fast's novel, "Spartacus", he notes that slaves will find a way to kill a horse they are working with. They understand that it is in their material interest to do so (ie: it makes their own labor more valuable to their owner--who will then have an incentive to keep them healthy and alive longer, etc). Under the feudal system, by contrast, a farmer can keep a portion of what he grows--so he will make more effective use of both his body and mind.

The decline in trade and so forth was not good, of course. But in historical terms that was, as they say, a bend in the road.

<blockquote>
I’m trying to follow the logic of this. You are saying that it is inevitable that society with one level of productivity is replaced by one with a higher level of productivity.

Is that true? How would you argue or prove that thesis?
</blockquote>

Truth is always concrete and for this reason it is important not to overgeneralize. It would be silly for me to assert that _all_ societies are replaced by other societies with higher productivity of labor. Rather I am asserting that this will happen to our current, global society.

Servir Le Peuple actually explained the point well but I think you did not understand what he was trying to say.

Here is an analogy:

A salmon may disperse hundreds of thousands of eggs which may be fertilized. Many or most of these may hatch but few will grow up to become adult salmon. Instead, most will get eaten when they are young and small. However, once the salmon has become an adult its chances of survival are vastly better.

Civilizations are not salmon, of course, but it is true that once they reach a certain point of development--things cannot go backward (not for very long at any rate). It just does not work that way.

The early civilizations you mention were comparatively fragile compared to modern society. Countless early civilizations were wiped out by (1) external invasion, (2) disease, (3) climate change (including drought) and (4) ecological crisis (such as the Easter Island people who were dependent on trees and vanished after cutting them all down).

Our civilization, on the other hand, is relatively robust. Of course we could all die if the CERN particle collider creates a black hole that escapes control and sucks up the earth or a nearby star turns into a nova and our solar system happens to be in the path of its polar jet. But these kinds of things are fairly unlikely. We also could suffer from a global pandemic or a full scale war that creates a “nuclear winter”. These things are possible and could kill many hundreds of millions--but they will not wipe out civilization.

So we need to focus on "normal" (ie: non-catastrophic) development.

What drives forward the development of higher productivity in a society?

Competition.

Consider two countries (or regions controlled by rival imperialisms) that are in competition with one another (and, of course, they always are). The country that has the more advanced social system (ie: "advanced" in the sense of having a higher productivity of labor) will eventually be able to overwhelm the other and take it over. This is because when you are more productive you can flood their markets (if they have open markets) with the goods you can more easily produce or simply take them over with modern weapons you can more easily produce. (I am not negating the need for national liberation wars, which I support. That is another topic.)

So the necessity is to be as productive as possible--or die.

So there is certainly a "directionality" and "inevitability" to this process. The ruling class of any society must learn how to put their resources to productive use--or someone else will push them aside (often not too politely) and do it for them.

For example, the ruling class in China needs the internet (for all the problems that the internet will bring to their police state) in order to have a modern, competitive economy. (They will eventually need to change the form of their state to adjust to this--but that is also another topic.)

<b>Classless society is _inevitable_ because people will be more productive when irreconcilable antagonisms no longer block or restrict the flow of information (of all kinds) necessary to make possible the most effective transformation of human labor into useful goods and services.</b>

This is the unshakable scientific argument for the inevitability of classless society. This basic principle will be widely understood as we overcome the "crisis of theory" and bring to hundreds of millions the news that the overthrow of bourgeois rule is both possible and necessary.

Ben Seattle
(http, etc) struggle.net/ben/

Nando writes:

"This is not true. There is no general trend “from simple to complex” (in biology or society). And often “lower” to “higher” are defined arbitrarily (laden with socially conditioned assumptions that are not objective)."
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

So there's no adaptive tendency in biology. We humans are no more complex than our biological predecessors. Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny arbitrarily. And writ large: Darwin was wrong!

Nando continues:

"And (i would assert) there is some general or inherent tendency to increase the productive forces — and therefore a corresponding tendency to go from “lower” forms of society to “higher” ones.

There is a specific history that happened — it more or less takes the form of

tens of thousands of years of almost zero change, then a thousand years of slow change, five hundred years of rapid change, a hundred years of explosive change.

But I don’t see that specific history as the outcome of an inherent tendency.

It is what happened, but it need not have happened. And (further) we can’t extrapolate from that specific history to an assumption that some trendline continues and will produce an inevitability of communism. Things could go that way, and they could not. It depends a lot on what people actually do and think and fight for."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

I would ask you to clarify something, Nando. This will lead to a question I think is begged by what you wrote - begged too by Marx.

First you wrote: "There is no general trend “from simple to complex”..."

followed by: "And (i would assert) there is some general or inherent tendency to increase the productive forces..."

and a bit later: "But I don’t see that specific history as the outcome of an inherent tendency."

Do you see a tendency/trend - I think you're using those words interchangeably - or don't you? While it's not for me to answer the question I'm posing to you, it seems clear that you have a preferred thesis, in your words:

"And (further) we can’t extrapolate from that specific history to an assumption that some trendline continues and will produce an inevitability of communism. Things could go that way, and they could not. It depends a lot on what people actually do and think and fight for."

Earlier, you put the same idea in a different way: "There is no law (or history) to human society that insists that people are climbing up some given “ladder” of social forms (primitive communism, barbarism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, communism)."

What seems missing here is acknowledgment of the question I say is begged by your observation: Why has there been movement over time from one social form to another? What causes, at different points in history, productive forces to become out of step with class structure, thus leading to "class antagonism"? Why are we humans compelled not just to progress in terms of economic restructuring, but to rebel at certain points against the results of that very progress?

What has compelled us, as human beings, to pass through and leave behind those periods of primitive communism, barbarism, slavery, feudalism and progress into this period defined, as Marx wrote, by "two great classes directly facing each other — Bourgeoisie and Proletariat." While we accept class antagonism as a given, don't we still have to ask why it exists?

And if it just mechanically pops up from time to time, if it's just a function of inexplicable, periodic friction between economic reality and the class relationships that supports it, then I guess I'd agree with you that history isn't the outcome of an inherent tendency and Communism certainly isn't inevitable on that basis.

But the conclusion I draw from History is that there is a trend, and the conclusion I draw from observing People is that we very essentially want freedom more than enslavement (though I admit it sometimes might seem we could conclude the reverse of that). Perhaps I am naive or a blind optimist - though I don't see myself as such - but I believe in a directionality which tends toward an overcoming of the bastion of oppression - maybe not the last? - we call Capitalism.

Does my optimism require a belief in Communism's inevitability? No, but only because we may all be annihilated by the powers that militate against us. Nuclear holocaust might destroy them along with us. But short of that minor consideration, I believe we move toward Communism as earlier forms moved toward bourgeois Capitalism - with an inevitability which stems from something inherent and essential to our being.

If you want to argue here that I'm doing just what you proscribe in your original post: inventing "a non-existent inevitability in order to succeed," I would beg to differ. But as we've yet to cross that bridge, or as you've yet to smash what I've presented, I shouldn't speculate that that debate is where we're headed. Anyway it's certainly not inevitable.

Stan: I would strongly recommend <i>The Origins of the Boxer Uprising</i> by Joseph Esherick as a sort of pre-history to the Chinese Revolution. I'll see if I can think of any other articles or books.

Many things have been raised. All of which deserve further discussion.

For now just a few quick points:

I wrote:

<blockquote>“There is no general trend “from simple to complex” (in biology or society). And often “lower” to “higher” are defined arbitrarily (laden with socially conditioned assumptions that are not objective).”</blockquote>

Jeff writes:

<blockquote>"So there’s no adaptive tendency in biology. We humans are no more complex than our biological predecessors. Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny arbitrarily. And writ large: Darwin was wrong!"</blockquote>

I'll note the tone of mocking and sarcasm here (as if the truth is obvious and Jeff possesses it)... and deal with the substance.

There is, of course, an adaptive tendency in biology -- and Darwin was correct, both in pointing it out and developing some initial explanation.

But there is not some general tendency in life from simple to complex. Let me break that down:

1) Early life was universally simple. There was a time when life was found throughout the oceans but was only single celled.

2) A small portion of life became more complex (i.e. clusters of cells, then sponges, then differentiated life forms.)

3) But the mass of life remained simple. It continued to evolve, differentiate, adapt. It is simply unknown how many species of bacteria there are (for example). But the mass of earth's biota are simple - and in both diversity and bio mass greatly number the "higher life forms."

4) A few branches of life became more complex. In some of those branches, complex plants and animals evolved. Among them are Homo sapians.

5) But the fact that some few complex life forms evolved out of the general mass of simpler forms does not constitute a "tendency" in life (biology) to move from simple to complex.

The vast bulk of life on earth did not move toward complexity. Only a relatively small subset did. The rest evolved without any "tendency" toward complexity (i.e. multicellular organisms with cellular divisions of labor, for example).

It is simple accident -- some life forms became complex, many more did not. How does anyone draw a general tendency (for life in general) from that.

6) Again, there is a metaphysical current in Marxist thought to see a development (which is largely localized, accidental and contingent) and imagine it as some general and universal tendency.

Here are two examples:

The earth's biophere is a festival of millions of species, most of whom are simple and even invisible to us. There is a section of life that became multicellular (both plants and animals) and to us (a multicellular creature) seem to "dominate" the earth. But in fact, the one-celled remain far more numerous (in both species and bio mass) and even among the multicellular the more "simple" (example: insects) are more numerous (both in species and bio mass) than the more supposedly more complex ones (i.e. mammals or whatever).

In fact, the automatic assumption that there has been a tendency to produce creatures like us is literally borrowed from cultural prejudices of human-centrism. there is no such tendency. We are not "higher" than a fish (unless we define consciousness as the main or sole measure of higher). We are unique in our consciousness, and we can choose to define our own particular and most unique characteristics as the definition of "higher" etc. -- but that is, after all, a social construct... not some especially objective measure.

Another example: In western Europe, the record of human society shows huntergatherer society giving rise to settled villages, then "barbarian" tribal society, then Roman, Greek and Slavic slave empires, then a particular few forms of feudalism (aristocracies, monarchies, with particular land structures etc.), then modern capitalism, then a movement for socialism in the 19th century.

Now we can <em>choose</em> to imagine that the particular forms of <em>European</em> social development are somehow "classic" forms, and that these <em>particular</em> stages and forms are necessary. But really, that to is to imagine the local and familiar is somehow special and universal. There is nothing scientific about that. In fact, European feudalism has to be examined in relationship with various extractive forms in other places of the world (at similar levels of productive capacity) and uncover what they have in common (in their emergence, operation, and dissolution). Eric Wolf does that (for example) and argues that you find a profound multiplicity of forms in which surplus is violently extracted from peasant farmers. There is nothing "classic" about European feudalism, or about the political structures and ideas that emerge on that basis.
And there is no "ladder" of human development that forces society through the development Europe had and there is nothing "deformed" or "arrested" or whatever, about the development in places on earth that didn't go that way.

It even comes up in the way people of non-capitalist cultures are discusssed by Europeans and Americans as somehow survivors of the "past." As if the tribal peoples of the twentieth century were really throwbacks to the "stone age" (of Europe) -- rather than what they were tribal peoples living in the twentieth century. Afghani patriarchal communities do have similarities to forms of life that existed in Europe in previous centuries, but they are (after all) fully inhabitants of this century (in the most simple materialist and factual sense) , not someone who wandered in from the 5th century (however it may appear to Europeans who are familiar with their own history, and see others through that prism).

Ben writes:

<blockquote>"I am not an expert but have always thought that, in many ways, the societies that followed Rome were more productive–at least in agriculture. Roman agriculture was based on slave labor. Slaves do not have a lot of incentive to be productive. For example, in Howard Fast’s novel, “Spartacus”, he notes that slaves will find a way to kill a horse they are working with. They understand that it is in their material interest to do so (ie: it makes their own labor more valuable to their owner–who will then have an incentive to keep them healthy and alive longer, etc). Under the feudal system, by contrast, a farmer can keep a portion of what he grows–so he will make more effective use of both his body and mind.

The decline in trade and so forth was not good, of course. But in historical terms that was, as they say, a bend in the road."</blockquote>

There is a claim that there is a general (and inevitable) tendency for society to go in a particular direction -- toward higher productivity.

I have given many examples of cases where that is not true. And my guess is that the cases of rise and fall are far more numerous than rise-to-more productivity (with the exception of the brief period of the last 500 years when the world market meant that things rose and fell in that increasingly interconnected context.)

And i am pointing out that the major historical transition from Roman empire to modern capitalism (through the stages of European feudalism) did not necessarily conform to a rise in productivity either -- because the collapse of empire-based trade routes meant a general decline of many kinds.

In answer ben says:

He makes a general argument that slavery is less productive than feudal productivity (because of the supposed general interest of slaves to avoid or disrupt productive work). I am familiar with that general argument, and I imagine there is some truth to it (though I have heard marxists repeat is over and over without real data or scholarship).

Ben doesn't give data or scholarship either, but quotes a novel by Howard Fast (who had himself been trained in a very particular and highly mechanical form of communist theory -- precisely the ladder theory we are critiquing here.)

But again: it may be true that serfs are more productive than slave (in some abstract realm) -- yet in the concrete history of Europe, early feudalism was less productive than a slave empire because (as I pointed out) the decline of trade.

Then Ben says, even if it is true, it may just be a "bend in the road."

In other words: we assert a general tendency, and any series of particular examples you may raise don't count, because they are just exceptions to that general rule that we continue to assert without data (but with examples from Comintern-inspired novels).

Oh well....

Mike asks whether the discussion of the Warring States period during the Cultural Revolution "was ever intended as serious historical analysis — or whether it was simply a metaphorical way of describing publicly the deepening struggle between Mao’s forces and Zhou Enlai’s forces."

I don't claim to have an answer, but it's interesting to note that Zhuangzi, who himself lived in the Warring States period, frequently appropriated historical figures (including Confucius) and employed them in a metaphorical way in his writing, often having them say or do things that contemporary readers would probably have known were not historically accurate. Indeed, Zhuangzi sometimes portrayed Confucius saying and doing things that his readers would have recognized as decidedly non-Confucian. The purpose was not to provide a factually accurate history but to illustrate philosophical points.

So if the discussion of the struggles between the Confucians and the Legalists in the Warring States period during the Cultural Revolution was intended in a metaphorical way, then it in fact had a sound basis in Chinese literary tradition, itself dating from the Warring States period.

Hi Nando,

<blockquote>
In other words: we assert a general tendency, and any series of particular examples you may raise don’t count, because they are just exceptions to that general rule that we continue to assert without data ...
</blockquote>
It appears to me that you are losing sight of my argument. I have not asserted a general rule for _all_ societies but rather for our _current_ society.

You have not replied to the scientific arguments that I gave regarding <b>our current, modern society</b>--but rather have focused on the decline of the Roman Empire. I had discussed the increase in the productivity of labor as society moves from the slave system to the feudal--because I thought this would contribute to the discussion. I thought it might be obvious that a man who gets to keep half of what he grows would find ways to be more productive than a man who gets to keep only enough to stay alive. Now you complain I have no data for that, only a passage from a novel. (By the way, if you have not yet read it, I would highly recommend it, in spite of certain flaws.)

You want to be skeptical? Ok, that's fine with me. I will not deal with Rome. Maybe it would be better if we focused less on ancient history and more on the world in which we live.

I gave arguments than in _modern society_ there is a general, long-run tendency for the productivity of human labor to increase. I said that this happens because of competition.

Do you want data for labor productivity also? I imagine it would not be too difficult to get. Labor productivity is kind of a basic thing in economics. I assume you know this because you are a smart guy.

Yes, you were part of a trend that fed you horseshit from Comintern mythology for breakfast--and you thought it was yummy for many years. And now you are determined not to be fooled again.

Hey, the same thing happened to me (and thousands of other activists). So I understand how you feel. If someone tells you that classless society is _inevitable_ you now ask for the _evidence_. That seems quite reasonable to me.

But I gave you (in my previous post) a scientific argument related to the society in which we live--and you have replied without giving any indication that you even read it.

You started this thread and it has drawn a lot of interest, so I need to give you credit for that. But I would like to see you deal with the arguments I made concerning the modern world--otherwise I do not see any point to my participation on this thread.

Ben

Mike,
Let me first clarifies some points:
1] The usage of concepts, the fundamental popular classes and all dominates classes, implies the peasantry.
2] The masses, as another concept as well as the above mentioned are not a melting pot of people. The masses are classes and fractions of classes, sometimes with a pretty diverse interest, that are connected because of their objective reality of being dominated and exploited by capitalism. Only the working class could objectively unite them, under its leadership, in their struggle to resist and eventually rid themselves of capitalism domination and exploitation.
3] the working class, with all its stratification will lead the society in the struggle to defeat capitalism. I felt the importance of pointing that out simply because in the main text by Nando Sims and the following responses the role of classes are not mention. I will argue there can’t be any alternatives to capitalism outside class struggle. There neither will be any communist alternatives outside of the leadership role of the working class. Communism, for me, is not utopian. Communism is the most advance form of proletarian ideology, not some intellectuals’ wishful thinking.
4] Under capitalism, the absolute relative truth of any alternative to capitalism, is the historical role of the proletariat because the proletariat is the class not only facing directly capitalism, but the only class proven to be capable of defeating capitalism and offer a viable alternative to capitalism. Capitalism defeated and conquers feudalism because it created a higher norm of productivity of labor. Capitalism renders society richer. Scientific socialism will defeat capitalism eventually because it[ scientific socialism] will render society more richer than the organized system of capitalism. Even if scientific socialism is/will be far superior that any form of organized economic system, it must be address from the proletarian problematic of class struggle. We need to oppose the political economic line of the proletariat [in charge] to the political economic line of capital. The economic political line of the proletariat, in charge, must be base, not solely, on the development of the productive forces, but determinatively on the radical transformation of the social relationships. The objective of the proletariat is surely not for class equality, for an equitable distribution of wealth, but surely for the abolition of wages, the dissolution of the State Apparatus and a classless society.

Why the working class?

1] In many of my posting, I argue on the role of the proletariat as the only class capable to defeat capitalism. I have argued on the historical limitations of other classes to offer viable alternatives to capitalism. History, in a sense, validated the limitations of other dominated classes to offer viable alternatives to capitalism, but to only prove to us these classes are only limited to offer variant types and forms of capitalism: State Capitalism is one example.
2] Mike said: “But I do disagree that we can just assert inherited Marxist-sounding statements as assumptions, and then build our analyses as logic extensions”
I say: we are still in the period, the stage, of imperialism/capitalism were proletarian revolution is the order of the day. We haven’t reach any new period, any new stage as stated by Maoist. The role of the proletariat is quite well defended by Mao. The universality of proletarian theories, as developed by Marx and others, are and must be a guideline in the struggle, a guide for revolutionary practices apply in the specificity of each social formation. Concrete analysis of a concrete reality. It is not a doctrine, a bible but a partial history, in a constant mode of deepening, of the working class movement and scientific socialism in all its universality and specificity.
3] Capitalist development is based on wage labor [form and conditions]. The process of disappearance of capital will be based on the process of disappearance of wage labor. Only class struggle under the leadership of the working class could guide us in that process.
4] The fundamental characteristic of the Capitalist Mode of Productions are the fundamental factors opposing capital to wage labor in the process of production of Surplus value. The production of surplus value is one factor that differ capitalism to other mode of productions. Surplus value is an organic unit of all forms of exploitation and domination in the capitalist mode of productions. To analyze surplus value is to analyze a determine form of class struggle in the process of productions.
5] I have enumerated imitatively some points validating as to why the working class is the only class capable to defeat capitalism and offer viable radical alternative to the capitalist/imperialist mode of productions. Perhaps, if a debate ensues we may cover more points.

As per the argument, as far as is it the whole working class or fraction of the working class, it is yet to be clarified. The low level of class struggle in the US is no help in helping in the understanding of that objective reality...
The role of the working class is universal to every social formation. It is one of my sharp differences [among many] with Maoism.

Ben writes:

<blockquote>You want to be skeptical? Ok, that’s fine with me. I will not deal with Rome. Maybe it would be better if we focused less on ancient history and more on the world in which we live."</blockquote>

Of course I will be skeptical.

The discussion here has been whether there is a general tendency in class society toward communism.

And it includes a discussion of whether there is a general tendency (at each point) in class society toward "higher" forms.

I think there are contradictions that resolve themselves in the direction of 'higher" forms, and other contraditions that tend toward regression. And that there is no general tendency becasue that requires an assumption of ongoing and inherent increase on the forces of production (which I don't assume is inherent or necessary at all). The forces of production my develop, or they may decline in the future -- it depends on what happens. (Currently they are developing "off the charts" -- while threats of nuclear war, ecological disaster etc. include the potential for reversing that).

But all of this talk of general tendencies does require a sweep of history. You may not want to talk about the past. That is fine. But then just don't make claims or assumptions about the past or the general sweep of history.

Jan wrote:

<blockquote>"2] Mike said: “But I do disagree that we can just assert inherited Marxist-sounding statements as assumptions, and then build our analyses as logic extensions”

I say: we are still in the period, the stage, of imperialism/capitalism were proletarian revolution is the order of the day. We haven’t reach any new period, any new stage as stated by Maoist. The role of the proletariat is quite well defended by Mao. The universality of proletarian theories, as developed by Marx and others, are and must be a guideline in the struggle, a guide for revolutionary practices apply in the specificity of each social formation. Concrete analysis of a concrete reality. It is not a doctrine, a bible but a partial history, in a constant mode of deepening, of the working class movement and scientific socialism in all its universality and specificity."</blockquote>

some points:

Maoists do not, generally, claim that there is a new historical period (distinct from the era of imperialism). Though I suspect we should ask whether monopoly capitalism has gone through new changes, and should be ocnsidered to be in some new "stage."

I am glad to see you saying:

<blockquote>"It is not a doctrine, a bible but a partial history, in a constant mode of deepening, of the working class movement and scientific socialism in all its universality and specificity."</blockquote>

That is a considerable level of agreement on something important.

Part of the challenge is precisely applying our theory -- and sorting out what is universal and what is not.

For example you write:

<blockquote>"The role of the working class is universal to every social formation."</blockquote>

I am curious what that means. Some social formations have very few workers. Is the role of workers the same in those countries -- compared to those where they form a majority (or very large minority)?

Also, we should explore how we are all defining our words (your definition of 'masses" is very different from any I have encountered before).

In the RCP, for example, working class was not the same as the proletariat. The proletariat refered to those lower sections of the working class that "had nothing to lose but their chains" -- while the larger working class in the U.S. is quite highly stratified (in dynamic and changing ways), and does not have (simply or uniformly) the same position or interests.

Often the discussion of "working class" is very abstracted -- so that the class is "leading" or "defeating" or providing ideas, in ways that are divorced from what the actual workers are doing, or leading, or thinking.

In some discussions the words "working class" appear to be simply an ideological marker that means "communist" -- in a way that is a bit odd, since so few workers today are connected to genine communism. (In the U.S., it is odd to talk about proletarian leaderhip by organized groups that have virtually no connection to proletarians. etc.)

Hi Nando and Jan,

---------- (1) ----------

First, I will reply to <b>Nando</b>:

<blockquote>
The discussion here has been whether there is a general tendency in class society toward communism.

And it includes a discussion of whether there is a general tendency (at each point) in class society toward “higher” forms.
</blockquote>

The discussion is more than that, as shown by the title you gave it: "Does Our Optimism Require Belief in Communism’s Inevitability?"

This title, by itself, indicates that the main focus of the thread is our current society. In other words: <b>Is it inevitable that our current society will inevitably be transformed into a classless society?</b> If the thread were focused more on Roman or Mayan society--then this topic would (presumably) have less of an impact on our optimism.

<blockquote>
But all of this talk of general tendencies does require a sweep of history. You may not want to talk about the past. That is fine. But then just don’t make claims or assumptions about the past or the general sweep of history.
</blockquote>

I usually find it useful to talk about the past. The main exception is on threads in which one or more of the main actors is so focused on the past that there is little attention left over for the present and the future. We struggle to understand the world for the purpose of changing it. <b>This requires a focus on the present and future.</b> We study the past to inform our understanding of the present and future.

I did attempt to give perspective by using the analogy of salmon. Someone might say that the tendency of a salmon hatchling is to (1) grow to become an adult salmon. Someone else might say that the tendency of a hatchling is to (2) be eaten while it is still young and small. From a statistical point of view, it is the second view which is overwhelmingly likely. Yet we understand (most of us, anyway) that it is the first view that (in spite of its statistical unlikelihood) best expresses the tendency of a salmon hatchling as the result of the development and interplay of its internal contradictions.

I laid out what I consider to be a scientific argument for why our society will inevitably be transformed into a classless society. There were basically two parts to my argument:

(1) Modern society is, over the long run, moving in the direction of a higher productivity of labor and

(2) The capitalist mode of production contains a <b>fundamental limit</b> in the growth of the productivity of labor because it <b>restricts the flow of information</b> (ie: essentially, conscious human energy) necessary for the most rapid improvement of the production process.

My second point is not really new in content but is (I believe) new <b>in the way</b> it expresses this fundamental limit of the capitalist mode of production: as a restriction on the flow of information.

I had somewhat hoped that you would comment on the second point (ie: the part that was new--at least in the form of its expression--certainly something not expressed in that form by the Comintern). Instead you seem to be stuck at the first point (ie: the part that no one, from any political trend, disputes). You do not deny or attempt to refute that modern society in characterized by a general trend toward the ever-increasing productivity of labor. Rather, you appear to argue that this is somehow irrelevant (ie: because all this productivity could be reversed by nuclear war or ecological crisis).

But to argue like this (it seems clear to me) is to insist on moving the thread in an unproductive direction. What activists today need, more than anything else, is to better understand the development of society as it will be under more "normal", simple and preferable circumstances (ie: without a major nuclear war, etc). We can deepen our understanding of extreme circumstances <b>later</b>--after we <b>first</b> better understand more normal development. It is the Avakian method to <b>paralyze thought</b> by raising the spectre of supposedly looming catastrophe. We can do better than that.

Put simply: I believe we must focus first on what we need to do if a nuclear war does <b>not</b> wipe out human civilization.

Nando, it appears to me that this thread has reached the limits of its usefulness. If you are invested in <b>not</b> understanding something (I do not mean to be pejorative but neither will I hide my assessment) there is little point in attempting to develop the discussion with you at this time. Maybe this can be pursued in the future. Things happen at their own pace.

---------- (2) ----------

Finally, I would like to thank <b>Jan Makandal</b> for his comments. Since so much, at this time, is "up in the air" it is useful to have someone lay out <b>basic principles</b> (I have added boldface because I am thrilled to see these principles highlighted):

<blockquote>
Capitalism defeated and conquers feudalism because it created a higher norm of <b>productivity of labor</b>. Capitalism renders society richer. Scientific socialism will defeat capitalism eventually because it [scientific socialism] will render society more richer than the organized system of capitalism.
</blockquote>

and also this:

<blockquote>
I will argue there can’t be any alternatives to capitalism outside <b>class struggle</b>. There neither will be any communist alternatives outside of <b>the leadership role of the working class</b>.
</blockquote>

These things are so basic to scientific views of the revolutionary process that I sometimes (incorrectly) assume that they are widely known in a forum such as this. But my experience is going in the other direction: <b>these basic principles must be fought for and must be repeated</b>.

I have argued along similar lines as Jan (in the Kasama "threads" forum) and, for my efforts, have been told that my horizon is (supposedly) limited by <b>"narrow workerism"</b>.

Jan, if you have time I very much appreciate your considered comments on this thread (still unfinished as I have yet to reply to Chegitz):

<b>Criticism of Kasama 's social-democratic mission statement

The Kasama group appears to have eliminated
the class struggle and class politics from
its mission statement in a bid to be "respectable"
and acceptable to a strata of social-democratic activists</b>

(http, etc) z11.invisionfree.com/Kasama_Threads/index.php?showtopic=1011

Ben Seattle
(http, etc) struggle.net/ben/

Nando,
For me:
A] the concept of the working class is the same as the proletariat. It is simply defining a social class, a social agent in relation to production.

B] words are concepts that have theoretical values and also are in a constant mode of deepening [consolidating and rectifying] from a proletarian problematic. The RCP conceptual definition of the masses is quite populist. I argue and insist, the masses and to some extent the people’s camp are classes and fractions of classes that have a common interest against the dominant classes, in particular capitalism. In fact, during the Chinese revolutions on class analysis of the Chinese social formation, the National Bourgeoisie was considered temporarily as part of the people’s camp but not part of the fundamental masses. One of the important contributions of Mao is to identify the fundamental popular classes. These are fundamental allies in the struggle against capital. The working class, some fractions of the peasantry such as poor peasants, landless peasants, dispossessed peasants, the lower strata of the petit bourgeoisie are fundamental allies in the struggle against capital, but also are fundamental allies in the struggle to build socialism from the political line of New Democracy a sharp demarcation from the revisionist line of the two stages.

C] Any definition of the popular masses, the people’s camps negating the leadership role of the proletariat is also populism. In one in my posting on China and Vietnam, not diminishing these experiences, I have argued a populist line dominantly guided both experiences.

D] the role of the working class/ the proletariat is not quantitative but qualitative. In fact, in the history of class struggle, no social classes have had[yet] the privilege to lead from a majority position. Te feudal class was a minority, the capitalist class is a minority, and the hegemonic class in the capitalist power block is also a minority. Mao correctly addresses this point in theory. He defines the peasantry as the principal force [quantitative] in China and the working class as the leadership role [qualitative]. The class alliance, which resulted to the independence of Haiti, was an alliance of the slaves [the principal force] and free slaves as the leadership force and the free slaves were a minority. In all types and forms of capitalist society, the problematic of proletarian revolution, under the leadership, of the working class, must be the order of the day.

F] Working class is not an ideological marker for communism. This argument will be populist and ideological marker for workerism. In order for the working to emancipate, the appropriation of his theory, from a fusion process needs to be achieved. There can’t be emancipation without appropriation. We need to construct the practical conditions allowing us to have the fusion of revolutionary theory with the working class movement...

Nice said Nando, both original essay and your followup comments.

If victory is not inevitable, this means it's up to all of us, which is kind of scary.

The fallacy of historical directionality is a really important point, I think. In some anarchist thought, you see that sort of fallacy in pining for the 'primitive' imagined hunter-gatherers, as if current indigenous people (or Western imagination of them) represent pre-historic people somehow time-travelled here. I appreciate your comment about how any culture in the 21st century has exactly the same amount of history as the rest of us, they are not time-travellers. (In the case of one particular mythologized contemporary-ish hunter-gatherer culture, there is a compelling argument that that very culture were pastoralists 200 years ago, and _changed_ to largely hunter-gatherers due to causes related to ecology, colonial globalization, and others).

Our future is unwritten and has no inevitability about it. Which is not to say that we are not constrained by material conditions. What exists now (and what path got us here) determines what happens next to some extent -- but if it determines it absolutely, it is not in our current power to predict what that absolute is. We've got to judge the lay of the land, and figure out the best way to move where we want to go, not where we are pre-ordained to go.

I'd add, there's a question not yet answered in the essay or it's discussion:

Okay, so where DO 'we' get our optimism from? Is there cause for optimism, and if so what is it? Or is it the right question to ask about 'optimism' in some grand sense; no doubt there are causes for both optimism and pessimism at any given time, including now. Some times may have fewer causes of optimism than others.

I guess when some people ask this question, they mean: If it's not inevitable, then what makes us even think we can possibly win? Either inevitability or existential pessimism, I guess.

I don't know the answers to these questions.

Is there anyone in this discussion who would suggest that the fundamental contradiction of the capitalist era has been resolved? Has been mitigated in any way, shape or form? Has been falsified as a scientific precept of communist theory? I say it is, in fact, ubiquitous. It is cooking. It is intensifying. The irrationality, criminality, bankruptcy, and insanity of "private appropriation" is howling at us, every minute of every day throughout the world, manifesting in ever more grotesque ways, some of which are indicative of deep structural fissures.

And, this is even more stark when posed in sharp relief against vast, socialized means and forces at hand in the world today, which offer up for humanity, more than ever before, perhaps unprecedented opportunities to make great strides toward putting an end to the epoch of class society, toward ultimately breaking all chains and constraints on humanity (in the most sweeping sense).

And, the most crucial element of these vast forces, the international proletariat, the only class that can be the backbone of the struggle to take humanity to a whole different world, is objectively in a far greater strategic position (materially) to make significant strides toward that future.

The above is a shorthand sketch of the "anarchy/organization" manifestation of the fundamental contradiction. Below is, to the best of my understanding, a sketch of the "class struggle" manifestation of the fundamental contradiction:

In a very real way, the first round of the communist revolution represented the first steps toward resolving the fundamental contradiction. The process of transforming the means of production into the common property of an increasingly conscious collectivity of human beings was begun in earnest. It emerged through earth shaking revolutions and carved out significant territory for something entirely different. Great transformations were made toward that end. Even though defeated by counterrevolution (in Paris, the Soviet Union, China), and even with some serious problems in how these harbingers of the future were led, this fact cannot be denied. At the same time, the "death of communism" onslaught of "triumphal capitalism" over the past two decades has led to widespread and serious lowering of sights, pessimism, and abandonment, with notable exceptions.

There is an urgent need, here and now, for communists to put the resolution of this contradiction
into the hands of all who must be called on to take part in resolving it. Put it in their hands, front and center, hold forth with the liberating vision of what this revolution can bring into being, and what it will finally bury, and in so doing, kick open the door to the revolutions that call out to be made, in the service of and in the course, of remaking the world.

The responsibility of realizing the process of the proletariat becoming the class conscious leader of human emancipation rests squarely on the shoulders of its communist vanguards across the planet. This is a profoundly international and internationalist calling. Communism should be made the common cause for humanity broadly. People are lifting their heads to seek fundamental answers.

This is, absolutely, in no way a simple matter (although resolving the fundamental contradiction is a relatively simple concept). It is not inevitable: capitalism has not only proven to be stronger and more resilient than any of the leading communist theoreticians could foresee, it has, at this stage of things, shown that it can potentially bring lasting, catastrophic devastation to the planet, and the current, deadly trajectory of global warming is an alarming illustration of that.

"Once the inner connection is grasped, all theoretical belief in the permanent necessity of existing conditions breaks down before their collapse in practice." (Marx)

This is, roughly, and in simple terms, where optimism lies. The hope that as communist theory is grasped by the masses, it becomes a material force to change the world. Let's get digging.

The post-modern critique os Marxism as a western 'meta narrative' that somehow hovers above the ground imposing itself on hapless individuals around the world (who apparently are too witless to see it for the 'euro meta narrative' that the post-moderns warn us about) is the bitter fruit of the mechanical materialism of revisionism and the comintern, it seems to me.

but none the less, that's no reason to toss out dialectics.

the history of life certainly DOES indicate a trend toward complexity, but perhaps not in the way its been described here.

Yes, this is a 'bacterial planet' but not the same bacterial planet at the point of 4 billion years ago, a much more complex - ecologically and phylogenetically one. Multicellular organisms are more complex than unicellular organisms. colonies are more complex than a stew of loosely assembling molecules.

Human societies have trended to become more complex over time, first numerically and then structurally. That is how we have developed our facility for symbolization, higher cognitive abilities, various social practices. I don't see why one would argue that point and continue to type on a computer.

There are of course various limits and tipping points and countervailing forces, internal and external; dialectical relationships that are to be considered. As M&amp;E noted in their manifesto, for example, mutual ruin is also an option in class struggle.

The fact that globally the totality of human society is not one whole but a diversity of types is not an argument against complexity. Actually it rather indicates that complexity (of types).

The argument here ought to examine the relationship of consciousness and social practice -- to paraphrase Gordon Childe (who was not all bad), 'humanity makes itself'.

Eddy Laing says:
"The post-modern critique os Marxism as a western ‘meta narrative’ that somehow hovers above the ground imposing itself on hapless individuals around the world (who apparently are too witless to see it for the ‘euro meta narrative’ that the post-moderns warn us about) is the bitter fruit of the mechanical materialism of revisionism and the comintern, it seems to me."

It is also a fruit of, and a response to, other important factors: the restoration of capitalism in the SU in the mid-fifties; the loss of China to a revisionist coup in 1976. Bottom line, there are no countries in the world today that stand as the beacons, inspirations, bastions, alternatives that these countries once were. This has been absent from the reality of planet Earth for nearly 34 years!

The Soviet Union was a social-imperialist country for some 45 years before its collapse. This created great difficulties for the cause of communism, not to mention Stalin's very harmful methods and approaches, even when it was socialist. It was such a liberating thing when Mao rescued communism with his greatest of contributions, and fresh new life was given to this cause internationally. Revolutionary China was a profound answer and had great influence. This is just by way of saying that state power, as humanity has been witness to, can be a huge global influence on hopes, optimism and a grasp of possibilities. It can be a formidable material force. And the fact that we had it, and lost it, has been a major factor in the calling into question of communism as a viable possibility by such trends as "post modernism".

In addition, on the heels of the collapse of the SU (again, it was a social-imperialist country for decades until then), a daunting ideological offensive proclaiming the "death of communism" and the "triumph of capitalism" was waged. This narrative rained down relentlessly from many powerful quarters and reaches, and has continued to dog humanity for twenty years. It is now the conventional wisdom, the accepted summation generally speaking, with notable exceptions. "Post modernism" is a fruit of, and a response to, this as well.

Another fruit of all this has been a trend toward revisionism, vanguards and leaders capitulating to the siren song of "bourgeois democracy", a lowering of sights, abandoning of dialectical materialism, and the gravitating toward eclecticism, agnosticism and relativism (have I left anything out?), with notable exceptions.

Meanwhile, our "little friend", the fundamental contradiction, goes on about its insidious business, extending its "dementor's clutch" everywhere in the world, through globalization, technology, taking on new forms, routing everything in its grasp into the circuits of capital accumulation. Its blind, life-devouring dynamic is relentless. It is a busy monster which is now threatening global devastation. Yet, through the workings of this very dynamic, the basis, the real possibility for its own destruction gets conjured up. "Imperialism is doomed because it always does evil things". (Mao) This is not inevitable (as Mao's statement might be simplistically interpreted), but it does speak to a fundamental truth. The international proletariat-as-gravedigger is a fundamental truth as well. But, can't be done without making this the common cause for the overwhelming mass of humanity. Obviously, this too is an ultimate assessment, and can't be done other than through many twists, turns, advances, setbacks, etc.

In the present worldwide milieu, there is a great need to advance as far as possible toward the resolution of the fundamental contradiction.

The responsibility for realizing this crying need rests squarely on the shoulders of the communist vanguards. Reinvisioning is imperative. But this can only be a genuine and true reinvisioning if based on synthesis.

It is a very difficult challenge, but the material basis is there, without a doubt. The question is can the vanguards and their leaders fill the great needs?

"the history of life certainly DOES indicate a trend toward complexity,"

I have to agree with Eddy here.

My particular take on this is informed by Stephen Jay Gould who cautioned against conflating complexity with "progress" or assuming that things with greater complexity had greater intrinsic value than things with less complexity.

Weird, I don't read Gould as allowing for any 'trend' toward complexity (either inevitable, or even contingently historic, on the whole). My reading of him is the reverse, cautioning that there is indeed no inevitability or directionality to 'complexity'. Any complexity that exists is purely accidental and contingent, and on the whole more of the biomass of earth has NOT moved toward complexity than has. In fact, I read Nando's standpoint as coming right out of Gould.

<blockquote>
Relative to the conventional view of life's history as an at least broadly predictable process of gradually advancing complexity through time, three features of the paleontological record stand out in opposition and shall therefore serve as organizing themes for the rest of this article....

...Moreover, we do not know why most of the early experiments died, while a few survived to become our modern phyla. It is tempting to say that the victors won by virtue of greater anatomical complexity, better ecological fit or some other predictable feature of conventional Darwinian struggle. But no recognized traits unite the victors, and the radical alternative must be entertained that each early experiment received little more than the equivalent of a ticket in the largest lottery ever played out on our planet - and that each surviving lineage, including our own phylum of vertebrates, inhabits the earth today more by the luck of the draw than by any predictable struggle for existence. The history of multicellular animal life may be more a story of great reduction in initial possibilities, with stabilization of lucky survivors, than a conventional tale of steady ecological expansion and morphological progress in complexity. ...

...One might grant that complexification for life as a whole represents a pseudo-trend based on constraint at the left wall but still hold that evolution within particular groups differentially favors complexity when the founding lineage begins far enough from the left wall to permit movement in both directions. Empirical tests of this interesting hypothesis are just beginning (as concern for the subject mounts among paleontologists), and we do not yet have enough cases to advance a generality. But the first two studies - by Daniel W. McShea of the University of Michigan on mammalian vertebrae and by George F. Boyajian of the University of Pennsylvania on ammonite suture lines - show no evolutionary tendencies to favor increased complexity. ....

</blockquote>

http://brembs.net/gould.html



Of course, I think the temptation also has to be resisted to think that, as biological selecton and speciation goes, so much social organization. They're really different things. Even if there was a trend trend of biological speciation toward complexity (which the evidence does not show), it would not mean that social life must follow the same pattern. So I guess just because the biological record doesn't, it may still be that social organization still does.

However, as Nando points out, the social history provides barely more evidence for this than the biological history. What we've got is what has _happened_, it is true, but it was not inevitable, and neither will be whatever happens next.

<BLOCKQUOTE>
Even if there was a trend trend of biological speciation toward complexity (which the evidence does not show), it would not mean that social life must follow the same pattern.
</BLOCKQUOTE>

Even a quick glance at a cladistic sketch of current domains and phyla would indicate a complexity that has emerged over time. I think you are confusing the question of whether the current schema is a <I>necessary outcome</I> of the initial beginnings -- which is to say that, for example, lions, tigers and humans must or must not descend from the first nucleic bacteria -- with whether the current phylogenetic array is complex or not. It clearly is.

Even among bacteria there is more diversity now than existed two weeks ago, let along 2,000,000,000 years ago.

Human social life, which is contingent upon biology but not completely dependent upon it, is also complex. And over time, every society generally trends toward a greater degree of complexity. Why? Because we develop new social practices, we acquire new understanding, our cohorts grow numerically, etc.

There is no stasis in human cultures, that's one reason we are so interesting to talk to...